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This podcast is part two of two on weaponizing brain science and continues the conversation

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with Dr. Jiodano from where I left off in part one.

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I want to talk a little bit about an article that you wrote for the HDI Act back in 2016,

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which was entitled Battle Skate Brain.

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And in that article, you talk about the need for deep surveillance of neuro-weapon technologies

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that you also mentioned the challenges and identifying and tracing those developments.

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Could you elaborate on some of those challenges and potential solutions for effectively understanding

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global developments in neuro-weapon technologies?

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The idea of deep surveillance is as the name would imply.

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I mean, actually, madactically, we're looking at a surveillance across a number of verticalized

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levels.

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Clearly, it becomes important to horizontalize surveillance to be able to have a wide field

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of surveillance to see who's doing what and what it is they're doing.

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But what deep surveillance entails, again, some with superficially in a definition,

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is both an examination of those explicit factors that could be contributory to the weaponization

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of any form of bioscience in tech, in this case, neuro.

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As well as those implicit and cacid factors that might be contributory or that in some way

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might be illustrative of ongoing programs and doer directions and trajectories for the possible

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weaponization of these tools and technologies.

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Now, that level of deep surveillance, obviously, is we alluded to not only in that paper,

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the Battlescape Brain Paper, but in a subsequent paper that looked at radical-leveling

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and emerging technologies, also in HTIC currents, examine the idea of what that type of surveillance

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end, its informational transfer and ultimately action ability would obtain an entail.

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And one of the things that we argued for very strongly is that very least what is necessary

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is a whole of government approach, a cooperative, collaborative, whole of government approach.

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But although that is necessary, we argued that that is not sufficient, working with my colleague,

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a former Navy captain, Remseth, again, Lieutenant General General of Snow, Dr. Diane Duelis,

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Joe DeFranco, what we argued for is that what is really required in that type of deep surveillance

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that carries it through for the acquisition of information all the way to actionable entities

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would then target certain things to be able to then mitigate our strategic competitors

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and our adversaries efforts in this area would require more of a whole of nation approach.

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We're now we have a seamless triangulation between government entities, research entities,

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and commercial entities that are then able to mobilize those resources in the deep surveillance

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that's necessary for acknowledging, addressing and assessing, relative risks that may become threats.

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Quantifying the risk to threat index and then identifying what aspects of those quantifiable risks

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are mitigable and preventable and then engaging the resources that are necessary to do that.

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And we're not talking about things that are bellicose here.

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Very often what we're talking about is a level of ongoing discourse that would then prompt,

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for example, a dialectic approach with our strategic competitors, this, all right.

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We gain some intel that you're doing A, B, and C, and A, B, and C can very easily to X, Y, and Z.

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So the nature of the international discourse across the proverbial bargaining table needs to change.

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And very often that then requires a new level of both integration and cooperation.

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So as to be able to create what we've called cooperative competition,

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we're cooperating in such a way that we understand the competition is there,

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but that competition then creates shared dependencies, interdependencies,

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whereby that level of cooperation is fundamental,

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if there are going to be some level of distinct hegemony that are exercisable,

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such that the rising tide would then raise all boats.

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Really easy to say, not really easy to do.

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And of course, it's going to take a whole of nation approach on our side to be able to affect

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that level of both deep surveillance and actionable programs that are then able to engage

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our strategic competitors, tactical competitors, and potential adversaries on the levels that are capable

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for both preparedness and readiness in response.

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So in that overview, you mentioned competition.

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And in the article for HDIQ, you hinted at the possibility of a narrow weapon's armory

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of sorts that could follow international surveillance.

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Specifically, you know the possibility of a spiraling reaction of testing and countering.

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Is that still a concern today?

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Well, I think it is.

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I think whenever you're dealing with international science and technology that are

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lebrisable across a series of fronts that then would impart some level of hegemony or

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power rebalancing, there's always going to be a tit for tap.

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It is as old as the human condition, if you will.

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And I think probably arguably as old as evolution itself, I develop characteristics A

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and characteristics A and part upon me some advantage.

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And so it was to be able to retain some type of ecological balance and or niche presence

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if not domination, you then must develop characteristics B that mitigate or counter

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characteristics A. And so you get this sort of escalation effect that can occur.

