1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:16,240 You've described WikiLeaks as untraceable and uncensurable. 2 00:00:16,240 --> 00:00:18,040 What do you mean by that? 3 00:00:18,040 --> 00:00:23,640 Well, nothing in this world is guaranteed for sure. 4 00:00:23,640 --> 00:00:29,760 But within that we have put together an infrastructure using technical and legal techniques 5 00:00:29,760 --> 00:00:35,660 to really make it hard to trace people and make it hard to take down our material 6 00:00:35,660 --> 00:00:37,280 once it's published. 7 00:00:37,280 --> 00:00:41,640 And today we've had 100% success rate. 8 00:00:41,640 --> 00:00:49,440 So that basic idea and intention is comprised of a number of specific ways of doing things. 9 00:00:49,440 --> 00:00:56,880 So for untraceability this means people send us material in the post in a particular way, 10 00:00:56,880 --> 00:01:01,920 engaging in particular procedures which makes it effectively impossible to trace. 11 00:01:01,920 --> 00:01:10,400 Or it means they submit material to us online and bounce the information through dozens 12 00:01:10,400 --> 00:01:15,600 of computers around the world, each computer encrypting its transmissions before it connects 13 00:01:15,600 --> 00:01:17,160 to another computer. 14 00:01:17,160 --> 00:01:23,920 So in this way, discarding identities as the information flows around the world. 15 00:01:23,920 --> 00:01:31,160 As it flows through different countries, we make sure it flows through Sweden and Belgium. 16 00:01:31,160 --> 00:01:36,760 And these two countries have specific source protection laws in Sweden as part of the Swedish 17 00:01:36,760 --> 00:01:39,000 Constitution to press freedom act. 18 00:01:39,000 --> 00:01:44,440 And in Belgium a specific law dealing with the communications protections between a source 19 00:01:44,440 --> 00:01:50,400 and a journalist using any means whatsoever including electronic transmissions. 20 00:01:50,400 --> 00:01:57,400 For publication this means housing our servers in many different jurisdictions such that any sort 21 00:01:57,400 --> 00:02:03,720 of interim attack on us, interim injunction is not going to take the information down entirely. 22 00:02:03,720 --> 00:02:07,520 It may not get out here, it may not get out there. 23 00:02:07,520 --> 00:02:14,720 But we can put up servers and gain support and respond legally fast enough such that the information 24 00:02:14,720 --> 00:02:17,680 is not going to be removed from the public. 25 00:02:17,680 --> 00:02:20,080 And that has been what has happened today. 26 00:02:20,120 --> 00:02:24,120 We've never lost the court case in any jurisdiction. 27 00:02:24,120 --> 00:02:29,880 Important thing to remember, but they have been interim attempts to injunct us. 28 00:02:29,880 --> 00:02:35,520 And while those interim attempts have gone on, we have managed to keep publishing. 29 00:02:35,520 --> 00:02:43,800 How many documents of real value have you been able to accept and publish? 30 00:02:44,120 --> 00:02:53,240 Well it's hard to know how many real value in the eyes of the holder to us all information 31 00:02:53,240 --> 00:02:57,880 that is true has value eventually. 32 00:02:57,880 --> 00:03:03,760 It may not only be a very small value to someone somewhere, but getting that information 33 00:03:03,760 --> 00:03:09,040 into the historical record, patting out the historical record, provides a sort of richness 34 00:03:09,040 --> 00:03:13,520 to every other bit of information is the record. 35 00:03:13,520 --> 00:03:20,800 So if you're talking about things which have clearly changed our comes elections or clearly 36 00:03:20,800 --> 00:03:29,800 introduce some law reform or clearly bought perpetrators to trial, then this is in hundreds, 37 00:03:29,800 --> 00:03:31,960 some are in the hundreds. 38 00:03:32,000 --> 00:03:39,160 Well the clearly changing governments or elections or heading ministers to pose this is maybe half 39 00:03:39,160 --> 00:03:43,680 a dozen to ten something like that. 40 00:03:43,680 --> 00:03:47,680 That's the power of information that's an all-true is not. 41 00:03:47,680 --> 00:03:55,720 And this is such a modern, ultramotten form of getting it out. 42 00:03:55,720 --> 00:04:02,520 It must frighten a lot of establishments and authority and especially governments. 43 00:04:02,520 --> 00:04:07,320 What governments have been successful in blocking it? 44 00:04:07,320 --> 00:04:09,560 In blocking WikiLeaks. 45 00:04:09,560 --> 00:04:16,640 The governments that have clearly tried to interfere with reusability to look at what we publish 46 00:04:16,640 --> 00:04:21,840 and weakers ability to give it stuff. 47 00:04:21,840 --> 00:04:23,600 China is the worst event. 48 00:04:23,640 --> 00:04:30,400 China has the most aggressive sophisticated interception technology that places itself in between 49 00:04:30,400 --> 00:04:35,560 every reader inside China and every information source outside China. 50 00:04:35,560 --> 00:04:41,680 And we've been fighting a running battle to make sure information can get through. 51 00:04:41,680 --> 00:04:44,760 So there's also a ways that China's readers can read outside. 52 00:04:44,760 --> 00:04:48,160 But the first thing that they try doesn't work. 53 00:04:48,160 --> 00:04:53,960 The first thing you would imagine doing just go to WikiLeaks.org that doesn't work. 54 00:04:53,960 --> 00:04:57,640 But variations on that do work. 55 00:04:57,640 --> 00:05:03,040 Iran has blocked us as well for a period. 56 00:05:03,040 --> 00:05:08,120 Have a renau unblocked in Iran. 57 00:05:08,120 --> 00:05:16,360 The Australian government has added us to the list of secret internet sites that are to be 58 00:05:16,360 --> 00:05:18,120 blocked. 59 00:05:18,120 --> 00:05:23,240 Once a national sort of filtering system is put into place, that national filtering system 60 00:05:23,240 --> 00:05:24,920 has not yet been put into place. 61 00:05:24,920 --> 00:05:28,360 But if it is, we'll be on the list. 62 00:05:28,360 --> 00:05:30,480 That's the only Western government, does it? 63 00:05:30,480 --> 00:05:32,120 There's also Germany. 64 00:05:32,120 --> 00:05:35,200 It has done a similar thing to Australia. 65 00:05:35,200 --> 00:05:39,240 In a similar position where they're trying to get up the national sensor system, it looks 66 00:05:39,240 --> 00:05:41,160 like it's not going to pass constitution. 67 00:05:41,160 --> 00:05:43,120 It looks like it won't get up. 68 00:05:43,120 --> 00:05:47,760 But something important to understand is what happens in the West is privatized 69 00:05:47,760 --> 00:06:04,640 and that means big corporations go through the court system to get injunctions and use the 70 00:06:04,640 --> 00:06:06,320 coercive power of the state. 71 00:06:06,320 --> 00:06:10,680 The ability to deploy unpolice to force the court order. 72 00:06:10,680 --> 00:06:13,760 They use the court apparatus to do that. 73 00:06:13,760 --> 00:06:17,760 The other way is the way it's going to be. 74 00:06:17,760 --> 00:06:19,080 It pushes and so on. 75 00:06:19,080 --> 00:06:26,440 But to give a specific example, a private bank, deals with wealthy private clients, minimum 76 00:06:26,440 --> 00:06:28,760 account balance of 1 million bucks. 77 00:06:28,760 --> 00:06:33,360 Hides their assets around the world to make sure credit is, ex-wives, police, tax 78 00:06:33,360 --> 00:06:36,000 departments, so I can't get them. 79 00:06:36,000 --> 00:06:40,880 We revealed the trust structures in the Cayman Islands, the beneficiaries who set up the trust 80 00:06:40,880 --> 00:06:43,600 and how much money was in it and so on. 81 00:06:43,600 --> 00:06:48,640 They attacked us in the United States in the courts. 82 00:06:48,640 --> 00:06:56,200 So it's a Swiss Cayman operation using US Federal Law to try and attack us. 83 00:06:56,200 --> 00:07:05,440 They attacked the main registration URL that people familiar with, WikiLeaks.org, because 84 00:07:05,440 --> 00:07:10,640 one of the companies involved in registering that was based in California. 85 00:07:10,640 --> 00:07:15,600 And through the interim injunction, they did take that down for 10 days. 86 00:07:15,600 --> 00:07:19,640 Now, of course, we were still publishing on all our other URL, still publishing successfully 87 00:07:19,640 --> 00:07:20,640 out of Sweden. 88 00:07:20,640 --> 00:07:25,760 But the thing that people were most familiar with was no longer available. 89 00:07:25,760 --> 00:07:32,960 And we then responded with a coalition of 20 lawyers and managed to turn that around. 90 00:07:32,960 --> 00:07:36,200 So quite an interesting result. 91 00:07:36,200 --> 00:07:40,320 It's not that the US justice system brings justice. 