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It's what my colleague Bob McRae refers to as brink'smanship.

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He's referred to something as brain science, brink'smanship.

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And I certainly agree.

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I mean, we're seeing off the same sheet of music.

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I think there is the potential for that level of escalation.

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And what's important to understand is that in some cases that level of escalation is

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going to be explicit.

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And in other cases, it's implicit.

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And then yet in many cases, both in the implicit and explicit range,

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it's almost unavoidable.

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And let me give you an example.

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A stance of preparedness, for example, would imply that I need to be aware of what's going on

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out there. And in my preparedness, at least have some level of readiness for response,

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which would mean I would then have to do something to further study those bad things out there,

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or those things that could turn bad out there.

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So as to be able to create things that might be an antidote,

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things that might be something preventive, or certainly the things that would allow me to be

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recuperable and go rebound.

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So I would then have to engage in this type of program.

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This is what we see with an arms race.

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Again, what I think becomes important is the nature of the discourse,

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and that discourse has to appreciate certain dialectical components.

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In other words, your point of view is certainly going to argue that you're doing these things.

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For reasons that sustain what you define to be relative goods of your way of life,

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your value, and your ideals.

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And we're doing the same thing.

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So in appropriating those things, one of the constructs that's important to consider is

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are the escalations of these types of techniques and these types of tools,

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bad unto themselves, are the tools of the methods,

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are the actual technologies, bad unto themselves.

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Or are there thresholds whereby these particular uses, in some cases,

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what we call dual uses or direct uses, then represent a threshold of potential

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malevolence and maleficence.

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The legal term here is malum in say, is the thing bad unto itself.

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So let me give you an example.

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If I develop some microbe, whether it's bacteria or a virus,

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and that virus is a to such an extent that there is no known treatment,

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there is no known vaccine, and it's highly reproducible and highly infectious

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in a human population.

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If I develop that synthetically, well, then clearly, that represents a definable harm.

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It is bad unto itself.

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If I develop a nuclear weapon, there's no way I can couch developing a nuclear weapon,

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and say, well, I was going to use it for fireworks on one of our national celebration.

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You should see the pyrotectics when this thing goes off.

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It's a bad thing unto itself.

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But what becomes problematic with the brain sciences, and many of the biosciences and technologies,

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is that the actual tools, and to the techniques, are, in fact,

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doly usable.

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And what we mean by that is they can be used in applications and biosciences and biomedicine.

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They can be used in applications that provide lifestyle and occupational enhancement and optimization.

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And certainly, just by flipping those things around, if we can make something

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called better, we can also identify those substrates and targets that could then make it worse.

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And as a consequence, the relative dual usability of the biosciences is relatively high.

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So to prevent that level of escalation, and or as Bob McRate refers to it,

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it is brain scientific brainsmanship, I think a relative level of clarity is necessary

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understanding that in some cases, opacity and frank transparency might be limited because of issues

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of what is classified and what is not.

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But I think at least understanding that there should be definable parameters that need to remain

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a pace of the science.

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And that's one of the problems with very, very rapidly progressing science and technology.

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Such as that, which you have in the brain sciences, which is a characteristically,

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the policies in the guidelines tend to lag a bit behind.

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And those lags and create opportunistic gaps for furthering programs of research development,

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testing and evaluation that could be diverted to dual use or in fact that could be used explicitly

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for national security intelligence and defense operations.

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So one of the things that we've been calling for working with my colleagues, Diane Duelis,

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Dr. Dan Gersh, thine of the Rand Corporation, has been a revisitation of the biological toxins

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and weapons and chemical weapons conventions to more appropriately assess, define, and categorize

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what things are weapons, what things are weaponizable, what tools and techniques are available

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to create such weaponizable trajectories and how the nature of the discourse and perhaps

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of surveillance needs to change, so as to allow for more effective oversight and governance.

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You've hinted at this a little bit so far with the mention of dual use, mentioned about

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capacity, and you know this in your article as well, that strict regulation of neuroweapons

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might not quite be feasible, but that developing a set of ethical frameworks could be useful

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for guiding future policies and biotechnology and its applications.

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In your opinion, what should those ethical frameworks look like?