92 00:07:40,320 --> 00:07:45,440 It's not that the US justice system is always unjust. 93 00:07:45,440 --> 00:07:49,280 But you have to bring justice to the US justice system. 94 00:07:49,280 --> 00:07:55,560 And if you have a big enough coalition with enough money, you can force a good verdict out 95 00:07:55,560 --> 00:07:56,560 of it. 96 00:07:56,560 --> 00:08:02,880 But the initial verdict by the same judge was that we were to be shut down. 97 00:08:02,960 --> 00:08:08,480 This interesting you mentioned just as there, because I was going to ask you where the 98 00:08:08,480 --> 00:08:10,200 idea of WikiLeaks came from. 99 00:08:10,200 --> 00:08:19,040 But I mean, having the sense I get from you is that you've been using the technology 100 00:08:19,040 --> 00:08:26,800 to mine this information, especially within authority for quite a long time. 101 00:08:26,880 --> 00:08:31,240 But there's really something, there's another element to it. 102 00:08:31,240 --> 00:08:35,440 There is an element of justice seeking about WikiLeaks. 103 00:08:35,440 --> 00:08:39,280 It seems to me almost a moral element. 104 00:08:39,280 --> 00:08:40,280 That's a lot. 105 00:08:40,280 --> 00:08:42,720 I won't go as far as saying as a crusade. 106 00:08:42,720 --> 00:08:46,080 But there is a passion about it. 107 00:08:46,080 --> 00:08:50,680 That's not just simply transparency. 108 00:08:50,680 --> 00:08:52,520 There's something else. 109 00:08:52,520 --> 00:08:55,920 No, the goal is just as the method is transparency. 110 00:08:55,960 --> 00:08:59,840 It's important not to confuse the goal and the method. 111 00:08:59,840 --> 00:09:06,560 So what I observed by looking at how the press worked and how successful activists 112 00:09:06,560 --> 00:09:14,720 can pains work is a very cheap and effective way of getting justice, was finding information 113 00:09:14,720 --> 00:09:19,640 that people were spending effort on concealing and revealing it. 114 00:09:19,640 --> 00:09:21,840 Why do people spend effort on things? 115 00:09:21,840 --> 00:09:24,640 Or because they believe it's going to benefit them. 116 00:09:24,640 --> 00:09:31,440 So when organisations spend effort to conceal something, they are making a statement. 117 00:09:31,440 --> 00:09:36,400 They're giving off an economic signal that if that information is revealed, it's going 118 00:09:36,400 --> 00:09:38,800 to have an effect. 119 00:09:38,800 --> 00:09:41,040 Otherwise why would you spend the work? 120 00:09:41,040 --> 00:09:48,640 So in many of those cases, the effect that it will have is a push to reform the organisation 121 00:09:48,640 --> 00:09:54,200 that is concealing some kind of abuse or some plan for some future abuse. 122 00:09:54,200 --> 00:09:59,400 And so they're both selectively going after that information as opposed to all the other 123 00:09:59,400 --> 00:10:03,040 sorts of information out there which they're a vast amount. 124 00:10:03,040 --> 00:10:07,240 We are able to selectively bring about just change. 125 00:10:07,240 --> 00:10:19,000 The arrival of WikiLeaks coincides with a whole almost a sense of permanent war. 126 00:10:19,000 --> 00:10:26,240 The term permanent war, perpetual war, is constantly used in the United States. 127 00:10:26,240 --> 00:10:34,240 We have two wars running together and others and other secret wars. 128 00:10:34,240 --> 00:10:43,320 In the information that you have revealed on WikiLeaks about these so-called endless wars, 129 00:10:43,560 --> 00:10:51,640 what has been the real high value of material that has given people, ordinary people, 130 00:10:51,640 --> 00:10:55,800 if you like, the kind of information upon which they can then act. 131 00:10:55,800 --> 00:11:05,240 Looking at the enormous quantity and diversity of these military intelligence apparatus 132 00:11:05,240 --> 00:11:11,760 inside the documents, what I see is a vast sprawling estate. 133 00:11:11,840 --> 00:11:19,800 The, what we would traditionally call the military intelligence complex or military industrial complex. 134 00:11:19,800 --> 00:11:28,480 And that this sprawling industrial estate is growing becoming more, 135 00:11:28,480 --> 00:11:31,520 more secretive becoming more, more uncontrolled. 136 00:11:31,520 --> 00:11:38,200 This is not as sophisticated conspiracy controls the top. 137 00:11:38,280 --> 00:11:42,280 This is a vast movement of self-interest. 138 00:11:42,280 --> 00:11:50,440 Thousands and thousands of players all working together and against each other to produce an end result, 139 00:11:50,440 --> 00:11:56,360 which is a rock and Afghanistan, and come on here and keep that going. 140 00:11:56,360 --> 00:12:08,120 So what I see is, we often deal with tax havens and people hiding us and transferring money 141 00:12:08,520 --> 00:12:13,320 as we're offshore tax havens. So I see some really quite remarkable similarities. 142 00:12:15,960 --> 00:12:24,040 Guantanamo is used for laundering people to an offshore haven, 143 00:12:24,040 --> 00:12:27,400 which doesn't follow the rule of law that we would normally expect. 144 00:12:28,520 --> 00:12:33,800 Tax haven is used for hiding people's assets, laundering people's assets through 145 00:12:34,280 --> 00:12:39,720 the jurisdiction which doesn't follow the rule of law that we would expect in our home countries. 146 00:12:40,680 --> 00:12:45,800 Similarly, a rock and Afghanistan, a ankle ambia, 147 00:12:45,800 --> 00:12:52,840 a used to wash money out of the US tax base and back arms companies, arms companies, yeah. 148 00:12:54,040 --> 00:12:59,160 And the general's and so on, which if you like non-profit versions. 149 00:12:59,720 --> 00:13:08,920 So that you can't just, or you can't always pull out two billion bucks from the US tax base and just say, 150 00:13:09,480 --> 00:13:15,880 hey, let's give it to the arms company straight away with no expectation of doing any work. 151 00:13:15,880 --> 00:13:22,040 But if you say this two billion dollars has got to go into Colombia, 152 00:13:23,000 --> 00:13:32,440 but the Colombian government has to buy US arms and those arms has to be of a particular type, 153 00:13:32,440 --> 00:13:36,200 particular specification that only one of these arms companies has, 154 00:13:37,720 --> 00:13:40,840 then that's just the way of laundering this back into United States. 155 00:13:40,840 --> 00:13:50,200 What you're saying is that money and money making is at the center of modern war and it's almost 156 00:13:50,280 --> 00:13:54,440 self-papetuating. Yes, and it's becoming worse. 157 00:13:56,040 --> 00:14:01,320 The number of private companies that sprung up around the rock, the number of private companies 158 00:14:01,320 --> 00:14:07,960 in our supporting the National Security Agency, this has increased a hundred times in the past ten years. 159 00:14:07,960 --> 00:14:15,560 The number of companies. So now you have a school of feeding school that is feeding off the US tax base 160 00:14:16,200 --> 00:14:25,320 and is a lobby to make sure that those wars go on. You have two sorts of lobbies. 161 00:14:25,320 --> 00:14:31,720 They have offences lobbies and defensive lobbies. So an offence of lobby tries to get new money 162 00:14:31,720 --> 00:14:38,600 that it didn't have before, by lobbying to leave the government. And a defensive lobby make sure 163 00:14:39,160 --> 00:14:43,960 that companies continue to receive the money that they've been getting before. 164 00:14:44,280 --> 00:14:50,760 So now we're in a position in the United States where we have both enormous offensive lobbies 165 00:14:50,760 --> 00:14:55,000 and enormous defensive lobbies. For the defensive lobbies always fight harder. 166 00:14:56,600 --> 00:15:04,600 They fight to keep the expectation of the money for going. And that apparatus has been 167 00:15:04,600 --> 00:15:11,960 built up in the past ten years. I think it's going to be extremely difficult to dismantle. 168 00:15:14,680 --> 00:15:25,480 What was your reaction when you first saw the Apache video that is now infamous? 169 00:15:27,880 --> 00:15:34,760 When I first saw this, we didn't know that there was a general cent. We didn't know who they were, 170 00:15:34,760 --> 00:15:41,400 we didn't know the circumstances. We knew this was a tape of a helicopter attack and otherwise nothing. 171 00:15:42,360 --> 00:15:51,800 So I could immediately see that this was a risk for attack on people walking in the street in a relaxed manner. 172 00:15:55,160 --> 00:16:00,200 But I didn't know where they are and where they really are. The bad guys, they seemed 173 00:16:00,200 --> 00:16:08,200 incredibly relaxed. It seemed like this was an attack that was very provocative. 174 00:16:09,000 --> 00:16:19,800 So if these people were insurgents, then they were insurgents on having a break playing on the street in a suburb. 175 00:16:21,240 --> 00:16:28,200 But as we dug deeper and deeper, the situation became more and more appalling. 176 00:16:28,200 --> 00:16:34,840 So we found that clearly, nearly all of these people were not armed. 177 00:16:35,960 --> 00:16:40,280 Clearly, there were two cameramen, they're holding cameras, not arms. 178 00:16:41,720 --> 00:16:44,600 These cameramen turned out to be warriors' news reporters. 179 00:16:46,040 --> 00:16:49,240 Then looking at this wounded man crawling on the curb, 180 00:16:50,920 --> 00:16:55,160 we could spending more time in the detail. It was clear that there was no arms being picked up. 181 00:16:55,160 --> 00:16:58,440 That he was just been rescued by a passerby. 182 00:16:58,440 --> 00:17:02,520 Could you hear the voices? Could you hear the voices from the helicopter at this point? 183 00:17:02,920 --> 00:17:09,080 Yeah, we could hear the voices from the helicopter and, you know, sort of the grotesque language that 184 00:17:10,120 --> 00:17:18,120 soldiers have. What really struck me was not this very dark grotesque humor. 185 00:17:18,440 --> 00:17:20,680 I can accept that. 186 00:17:21,880 --> 00:17:26,360 People exercise black humor very black humor sometimes in war. 187 00:17:27,480 --> 00:17:30,600 Rather, it was the another day at the office. 188 00:17:32,520 --> 00:17:41,240 Feel to all the proceedings. How routine it was to kill these 18 to 26 people. 189 00:17:42,120 --> 00:17:50,120 And that a whole street covered with bodies, the reaction to that, was nice. 190 00:17:52,200 --> 00:17:57,160 This tape from me and the other people involved made nice and dirty word. 191 00:17:58,440 --> 00:18:07,160 So we just couldn't see something has been nice anymore when a whole street covered with carnage is nice. 192 00:18:11,560 --> 00:18:22,680 The reaction, let me ask you, what did you make of the reaction to it in the media? 193 00:18:22,680 --> 00:18:27,320 The mainstream media reaction to the release of this video. 194 00:18:28,040 --> 00:18:32,760 We have been involved in obviously many different stories that have produced 195 00:18:33,480 --> 00:18:35,960 fall out in the United States in the countries. 196 00:18:36,920 --> 00:18:42,600 But this one was over degree and of a specific issue. 197 00:18:42,600 --> 00:18:48,040 The real able to sort of plot how all this unfold and blew out and what the 198 00:18:48,040 --> 00:18:53,720 back reaction was. So initially, on the TV networks, 199 00:18:54,600 --> 00:18:58,520 there was an attempt to immediately downplay this. 200 00:18:59,240 --> 00:19:04,360 So for example, CNN, we'll split so, I mean, they only showed. 201 00:19:05,080 --> 00:19:10,600 They took the first segment, which is not the most appalling on the first attack. 202 00:19:10,600 --> 00:19:17,320 And then blanked out all the shooting. And then said, this was out of sympathy or difference to the 203 00:19:17,320 --> 00:19:20,120 families. But there's no blood here, you can just see dust coming up. 204 00:19:20,920 --> 00:19:29,720 And then immediately started apologizing for the military saying, oh, well, it's hard for our soldiers. 205 00:19:30,040 --> 00:19:38,760 Reminders that war is more difficult. No condemnation, not even any request for an inquiry, 206 00:19:38,760 --> 00:19:44,120 which is the sort of neutral response. Well, we don't want to blame people before all the facts 207 00:19:44,120 --> 00:19:48,520 are in, although actually, if you see the video, you've got most of them. But we want to know 208 00:19:48,520 --> 00:19:54,520 everything about this. We want this inquiry to be open. We want to fall disclosure. We want to know 209 00:19:54,520 --> 00:20:02,200 why this video was withheld from Reuters for so long. So we're going to know where the children 210 00:20:02,200 --> 00:20:06,520 who were in New Compense did daily, all these things, which would be sort of in a natural reaction. 211 00:20:08,200 --> 00:20:17,240 I did not take place in the broadcast networks. Then, for CNN and NBC, there was, 212 00:20:18,200 --> 00:20:25,000 I think, a sort of internal revolt by journalists who were seeing other journalists 213 00:20:25,000 --> 00:20:33,480 slowed down in the streets of Baghdad. So I pushed back against the editorial management 214 00:20:33,480 --> 00:20:41,720 decision to treat it so briefly and incentivize way. So the next day saw a richer 215 00:20:42,040 --> 00:20:56,920 discussion. And then it flipped. Then, enormous editorial space, both in the printed press 216 00:20:56,920 --> 00:21:04,280 and in TV press opened up for military apologists and no space opened up for anyone else, 217 00:21:04,280 --> 00:21:10,600 including people with new facts, including the soldiers on the ground who were there, 218 00:21:10,600 --> 00:21:16,680 the only English speaking witnesses, the only US witnesses and the only soldiers speaking. 219 00:21:16,680 --> 00:21:21,080 Those people couldn't get into the mainstream press and couldn't get on to TV. 220 00:21:21,080 --> 00:21:27,480 Talk about that one, the one soldier who his name was McCord, is that right? 221 00:21:27,800 --> 00:21:33,240 Yeah, one of the soldiers on the ground who was one of those who see arriving at the van. 222 00:21:34,200 --> 00:21:42,920 Ethan McCord. Ethan McCord is a soldier about 30 years old. It was in the ground unit that 223 00:21:44,440 --> 00:21:52,520 was been serviced if you like, by the patches in this in this way. And they marched in and arrived 224 00:21:52,520 --> 00:22:00,440 to where the bodies were in the shooting up the van. And Ethan heard the child crying in the van 225 00:22:01,320 --> 00:22:07,560 historically and pulled out the girl saw the boy and thought the boy was dead. 226 00:22:09,000 --> 00:22:15,640 Took the child away from the van to sort of intermediate location and then went to look for anyone 227 00:22:15,640 --> 00:22:20,840 else in the van and just saw the boy was just breathing and pulled him out. So he ended up being 228 00:22:20,920 --> 00:22:29,800 covered with a blood of his children. And he was quite disturbed by this event and he got in contact with 229 00:22:29,800 --> 00:22:37,160 us immediately after the video was published and he produced a statement to a letter of apology 230 00:22:37,160 --> 00:22:43,160 to this family. Of course he was involved directly with killing a bit indirectly. 231 00:22:43,240 --> 00:22:51,080 It was his unit that was being serviced by the suspension and indirectly that it was part of the 232 00:22:51,080 --> 00:22:59,080 US Army in Iraq. But he says that he complained to his superiors about the event and they just 233 00:22:59,080 --> 00:23:09,080 told him to stop being a pussy in the suck it up. And he's tried quite hard to draw attention to what 234 00:23:09,240 --> 00:23:18,840 happened in the mainstream to get the mainstream for his interest in. In it, within two days of us 235 00:23:18,840 --> 00:23:26,440 revealing the material. So why it was still newsworthy? It can't be an excuse in the US press too. 236 00:23:26,440 --> 00:23:31,560 Well the moment had passed and therefore I guess his story is interesting but the moment has passed 237 00:23:31,560 --> 00:23:37,880 because at the very same time that he was trying to get his story across, 238 00:23:39,320 --> 00:23:45,960 editorial space was being given to military apologists who were just war is hard and 239 00:23:47,160 --> 00:23:51,400 these things had these things happened. And you didn't show the full context and 240 00:23:52,200 --> 00:23:58,600 they were shooting that morning. So it's not like you know, and the soldiers, it's difficult 241 00:23:58,920 --> 00:24:06,760 to say, no, to get whatever. Not new facts. Whereas this soldier had new facts about what had 242 00:24:06,760 --> 00:24:12,040 happened then and incident happened. It immediately after. I mean it was interesting about him. He also 243 00:24:12,040 --> 00:24:21,560 had an overview and he described what had happened that day as a common occurrence and he talked about 244 00:24:21,560 --> 00:24:32,120 if there's any kind of threat or perceived threat to American soldiers. They would let everybody 245 00:24:32,120 --> 00:24:41,400 have it. He said let all the motherfuckers have it of 360 degrees. That's right. If there was an idea. 246 00:24:41,400 --> 00:24:51,000 He was instructed. If there if an idea goes off anywhere in the street then 247 00:24:51,720 --> 00:24:58,120 360 degree rotational fire and just take out everyone. Everyone, children, everyone gets it. 248 00:24:59,560 --> 00:25:06,760 I guess as to try and act as a disincentive for the local population for supporting any 249 00:25:06,760 --> 00:25:12,680 idea placement. And that's what happened. It's not that he was told that and it didn't happen. 