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But, well, you know, again, I have to have a deep nod of homage to my colleagues

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with whom I worked on the European Union Human Brain Project, the SP12 subprogram that looked

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at philosophy and ethics, and particularly group that I was involved with and had the pleasure

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to be engaged with for a couple of years, which was their their task force on dual use

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brain science. And again, a deep, deep nod to my colleague Nicholas Rose of King's College to

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my colleague Atinka Evers of University of Uppsala, who were leading figures in this task force

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with whom I engaged. And I think what becomes important to understand is that when you're establishing

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ethical criteria, trying to attain some level of homogeneity and uniformity of adherence to

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ethical criteria is indeed balancing act. I also had the opportunity to work with some very esteemed

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colleagues of the organization of economic cooperation and development, and we were able to

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literally sit at the discourse table with the number of our international colleagues that are

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for all intents and purposes, at least commercial and economic competitors in the brain science

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and neurotechnology form. And what became very, very clear is that different cultures have different

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histories, different cultures have literally different geographies and different colleges,

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different cultures have different needs and values. And those needs and values very often are

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predicated upon those physical conditions that were part of their history or part of the current

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ecology, as well as their philosophies. And those philosophies are longstanding and can be

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filtered through relatively new lenses. And different philosophies will very often give rise to distinct

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ethics. Ethics is always about the effort. Ethics is always about the enterprise. Ethics is

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always about the endeavor. And if that endeavor is maintaining values, actions, ideals and more

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rays that are intrinsic to a culture historically and that are being upheld politically,

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then you're going to get varying ethics in ways that sometimes are grossly variant. And in other ways,

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that are more subtle and implicit. And the more global we become in these enterprises with regard

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to our international exchange and multinational exchange. And the more advanced the brain

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sciences as well as other sciences become. And as a consequence of that, their utility becomes

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apparent, not only in biomedicine and or in public life and occupational use where they might be

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leveraged economically in terms of soft weaponology and non-kinetic rebalancing. But also,

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literally being uptake into national security intelligence and defense operations or perhaps

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more specifically defined as warfare intelligence and national security operations wins.

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Well, that's what they're looking to do. They're looking to evoke some wind with regard to some

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form of a gemony, whether it's economic, whether it's geopolitical, and or whether it's economics

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and geopolitical also play into how these things are used in strategic tactical intelligence and

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military operations, whether by enhancing and enabling our own or by in some way influencing

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debilitating others. So the issue there becomes one of the ethical discourse. How do you go to the

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table and begin these discourses when a priori you understand that cultures are going to differ,

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needs are going to differ and they're also a certain nationalistic interest that need to be appreciated.

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That makes it difficult. That makes the types of ethics difficult that I think need to be leveraged

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and need to be perhaps developed. This is not to say that the ethical systems that are

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extant are ineffective, they certainly are, but I think that nuances of how those systems then

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come together on a common palette might need some level of revisitation and perhaps revision.

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So I was able to create a more cosmopolitan viewpoint that also has more community and

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more local senses of applications. Where it does get tricky is where you begin to deal with the

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ethics of utilizing science and technologies, national security intelligence defense and

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welfare intelligence and national security initiatives, operations and agendas.

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Because the nature of those operations, the nature of those agendas, are towards some level of

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a gemony and or superiority and advantage. And many times that information does exist on a classified

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side where transparency is less than full. So engaging those discourses I think will take some

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level of sophistication to be able to understand not only where the research is at present,

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but what can temporary or heart research obtains and entails and perhaps implies for developments

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within the next five to ten years, ten to twenty years and then beyond. We've described those as we

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mentioned last time as particular vistas of scientific technological as well as social development.

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The most proximate being the vista or zone of probability, those things that have a high

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probability of coming to fruition or that already are in that tech readiness pathway.

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Those things from let's say six to 15 years represents the zones of possibility, the vista of

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possibility by realizing certain probabilities now, the next five years, I then open up a

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new vista of what things might be possible as those things come to fruition or realization.

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And then looking into the future to the 16 to 30 year vista is really the zone of potentiality.