250 00:25:12,680 --> 00:25:18,680 But rather that happened and he was instructed. So he and some other soldiers in the unit who 251 00:25:19,640 --> 00:25:25,960 liked that instruction apparently. Five high when those orders came. When an idea went off 252 00:25:25,960 --> 00:25:34,520 and they were instructed to fire those orders. What what do the leaks around this issue tell you about 253 00:25:35,400 --> 00:25:41,960 whether this particular incident was as the government, the US government claims, 254 00:25:41,960 --> 00:25:50,840 an aberration or not? We have seen in other leaks. I mean, I just have a vast number of 255 00:25:52,600 --> 00:26:00,920 these type of incidents. And when I say these type what I mean is indiscriminate attacks on civilians. 256 00:26:02,760 --> 00:26:08,120 Not deliberate attacks on civilians. It's important to make clear but just not giving it down. 257 00:26:09,000 --> 00:26:14,200 Not caring whether they are or whether they are. Sometimes occasional attack, 258 00:26:14,200 --> 00:26:20,280 deliberate attacks on civilians. But those do seem to be rare in the record. But just maybe they 259 00:26:20,280 --> 00:26:29,160 are maybe they're not that we want to shoot. And so go for it. Ethan McCord and one of his fellow 260 00:26:29,160 --> 00:26:36,360 soldiers who were in that ground unit, they say that they were surprised that was this video 261 00:26:36,440 --> 00:26:42,280 that leaked because there were many many worse instances. And this was a sort of every day, 262 00:26:43,320 --> 00:26:50,680 no currents. Not every day that journalists were killed. Although I did read the statistics that 263 00:26:51,240 --> 00:26:55,880 they have been seven warriors journalists killed. Back there in all of them were killed by 264 00:26:55,880 --> 00:27:02,840 the US military fire. But probably the only reason we were talking about this now is because they 265 00:27:02,920 --> 00:27:07,640 were too journalists there. And they were sort of trackable and warriors put in a free 266 00:27:07,640 --> 00:27:12,200 movement of nation act request. Whereas if they weren't journalists, if they were just regular 267 00:27:13,320 --> 00:27:19,240 citizens of Baghdad, we wouldn't even be talking about it. The material just would have been buried. 268 00:27:19,240 --> 00:27:24,840 They would have been no internal investigation at all, which prompted the eventual leaking. 269 00:27:25,640 --> 00:27:30,200 So this is a kind of tip of an awful iceberg in many ways. It's not because 270 00:27:30,600 --> 00:27:39,400 a war like Iraq and a war like Afghanistan. If not directed at civilians, civilians become 271 00:27:39,400 --> 00:27:45,560 the casualties. Their civilians wore us and what has sent something. No, there's a 272 00:27:45,560 --> 00:27:52,040 old statement that absolutely power corrupts absolutely. And you can see from this video that 273 00:27:52,040 --> 00:27:57,160 when you're in an Apache with a zoom lens that can show you people's face from one 274 00:27:57,240 --> 00:28:03,400 mile up in the sky. And you have a 30 millimeter cannon and you shoot and there's no 275 00:28:04,760 --> 00:28:10,200 effect against you. You can't even hear the screams. And when you get back to base, 276 00:28:11,320 --> 00:28:14,920 there's no discipline for seizures against you. The wind this happens every day, 277 00:28:16,040 --> 00:28:25,240 the days for a year, of course it's incredibly corrupting. And these people are shot in the same way 278 00:28:26,200 --> 00:28:32,520 that every day person walks over ants on the street because they just seem to be 279 00:28:32,520 --> 00:28:40,120 irrelevant. They're not complaining. There's no discipline for seizure. And so as the war goes along, 280 00:28:40,120 --> 00:28:50,040 civilians do become just something to get rid of because they're annoying or have no concern 281 00:28:50,680 --> 00:29:03,000 over. And why there are some of these civilian massacre cases do a cheap prominence. And then 282 00:29:03,880 --> 00:29:13,960 a do a fine genuine concern by some of the higher general's or by other groups looking into them. 283 00:29:14,600 --> 00:29:24,520 That's not what we see for the everyday cases of civilian kills. And we have acquired records 284 00:29:26,280 --> 00:29:35,000 of six years worth of civilian kills for a rock and Afghanistan. And not just the big ones 285 00:29:35,720 --> 00:29:40,760 where there's 100 people killed or 20 people killed, where there is some investigation of 286 00:29:40,760 --> 00:29:52,200 publicity sometimes. But rather this sort of everyday incident where a man might be in one case, 287 00:29:52,200 --> 00:29:58,760 you know Afghanistan, a man is seen to be running away after US soldiers approach. 288 00:29:59,800 --> 00:30:07,640 And they try to shoot him against jam. So he's running towards a village. So what did they do? 289 00:30:07,720 --> 00:30:14,920 It comes up jam. They get the artillery and they shell him. There's one man they want shells towards him. 290 00:30:14,920 --> 00:30:22,120 They over shoot hit the village and they kill a five-rock boy. So there's hundreds and hundreds of those 291 00:30:23,800 --> 00:30:30,200 small incidences which sort of reveal the the squalor of war at a micro-scopic detail. It's not 292 00:30:30,280 --> 00:30:37,560 always these big kill events. It's these little events where there's a lack of concern and care 293 00:30:38,680 --> 00:30:45,880 about the sort of lethal engagement or the use of lethal force. Another example from Afghanistan 294 00:30:46,680 --> 00:30:57,800 is American troops going through an area, they're not receiving fire. But they see some unexploded 295 00:30:57,800 --> 00:31:09,640 ordinance. They see a one point five meter shell that's sitting there in a sort of dusty area. 296 00:31:10,360 --> 00:31:15,880 And could it be a village? Possibly. Could be a village? I mean they could just walk past 297 00:31:16,680 --> 00:31:21,320 what should they do? Should they shoot it? Should they call in their bond of squalor's squad, 298 00:31:21,480 --> 00:31:28,360 which is what you normally do and have a taken care of. They call in their strike instead. 299 00:31:29,560 --> 00:31:37,320 To take out just this one unexploded shell. Now presumably these are guys and Afghanistan 300 00:31:37,320 --> 00:31:43,560 they're bored. They want to see what their strikes like up close. It's very easy. It's a day time. 301 00:31:43,720 --> 00:31:53,800 They call an astrike. The astrike. Overshoots. The shell. It's a village. This is sort of just a lack of concern, 302 00:31:53,800 --> 00:32:01,400 lack of care. Are these particular incidents from the documents that you've released 303 00:32:02,680 --> 00:32:11,400 in July? Yes, that's right. And there's hundreds, hundreds like that. Can you just describe the 304 00:32:12,360 --> 00:32:18,440 almost the panorama of these documents? They're across Afghanistan. Yeah, a lander up there. 305 00:32:18,440 --> 00:32:28,600 So for Afghanistan this is 91,000 reports by troops on the ground and by some intelligence people back 306 00:32:28,600 --> 00:32:35,320 at the base. These are like done just starts and event happens or are updated during the course of 307 00:32:35,320 --> 00:32:42,440 a day. So there's a raw data before, before bandicoons been doctors have had a chance to mess 308 00:32:42,440 --> 00:32:47,000 out of it. Although that said sometimes troops don't put things in there that might incriminate 309 00:32:47,000 --> 00:32:55,720 their meal. And for Iraq this is 490,000 reports over the same period. 490,000. 310 00:32:55,720 --> 00:33:04,440 Or a 98,000 over the same period of time. That's a hell of a leak. That's a really extraordinary thing. 311 00:33:04,520 --> 00:33:11,880 This is the most finely detailed history of war that has ever been disclosed. 312 00:33:12,680 --> 00:33:18,600 Besides times, locations, kill counts. Although the kill counts are sometimes massaged. 313 00:33:19,480 --> 00:33:27,880 But kill counts, people detained. What happened from the US troops point of view? They're not 314 00:33:27,880 --> 00:33:33,640 reliable narrators, but you can't hide everything when you're producing so much detail so quickly. 315 00:33:34,440 --> 00:33:40,760 And I mean, statistics extraordinary. We're sorry, we're ready to computer program to add up all these 316 00:33:40,760 --> 00:33:48,040 kill counts. And so for Afghanistan this is in the hundreds of thousands. Hundreds of thousands. 317 00:33:48,040 --> 00:33:55,240 It's important to remember this wasn't just a figure of a hundred thousand. This hundreds of thousands 318 00:33:55,240 --> 00:34:02,040 is a result of adding up all the individual cases which are documented. So the individual 319 00:34:02,120 --> 00:34:13,400 cases that the highest kill count was 480 or so related to a stampede that occurred on a breach. 320 00:34:14,520 --> 00:34:20,600 490 people were killed. Checking this in the news report seems like it was more like a thousand 321 00:34:20,600 --> 00:34:25,960 people were killed. But in the internal US military reporting it's 480 people who were killed. 322 00:34:26,760 --> 00:34:34,040 And that's the single highest event. That's sort of an unusual. Next one down was a US sweeping 323 00:34:34,040 --> 00:34:44,280 operation that killed about 300. Some of these events are on the surface disturbing. So the highest 324 00:34:44,280 --> 00:34:55,480 kill count event in Afghanistan killed 181 people in a US operation led by Canada. I call the operation 325 00:34:55,560 --> 00:35:09,000 the juicer in December 2006. And that kill count of 181 there was only one wounded. 326 00:35:09,720 --> 00:35:15,080 One wounded. One wounded. It says no civilians were killed and they were no captures. 327 00:35:16,440 --> 00:35:24,840 So if we then look at what was a sort of military hardware deployed. So it speaks about some ground 328 00:35:24,920 --> 00:35:29,560 force sweeping and so on. A couple of people went to the benelie everyone. 329 00:35:30,760 --> 00:35:39,480 Who has been killed was killed by an AC 130 gunship. So this is an AC 130 is a big 330 00:35:39,480 --> 00:35:46,120 cargo plane which is being converted to have be decked out with machine guns and tank guns and 331 00:35:46,920 --> 00:35:53,960 saturation from high up. But it's a plane that's moving. This is it's not exact. 332 00:35:55,800 --> 00:36:04,440 And in the course of 362 people are described as being killed by this. And then there's also an unexplained 333 00:36:04,440 --> 00:36:10,760 missing 90 or so people were at their how they are killed is not established in the report that they 334 00:36:10,760 --> 00:36:17,400 are listed as having been killed in two places. I just they call these all Taliban the enemy. 335 00:36:17,400 --> 00:36:21,960 Yeah they're all called the enemy. Looking at that operation, a juicer killed. 336 00:36:22,680 --> 00:36:28,040 That broader operation. Quite interesting. I mean I hadn't heard about this before. 337 00:36:28,040 --> 00:36:35,080 But this was the biggest according to the Canadian military, the biggest operation in Afghanistan 338 00:36:35,080 --> 00:36:41,320 post-invasion. And but Afghanistan wasn't when people's radar in December 2006. The rock was. 339 00:36:42,760 --> 00:36:51,080 But during that week they say they killed about a thousand Taliban. But actually what happened is 340 00:36:51,160 --> 00:36:58,520 that this was in a region of about 20k out of Canada where there's lots of vineyards. 341 00:36:58,520 --> 00:37:07,400 And there was the government installed by US forces posted 2001 invasion, 342 00:37:07,400 --> 00:37:14,840 had become extremely corrupt. And the local people had grown to support the Taliban in 343 00:37:15,480 --> 00:37:23,160 United effort to clean out this government. And then when US and Canadian and 344 00:37:24,920 --> 00:37:32,360 I-Saf, so the Allied forces. The western forces came in. These people 345 00:37:34,360 --> 00:37:40,760 not just Taliban. They do seem to have been Taliban there. But the local population were supportive. 346 00:37:41,480 --> 00:37:48,200 And so the main in the vineyards, the workers in the vineyards, were killed 347 00:37:49,240 --> 00:37:54,600 along with these others. And seems to, if we read the press reports at the time, some press say it's 348 00:37:54,600 --> 00:38:01,480 50-50-50% teleband, 50% local people. It's pretty hard to gauge from the on the ground reporting. 349 00:38:02,200 --> 00:38:07,160 But we look at events like this, like document shows. And we see something pretty disturbing. 350 00:38:07,480 --> 00:38:15,080 A lot of people killed very little time using indiscriminate fire. No investigation into 181 351 00:38:15,080 --> 00:38:21,480 people being killed. The biggest kill of single event in Afghanistan, post 2001. 352 00:38:23,480 --> 00:38:27,880 It doesn't smell right. It's suppose that those doing the killing, 353 00:38:28,680 --> 00:38:32,760 who I'm assuming they regard everybody as the Taliban or as insurgent. 354 00:38:33,640 --> 00:38:38,120 The patent, the- So who isn't? The pat- the patent we see in Iraq, 355 00:38:38,120 --> 00:38:42,520 kind of kind of kind of kind of the very clear patent. And it's not just me who sees this, but other 356 00:38:42,520 --> 00:38:52,120 war reporters. Is that anyone who's a man is and dead is an insurgent. That's how they are 357 00:38:52,120 --> 00:38:59,800 always listed on reports. And it's only after there's some investigation, usually stimulated by the press, 358 00:38:59,880 --> 00:39:08,200 or by competing the literary reporting on it. There's a sort of pull down from that number. 359 00:39:10,200 --> 00:39:13,880 Not any man who is dead is the surgeon of Taliban. 360 00:39:15,160 --> 00:39:20,600 Children, if their bodies are hold enough to see, and remember things like 30 millimeter cannon 361 00:39:20,600 --> 00:39:27,240 fire, I would decimate the body. Arlis stood as children, so they're not the citizen's 362 00:39:27,240 --> 00:39:35,000 surgeons, and women can go either way. And so as an example, if we look at Kundus, this is 363 00:39:36,360 --> 00:39:44,920 an era strike that occurred in Afghanistan last year, where it was called in by the German military. 364 00:39:46,200 --> 00:39:51,720 Petal tankers, about three kilometers away from German military positions, had been put in a riverbed, 365 00:39:51,720 --> 00:39:55,800 and the local people were unlaid, unleading the petrol from them, taking this off. 366 00:39:56,440 --> 00:40:03,720 Now the allegation is that the Taliban hijacked these petrol tankers, and was then giving 367 00:40:03,720 --> 00:40:08,440 the petrol to local population, which is quite possibly true. I mean, maybe they're trying to 368 00:40:08,440 --> 00:40:13,480 carry favour of local population, but the reality is there was over 100 people clustered around this 369 00:40:13,480 --> 00:40:20,680 tanker, taking the petrol, and they weren't going either, they're sitting there. So air strike was 370 00:40:20,680 --> 00:40:27,640 called in and killed most of these people. Yet, when we look at the internal military reporting 371 00:40:27,640 --> 00:40:35,560 by the United States, what we see is in these legal reports, 57 in search and skilled. 372 00:40:38,120 --> 00:40:44,440 When we look at the internal military reporting for the claddle murder, this Iraq 373 00:40:45,160 --> 00:40:51,400 massacre, which included two warriors journalists that have been in July 2007, what we see is 374 00:40:53,240 --> 00:41:01,000 14 people killed, and they were actually between 18 to 26 people killed, and all of them 375 00:41:01,640 --> 00:41:09,240 insurgents, except for two children who were wounded. So even the writers' camera man 376 00:41:10,120 --> 00:41:17,080 were listed as insurgents. And your warriors came in contact and said, hey, where's our camera man? 377 00:41:19,080 --> 00:41:26,520 I mean, for you to receive that volume of documentation suggests that there must be 378 00:41:27,640 --> 00:41:31,640 something of a rebellion going on within the system. 379 00:41:32,600 --> 00:41:40,600 Yes, I mean, it's the one hopeful thing. It's in fact, there are good people in the US military. 380 00:41:41,000 --> 00:41:48,120 There are good people in military intelligence organizations, and some of those people have had enough. 381 00:41:48,840 --> 00:41:58,280 And so they provide us with evidence of abuse. And I mean, that's um, it is sort of another way of being a 382 00:41:58,360 --> 00:42:06,520 conscientious objective. In fact, argue with your far more powerful way of objecting to the wall. 383 00:42:07,800 --> 00:42:13,640 And what about among journalists is there were rebellion amongst journalists. I mean, you said 384 00:42:14,680 --> 00:42:22,760 some time ago, I think the journalists need to respect their readers and viewers. 385 00:42:22,840 --> 00:42:36,200 How did journalists by a large react to WikiLeaks? Of course, some are very impressed, obviously. 