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And it becomes important to engage those discourses to say, do we have the ethical tool kit

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at present to be able to navigate across those vistas? And or unless we see that they might be

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new ethical situations, ethical legal situations, international and political situations that are

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predicated upon particular trajectories of advancement of these technologies across those vistas,

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that might necessitate revisitation, potential revision, and perhaps even development of certain

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ethical precepts, principles and engagements of new. So to wrap things up, thinking to the future,

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what keeps you up at night in the space? Well, you know, I think there are a few things.

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I think when you begin to open the door to technologies that are easily acquired and methods

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that are easily relatively easy to perform, that require nominal or minimal training and that access

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is very viable, clearly what you then do is you make something more accessible and more available

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to a broader range of individuals, not only nation states, but also non-state actors,

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roads, proxies, etc. There has been some concern, for example, about to do it yourself community,

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the fobiohacker community. And I want to say explicitly that no one is viewing that community as

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inherently problematic, and I certainly am not. I think the idea of public science as we're moving

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forward is more could become literate in STEM. Certainly as an interchangeable and I think

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very viable option to pursue. The problem with the do-it-yourself community is that there are certain

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gaps in those communities that then render that community and its participation in activities

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vulnerable, vulnerable to infiltration, vulnerable to influence, vulnerable to corruption. And that

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level of corruption can occur from a variety of levels. It can occur from a nation state that then

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infiltrates either its population of do-it-yourselfers or do-it-yourselfers elsewhere around the globe

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that are in fact already operable in some other sovereign state. End-or would it could then

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do is enable proxies to be able to work to fund certain things whereby other the information of

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the products then goes back to the proxy resource that was ultimately underlying funder. So the

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do-it-yourself community represents a potential point of vulnerability for infiltration and corruption.

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Only in that the nature of it itself can sometimes drift from its centerline. And what I mean by that

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is though, although 99% of that community practices good rigorous science and utilizes a variety of

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open institutional review boards and a self-policing, the nature of the community itself in

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that is in the public space. Actual to certain institutions with their oversight make those

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chunks in its potential armor viable. And with those viability there's vulnerability, which is why

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ongoing programs for example for our federal bureau investigation and interpol have looked

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very strongly to work cooperatively with to do it yourself or a biohacker community so as to be able

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to be self-protective and purport some level of protection provides a level of protection

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that would then in some cases sure up some of those gaps that then would be representative of

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vulnerabilities that could be penetrated by various nefarious nation states and darker

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perishes actors. Point one. The other thing that does keep me up at night is the ubiquity of data and

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information on three levels. Number one, what I'll call real information, real data, the growing capability,

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the developments and advancement of not only big data resources and tools, but also the

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yoking of big data in the sciences and technology to additional sciences and technology such as

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decision technologies and artificial intelligence on a variety of scales. That makes data and information

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very viable and valuable for a host of different uses and where there are uses. There's the

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potential for inadvertent misuse and there's also the potential for abuse or intentional abuse

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and misuse. Number one, number two, that viability of information I think is also becoming ubiquitous

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in the public space and the more information that we're receiving, the more potential

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misinformation we're receiving. The issue here is that the more capable we become in various areas of

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science and technology and brain science and technology of course notwithstanding and in some cases I

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would argue ever more so because there are still unknowns about brain science. There are still unknowns

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unanswered questions and problems about what the brain is and how the brain does what it does.

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Misinformation can be a problematic thing. It can lead to public attitudes, values,

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anticipations, anxieties that may be in some cases exaggerated in another cases under appreciative.

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And to think that level of knowledge is going to be important as the brain science is in other

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sciences advance. So as to make the public aware not in a way that is anxiously apprehensive

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but aware in a way that is salient and sentinel of what is going on in the sciences and the

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potential benefits as well as burdens and risks that these may pose and in so doing, understanding

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that that public is a constituency for politics and it's that interaction between the polis

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and our elected officials that will help to create that type of engine in bio-security that will be

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far more better equipped to informed and think capable in terms of our bio-security preparedness,

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readiness and response engaging that whole of government to hold a nation approach that we advocate.

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Dr. Jardano, that's it for my end. Thanks again for your kind today. As always it's a pleasure

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having you. Thank you. Thank you so much for your ongoing interest in my work.

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Thank you for joining the HDI Act podcast to learn more about our other services,

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