386 00:42:36,200 --> 00:42:46,040 But you've described, for example, the reaction in the United States was CNN and NBC and CBS 387 00:42:46,120 --> 00:42:53,320 and so on. That's journalists being used to justify it. So how did journalists, how are journalists 388 00:42:53,320 --> 00:43:00,760 dealing with the arrival of WikiLeaks? Yeah, very interesting mixture. So, you know, it seems like 389 00:43:00,760 --> 00:43:07,560 all the good journalists support us and all the bad ones don't. But of course, maybe that's just my 390 00:43:07,560 --> 00:43:15,960 interpretation based upon this. Probably a good interpretation. But um, it does seem that the more 391 00:43:16,040 --> 00:43:20,280 accomplished and independent the journalists, the more they are likely to support us. 392 00:43:22,040 --> 00:43:27,800 The more they are able, in fact, to, the more established they are as an independent journalist with 393 00:43:27,800 --> 00:43:33,560 their own independent reputation that they can choose to take from one newspaper to another. They can 394 00:43:33,560 --> 00:43:40,280 choose to take from one network to another. If they're stopped around, it seems like the more they 395 00:43:40,360 --> 00:43:47,480 are able to state their support for us. Whereas the journalists who are not in that 396 00:43:49,400 --> 00:43:55,160 position of freedom, that are more part of the group of the company, that they're companymen, 397 00:43:57,240 --> 00:44:02,760 they're more likely to be critical. And because your very WikiLeaks is very threatening to systems 398 00:44:03,720 --> 00:44:11,800 and the BBC is a system, the network making this documentary, ITV is a system. 399 00:44:12,440 --> 00:44:19,240 So, individual journalists, as opposed to the organizations that they're working in, are supportive 400 00:44:19,240 --> 00:44:26,760 of us in that they may be able to collaborate with us or use our material. And that can be extremely 401 00:44:26,840 --> 00:44:32,200 important material. And some people have an ability to see that and they want to help them. 402 00:44:32,200 --> 00:44:37,800 And so, you get that material out to the public or bring extra angles in on it or use their 403 00:44:37,800 --> 00:44:45,000 existing understanding to help flinch it out. So, they see us as, you know, as colleagues. 404 00:44:45,720 --> 00:44:51,400 And then we have a group that sees us as competition, that sees us as a threat. 405 00:44:52,360 --> 00:44:58,840 And in the regular sort of competitive news competitive news ants, but also in that we 406 00:44:59,800 --> 00:45:06,040 are demanding certain standards. So, higher levels of information, harder to get information. 407 00:45:06,040 --> 00:45:13,320 And the use of primary sources in material that has been released in print. So, that makes 408 00:45:13,320 --> 00:45:19,640 them have to work harder. So, they see us as a threat. And then there's another group that 409 00:45:19,720 --> 00:45:28,200 appreciates what we're doing because we're drawing the fire. The we are the free press band guard. 410 00:45:29,160 --> 00:45:33,560 We are the sort of defender of whistleblowers. And we knew that whole field 411 00:45:34,520 --> 00:45:40,440 further out. And that creates a sort of a vacuum behind us into which these people can come. 412 00:45:40,840 --> 00:45:47,880 Which doesn't have any fire because we're attracting the opposition by pushing in for it. And that's 413 00:45:47,960 --> 00:45:54,920 quite nice because over the last four years we have been changing the standard. So, 414 00:45:54,920 --> 00:46:02,520 there's some degree we are now the status quo. We are something that exists. There's an economic 415 00:46:02,520 --> 00:46:10,440 and political social need. You're the main stream. Go quite that far, but there's an understanding 416 00:46:10,440 --> 00:46:16,760 of political and economic understanding. But there is a place for we heal this in this world. And 417 00:46:16,840 --> 00:46:22,280 that if we were to disappear, that would be something you. I'm just quite, yeah, it's quite interesting 418 00:46:22,280 --> 00:46:30,840 about how you've shifted in. I mean here, the guard in media pages, every year, and this 419 00:46:30,840 --> 00:46:37,160 100 most important media people, you've probably seen this. This year they've included you. 420 00:46:37,960 --> 00:46:43,880 Yeah, this year 58. But last year we went in there at all. That's quite an improvement. 421 00:46:44,680 --> 00:46:51,720 The fact that you're in there is interesting. Very interesting. I mean, it's true we do have 422 00:46:51,720 --> 00:46:57,240 some influence, but I think it's also the case that those people in the garden who have 423 00:46:57,240 --> 00:47:04,120 put that list together. I'm sure it's totally accurate, but I'm sure that's also a desire. 424 00:47:05,240 --> 00:47:11,560 There's a desire for us to be leading in that way. And they want to support. 425 00:47:12,520 --> 00:47:19,400 It's important. And see that we do something beneficial for them, which is to open up this space. 426 00:47:20,120 --> 00:47:26,840 I mean, there's clearly a big shift underway, and we've talked about this already. 427 00:47:29,320 --> 00:47:36,520 But the shift is from traditional, so-called mainstream journalists, journalism, 428 00:47:37,480 --> 00:47:48,040 to what has become known as citizen journalism. Is that a very significant shift now? 429 00:47:48,040 --> 00:47:55,800 Is it the whole nature of journalism likely to change because of this trend? 430 00:47:57,480 --> 00:48:05,960 It is changing. And the changes will be dramatic. But I'm not one to sell 431 00:48:06,920 --> 00:48:11,880 citizen journalism as being at the moment, being a great answer yet. 432 00:48:12,840 --> 00:48:21,480 And because what I see in the alternative press is very little journalism going on. In fact, 433 00:48:21,480 --> 00:48:31,800 what I see is people taking the front page in your times. Using that is the issue of the day 434 00:48:32,440 --> 00:48:40,040 and saying, I don't agree with it, or I do agree with it. And when our idea is that 435 00:48:40,040 --> 00:48:46,440 our material would spark tremendous amounts of citizen journalism. Because all these people who 436 00:48:46,440 --> 00:48:54,680 write opinion pieces on blogs and so on, when given the complaint, why are you doing any real journalism? 437 00:48:54,680 --> 00:48:59,320 Why are you going in researching, investigating something? And they say, well, it takes a long 438 00:48:59,320 --> 00:49:04,200 time to build up sources. So we don't have anything new to talk about. So we have to just 439 00:49:05,000 --> 00:49:13,000 analyze what the mainstream press are doing. But we have produced hundreds of thousands or millions 440 00:49:13,640 --> 00:49:22,760 of pages of new source material that these people could analyze and could report. And it's extremely 441 00:49:22,760 --> 00:49:31,080 rare that they do. So the specific example that I like to use is we got hold of a classified U.S. 442 00:49:31,080 --> 00:49:37,000 intelligence report into what happened in the war in Follusion. So this was a left course to let 443 00:49:37,000 --> 00:49:46,200 breed that invasion of the town of Follusion in Iraq in 2004, of course, Iraq itself had already 444 00:49:46,200 --> 00:49:52,360 been invaded, but Follusion was some kind of holdout to the New Government that had been put in place 445 00:49:52,440 --> 00:50:01,400 by the United States, the Coalition Parasional Authority. And that the circumstances of that invasion 446 00:50:01,400 --> 00:50:09,480 is some U.S. contractors going through this area had been killed. Anyway, so we're not wanting 447 00:50:09,480 --> 00:50:17,800 to go into the detail, but that was a very bloody invasion and it ended up with a pullout. 448 00:50:18,520 --> 00:50:26,200 And a reinvasion, some five months later. So what was the circumstances? Everyone knew that 449 00:50:26,200 --> 00:50:32,520 all sorts of tragedy had occurred in that town. This report, in fact, revealed both how things 450 00:50:32,520 --> 00:50:38,520 progressed militarily, how things progressed politically, spoke specifically about Paul Bremer, 451 00:50:38,520 --> 00:50:42,840 who was the head of the Coalition, the Regional Authority, the role of our Jazeera, 452 00:50:43,480 --> 00:50:49,960 in that town of the Media War, as well as the on the ground war, the different tribal regions, 453 00:50:49,960 --> 00:50:56,760 classified secret via U.S. Army, ground intelligence. So we took this classified U.S. intelligence 454 00:50:56,760 --> 00:51:05,400 report about Mlugia and released it. So all citizens in journalists, academics, 455 00:51:06,360 --> 00:51:13,400 employee journalists, we'd analyze it, write about it, call up the US military, ask them about it, 456 00:51:14,760 --> 00:51:20,600 ask the countries involved, human rights groups, what was going on etc. This was the raw 457 00:51:20,600 --> 00:51:30,200 primary ingredient that you needed to actually do some journalism. And mail this out to 3500 people 458 00:51:31,080 --> 00:51:40,920 on our mailing list. And the result was not a single citizen journalist did anything. The first 459 00:51:40,920 --> 00:51:49,400 person to publish was a print shown in the U.P.I. He was a national security reporter. And then another 460 00:51:49,480 --> 00:51:58,280 five professional press journalists, not all of them full-time journalists, some working for the 461 00:51:58,280 --> 00:52:03,880 Asia Times, half time and working for the K-to Institute, half time as an example of one of these 462 00:52:03,880 --> 00:52:13,480 five. But the bloggers, the political activists of all kinds, in fact, didn't do anything with 463 00:52:14,120 --> 00:52:17,160 this material. So I mean, that's interesting. So real information 464 00:52:18,920 --> 00:52:23,000 or can almost paralyze as if they don't know what to do with it. 465 00:52:23,640 --> 00:52:28,840 Well, over time we are seeing that we're sort of training people up a bit. So it's getting better 466 00:52:28,840 --> 00:52:32,760 over time. People are dying to become used to this emerging information and on the 467 00:52:32,760 --> 00:52:40,600 lecture, understanding that when we release it is definitely true. But yeah, it's a very surprising 468 00:52:40,600 --> 00:52:46,680 effect. I mean, that report, as an example, it looked good. It wasn't just that it had the 469 00:52:46,680 --> 00:52:54,760 important details. It wasn't too long. It was only 630 pages. It was accessible. It had a nice map 470 00:52:54,760 --> 00:52:59,720 of Felizur on the front, split into tribal words. And no one picked it up. No one picked it up. 471 00:53:00,440 --> 00:53:07,640 And eventually, professional press picked it up. You're making some very serious enemies. 472 00:53:07,640 --> 00:53:20,920 Not least of all, a government engaged in two repatious wars. How do you deal with what must 473 00:53:20,920 --> 00:53:27,880 be a sense of that danger? Do you ignore it or do you accommodate it within yourself? 474 00:53:28,280 --> 00:53:36,280 So, not at all. I think a lot of people say, we're very courageous in our work. 475 00:53:37,320 --> 00:53:46,040 And I wouldn't reject that label entirely. We're not uncharagers. But to me, courage is not the absence 476 00:53:46,040 --> 00:53:52,440 of fear at all. Courage is the intellectual mastery of fear of our understanding. So we just 477 00:53:52,440 --> 00:53:57,480 understand what the risks are and having understood them, labels navigate the path through them. 478 00:53:58,840 --> 00:54:03,320 One of my good friends who's a reporter for the standard newspaper in Kenya. 479 00:54:04,680 --> 00:54:11,080 Investigative head whenever he is about to publish a big story, exposing a changing government. 480 00:54:11,080 --> 00:54:16,680 And they were raped. The newspaper was rated by the police a couple of years ago. He publishes. He 481 00:54:16,760 --> 00:54:22,840 goes to Tanzania. He waits to see what happens. Eventually, he becomes clear what's going to happen. 482 00:54:22,840 --> 00:54:27,800 He comes back. If he doesn't understand the risks, he understands the risks, can he see such 483 00:54:27,800 --> 00:54:34,280 it's relatively low risk, then he publishes any states in Nairobi. And so that's how we work. 484 00:54:35,000 --> 00:54:43,720 What do you do? Because your public thought unlikely to go through the United States at the moment. 485 00:54:44,520 --> 00:54:56,760 Well, in July of 2010, I had three speaking engagements in the United States, including one of 486 00:54:56,760 --> 00:55:04,440 the investigative reporters in Editors' conference in Las Vegas. A panel there with Scott Ryzen, 487 00:55:05,080 --> 00:55:11,880 New York Times, National Security reporter, and Valerie Plain was also in the panel. I canceled my visit 488 00:55:11,880 --> 00:55:17,800 to United States because there's some information that was coming out from our sources. 489 00:55:18,680 --> 00:55:24,680 Within the US administration saying that it would be a danger to me to go to United States. 490 00:55:26,440 --> 00:55:32,680 In the Pentagon recently, I asked the Assistant Secretary of Defense Brian Whitman. 491 00:55:34,440 --> 00:55:40,120 This, I said, can you, as a senior official of the United States government, 492 00:55:40,600 --> 00:55:45,880 can you give a guarantee that the editors of WikiLeaks and the editor 493 00:55:45,880 --> 00:55:52,760 in chief himself who is not American, that you are not in danger, that they themselves will not be 494 00:55:52,760 --> 00:56:01,880 subjected to the kind of hunt that we've read about in the media. And his reply to Natural, 495 00:56:01,880 --> 00:56:07,320 well, first of all, it's not my position to give guarantees on anything. 496 00:56:08,280 --> 00:56:12,920 I mean, how do you feel about that? 497 00:56:14,200 --> 00:56:17,960 More of sounds like keeping all options on the table to me. 498 00:56:18,680 --> 00:56:24,040 And they're not good options, are they? I don't want to dramatize this too much, but 499 00:56:25,640 --> 00:56:31,160 you're in a sort of unique position in a way, aren't you? 500 00:56:31,880 --> 00:56:35,240 I don't know. We're in a WikiLeaks before. 501 00:56:35,240 --> 00:56:39,480 There hasn't, and they don't know how to deal with us. And there's no, 502 00:56:41,720 --> 00:56:43,880 something that has preserved us is that there's no 503 00:56:46,040 --> 00:56:51,240 in the United States or in any other country. There is no department to deal with WikiLeaks. 504 00:56:52,280 --> 00:56:56,600 Most of those government departments are split up into regional focuses. 505 00:56:57,560 --> 00:57:03,560 So there's no sort of specialists in dealing with what we are, or understanding what we are, 506 00:57:03,560 --> 00:57:09,880 or understanding how to deal with us. But I mean, a serious statement's coming out of the US administration 507 00:57:09,880 --> 00:57:14,760 under the surface that implied that they would not follow the rule of law. 508 00:57:16,760 --> 00:57:19,560 They would not follow the rule of law. They would not follow the rule of law. 509 00:57:19,560 --> 00:57:22,680 And that is a serious matter. It's a certain record there. 510 00:57:23,400 --> 00:57:27,880 And there were senior figures like Sihush giving me warnings. 511 00:57:28,840 --> 00:57:35,000 I've been a US national security reporter. And so I mean, we listened to those warnings and 512 00:57:35,000 --> 00:57:42,840 took appropriate security precautions. That said, I think our political position in countries 513 00:57:42,840 --> 00:57:51,560 like United Kingdom, Australia, Iceland, Germany, and other countries with less strength. 514 00:57:53,400 --> 00:57:59,320 Is such that it is impossible to, I mean, arrest me here and then I can do politically. 515 00:58:00,040 --> 00:58:07,640 It is just not possible to do that. And why some intermediary bureaucrat might do it and not understand 516 00:58:07,640 --> 00:58:16,440 the political risk. Eventually, the matter would be pushed up high enough. And people in 517 00:58:16,440 --> 00:58:23,000 with better understanding of politics will go do not do that. That's just going to create a terrible 518 00:58:23,000 --> 00:58:32,600 political dilemma for everyone concerned. Don't do it. I note your preemptive strike in response 519 00:58:32,600 --> 00:58:39,960 when you posted on WikiLeaks a leaked Pentagon document that says that the US intelligence 520 00:58:40,040 --> 00:58:47,080 intends to destroy WikiLeaks. And the words used are that they would want it to fatally marginalise 521 00:58:47,400 --> 00:58:55,640 the organization. And the story are center of gravity. They're using sort of military language, 522 00:58:55,640 --> 00:59:02,520 which is what they say is the trust that sources and public happiness. They can destroy that. 523 00:59:02,520 --> 00:59:08,280 Then they can stop US military whistleblowers coming to us. And they say the word whistleblowers. 524 00:59:08,360 --> 00:59:14,520 I mean, they're not talking about, or at least not just talking about unauthorized 525 00:59:14,520 --> 00:59:20,440 disclosures, which may or may not be revealing abuse. They are saying whistleblowers people who 526 00:59:20,440 --> 00:59:26,760 reveal abuse. They give examples. Examples given are Guantanamo Bay, when we released the main 527 00:59:26,760 --> 00:59:31,480 menace with this which revealed that they are hiding people from the Red Cross falsifying documents 528 00:59:31,800 --> 00:59:40,040 on. Felugia and abuses that we revealed there. And a number of other cases. So these are 529 00:59:41,080 --> 00:59:46,840 upset with us because we are revealing abuses and embarrassing the United States military. 530 00:59:48,600 --> 00:59:54,600 So we released that report which was written in 2008. We released this earlier in 2010. 531 00:59:54,680 --> 01:00:00:03,720 As maybe as a preempt to write, I mean it's putting them on notice. And by us releasing that 532 01:00:03,720 --> 01:00:12,520 there is an understanding that didn't come from nowhere that report clearly came from some 533 01:00:12,520 --> 01:00:18,360 intelligence inside the United States. We have support inside the US intelligence community. 534 01:00:19,160 --> 01:00:28,120 So it is difficult and dangerous for people within the US intelligence community to try and 535 01:00:28,120 --> 01:00:34,280 investigate us because they will be dissidents at the full step forward and reveal that. So they 536 01:00:34,280 --> 01:00:40,120 have to tread very carefully. What happens when you return to Australia, your homeland, because when 537 01:00:40,200 --> 01:00:51,720 you went back recently, they took away your passport saying that it was look worn and something 538 01:00:53,160 --> 01:00:58,760 you've perhaps needed a new one. But miraculously you didn't need a new one. They gave it back to you 539 01:00:58,760 --> 01:01:06,120 sometime later. And just a little bit after that they also searched my bags and made references 540 01:01:06,120 --> 01:01:11,880 to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Australian Federal Police, specific information that had to 541 01:01:11,880 --> 01:01:20,520 come off their database file. So it's quite interesting. In Australia, I mean there is a sort of patriotism 542 01:01:20,520 --> 01:01:29,640 in Australia that is proud of what he looks and proud of me. And that is defensive. And as a result 543 01:01:29,720 --> 01:01:37,560 there have been very positive articles in the Fairfax press and in the Australian. 544 01:01:39,320 --> 01:01:46,280 So I'm told by politically connected people in Australia that it would be extremely difficult to 545 01:01:47,560 --> 01:01:55,320 arrest me to take me or deport me or are there volunteers in Australia? That said, 546 01:01:55,400 --> 01:02:07,480 there has been extensive spy on our people in that country, which I assume has been agreed to 547 01:02:07,480 --> 01:02:13,480 in some way by the Australian government and we have some information about the Australian government 548 01:02:13,480 --> 01:02:24,760 being involved in that. Is it hard after a while to keep these shadows at bay, do you get used to them? 549 01:02:24,840 --> 01:02:32,440 You must say to yourself, look, I can't become paranoid about this. I'm going to live a normal life. 550 01:02:33,480 --> 01:02:40,600 Is that difficult? I'd be come pretty easy. I mean we have some security precautions, 551 01:02:40,600 --> 01:02:44,680 we have some security procedures, we have different people doing different things, 552 01:02:44,680 --> 01:02:52,280 different places depending on their need for security. For me, it doesn't matter if I'm followed around, 553 01:02:52,440 --> 01:03:00,760 I've provided I'm not meeting with the source. Quite a few BBC journalists who have got in touch with me 554 01:03:02,120 --> 01:03:11,160 and want to talk about the pressure within the BBC. In other words, they represent the kind of rebellion 555 01:03:12,200 --> 01:03:21,640 that you're describing. What would you say to people like then in an institution like the BBC or 556 01:03:21,640 --> 01:03:31,240 indeed journalists who are led by their conscience or just by their professional integrity 557 01:03:31,240 --> 01:03:35,560 within certain organisations? What would you say to them? What can they do? 558 01:03:35,560 --> 01:03:41,880 When your stories are killed, get them to us and we'll publish them. It's the simplest one 559 01:03:41,880 --> 01:03:48,200 or when the primary source material is, is a press get them to us. You don't have to leave the 560 01:03:48,200 --> 01:03:54,440 institution. You can work on the inside and on the outside and keep this line between the two 561 01:03:54,440 --> 01:03:59,560 invisible. What they can't get on there and what they can't get in the paper, give to them. 562 01:03:59,560 --> 01:04:05,160 Okay, let's get on. Unfortunately, there's no so much career. 563 01:04:05,160 --> 01:04:11,240 Motivation do that because you're kind of sticking to your name on it. At the time, but later on, 564 01:04:11,240 --> 01:04:16,040 maybe you can put your name on it. When you leave the institution. What wouldn't you accept? 565 01:04:17,000 --> 01:04:22,680 What wouldn't you publish? What leak wouldn't you publish? Unlike every other 566 01:04:23,480 --> 01:04:31,400 news organisation, we say precisely in policy, what we will and will not accept 567 01:04:32,200 --> 01:04:40,040 the material that we publish. So we say to whistleblowers, we will take material that hasn't appeared before. 568 01:04:40,120 --> 01:04:45,240 It is been some force of pressing it legal or threat of violence or being fired. 569 01:04:46,520 --> 01:04:52,760 And the disobdip thematic, political, ethical, or historical significance. And you didn't write it 570 01:04:52,760 --> 01:05:00,120 so. So provided it fits that, we will publish it. Now, we might go through some harm in 571 01:05:00,120 --> 01:05:06,840 myisization process in the interim. So the only forms that has taken is, as things out with a 572 01:05:06,840 --> 01:05:12,440 British national party, when we publish their secret, membership lists. We contacted all these people 573 01:05:12,440 --> 01:05:18,360 ahead of time and we said, we're going to publish this in a few days. We're giving you the heads up, 574 01:05:18,360 --> 01:05:23,320 just in case this, you know, you telephone them with the public and so on and causes problems. 575 01:05:24,200 --> 01:05:32,680 You go and sort it out. So that has always worked so far, where aware of no incidents, 576 01:05:32,760 --> 01:05:38,600 where anyone has come to any sort of physical harm, as a result of anything we've published, 577 01:05:39,160 --> 01:05:42,840 we are aware quite a few results where people have been fired or lost elections, 578 01:05:43,640 --> 01:05:48,520 as a result of things that we've published, but that seem to be on the side of the angels. 579 01:05:51,240 --> 01:05:57,080 If it's some stage that policy doesn't seem to be working, then we'll create a new policy. 580 01:05:57,640 --> 01:06:02,120 Remember, our goal is just as our main sister and transparency. We don't confuse these two. 581 01:06:02,760 --> 01:06:11,560 The propaganda efforts of governments has become vast. I read an AP investigation that said the 582 01:06:11,560 --> 01:06:19,480 US was spending 4.7 billion over the last five years on basically winning half some minds, 583 01:06:19,480 --> 01:06:29,640 not of the enemy, but of its own people. This kind of information war and portrays general 584 01:06:29,720 --> 01:06:38,200 portrays in his counter-insurgency manual refers to wars of perception in which the media is one of the weapons. 585 01:06:41,480 --> 01:06:49,000 So information war has never been more important, but what happens when Wikki leaks runs into 586 01:06:49,400 --> 01:06:56,040 the United Kingdom, which has some of the most draconian secrecy laws in the world, such as the 587 01:06:56,120 --> 01:07:01,720 official secret sect. Isn't more difficult here to to mine information? 588 01:07:03,160 --> 01:07:10,840 We haven't found a problem publishing a UK information. I mean, when we look at the 589 01:07:10,840 --> 01:07:18,680 official secrets act, label documents, we see they state that it is an offense to 590 01:07:18,760 --> 01:07:27,080 retain the information and it is an offense to destroy the information. So the only possible outcome 591 01:07:27,080 --> 01:07:37,240 is that we have to publish the information. And that's which we have done on many many occasions. 592 01:07:37,240 --> 01:07:47,160 I noticed one of those that I had a personal interest in was one that from the Ministry of Defense 593 01:07:47,880 --> 01:07:53,640 classified document that equated terrorists with investigative journalists, 594 01:07:53,640 --> 01:07:59,400 so it's threat. And Russian spies? And Russian spies? Yes, as in fact many sections of that 595 01:07:59,400 --> 01:08:05,320 report, investigative journalists are the number one threat to the sort of information security 596 01:08:06,360 --> 01:08:13,720 of the Ministry of Defense. That was a two thousand page document on how to stop leaks 597 01:08:14,280 --> 01:08:20,440 of the Institute of Defense, which we leaked. I didn't know whether to be offended or honored. 598 01:08:21,720 --> 01:08:25,080 Well, it's nice to be having an impact.