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Tonight, I'm abandoning the future.

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We're taking a close look at the collision between open society and surveillance, with guests,

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Bruce Schneider and Julian Sanchez stay tuned for What's Next After What's Next.

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100,000 BC Stone Tools, 4000 BC, the wheel, 9th century AD is gunpowder.

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19th century, you'll recover the light bulb, 20th century.

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The automobile, television, nuclear weapons.

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We choose to go to the moon and disdicate and do the other thing.

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Not because they are easy, but because they are hard.

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The future doesn't belong to the thing target.

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Everything around you that you call life was made up by people that were no smarter than you.

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And you can change it. You can influence it. You can build your own things that other people can use.

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People want their technology to have a sense of humanity. They want it to understand me.

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Specifically.

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We have 3 billion new minds coming online to work with us to solve the grand challenges.

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The rate at which the technology is getting faster itself, getting faster.

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To a point that we have the potential to create a world of abundance.

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Thank you.

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Thank you.

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I'm happy to be back here with the future.

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Tonight shows a little bit different than our usual show.

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Today I come out and talk about technologies that get me excited.

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Tonight it's going to be a rather different perspective.

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It turns out that the digital technologies that so delight us and brought us so much abundance in information and new ways to communicate and share ideas.

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We're going to take a look at that tonight.

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It turns out that these technologies are in use around us right now.

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For instance, you're familiar with the idea of a hacker who might be going after your social network account or credit card information or something like that.

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It turns out that they have a convention in Las Vegas.

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It's just like any organization that the black hat conference.

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In 2011, just a couple years ago, one of these hackers presented a paper where he proved that he can actually wearously hack into an insulin pump or a heart meter and actually hack it from distance in a way he can send a jolt to that person and commit the perfect crime by killing them in a way that we totally undetectable.

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That's a scary thought.

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Some of the manufacturers are already working on cloaking technologies to prevent that from happening.

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Just last week, the National Intelligence estimate was published.

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This is a document that details how China has a massive sustained campaign underway right now to hack into multinational corporations.

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And as it turns out, more than 50 corporations are under almost constant assault in this way.

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More than 50 corporations per week are hacked into an average of almost two times a week.

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They're internet defences are successfully penetrated.

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So this is a real present threat that's happening.

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And it's not just the overseas threats that are happening.

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This technology is starting to pervade our life.

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It's becoming actually a scaredly commonplace.

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There are already companies, retailers that are experimenting with cameras that will track you as you walk into the store.

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And they'll compare your face to faces that have faced images that have been tagged on Facebook.

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This facial recognition technology that's so prevalent.

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Not just on Facebook, but also Apple and Google and other companies have promoted.

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And that's not all.

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Some companies are starting to use this in a way that I feel is almost unfair, where in a job interview situation,

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a corporation made demand that you relinquish your Facebook credentials or your Twitter account,

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so that they can get a better understanding of your habits and how you communicate who you're connected to.

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And that's a little bit or well-in, I think.

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And perhaps most creepy of all, just this last week, Raytheon, a major defense contractor, announced a new program called Riot.

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It's the rapid information overlay technology.

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What this allows them to do is assess in mass of scale.

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People's behavior in social networks so that they can predict future behavior.

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And this starts to take on a creepy sci-fi theme.

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Now, some people feel that privacy's over.

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Just a decade ago, the CEO of Sun Microsystem Scott McNeely said this.

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He said, you have zero privacy anyway, so folks get over it.

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That's the world that he envisioned.

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We want to hear from you.

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We'd like to know what you think about this issue.

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And you can certainly use the hashtag ITF, until that is known.

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I noticed that some people before the show have already started to send in questions on Facebook.

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And on livestream, you can chat in and offer your questions and comments as well.

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After tonight's show, we're going to stick around a little while for some live Q&A with the audience about this.

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But first, what I want to do is introduce our experts with two fantastic guests for you tonight.

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And first, let's bring on stage one of the most renowned security experts in the world.

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Bruce Schneier, Bruce welcome to the show.

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Thanks for joining us.

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So, you are well known as a kind of pundit about security and the issues that we're going to talk about tonight.

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And your services are also in high demand for organizations all over the world.

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What people might not know is that you have a fantastic newsletter.

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They can sign up for it's where I learn about these issues and I've been fairly quite a while.

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Well, Bruce also recently published this book, Liars and Outliers.

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Tell me a little bit about this book is this on this topic or...

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Well, it is in sort of a meta-way.

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What I'm looking at is the notion of why security exists and I'm looking at trust.

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And really if you think about society, we need trust to make it work.

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And you got this audience here and I'm looking at them and not one of them is jumped up and attacked the person sitting next to them.

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You laugh, but if there was an audience full of chimpanzees, we couldn't get away with it.

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Humans are the only species that can sit there quietly and society works because of this.

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And there's a whole bunch of reasons, right?

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One of them might want to muggle the other person or steal my iPad back in the dressing room.

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But they don't for a whole bunch of reasons.

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Right?

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How to secure it there.

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And we have a social construct that keeps us all looking out for each other.

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It's social legal.

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There's a lot of things going on there.

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So the nature of society requires some measure of trust to function.

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But in some respect, this might be getting undermined.

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For instance, this topic of hackers, it keeps coming up.

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People are very familiar with it.

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But from what I've read, you think it's kind of an overblown idea.

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Sometimes it's overhyped.

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Well, we do tend to overhype the criminal threats.

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And it's really what makes headlines what sells newspapers.

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We like to hype the tax from China, cyber terrorists, cyber war.

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Basic cyber crime, stealing money, I think, is under-reported.

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Okay.

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More have people to make a news.

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That accounts for almost two-thirds of all crime is now internet crime.

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I don't know if that number's accurate, but I've heard that.

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It's really hard to count.

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It's hard to make.

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It's certainly a lot of it.

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Okay.

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So we can't dismiss it.

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It's a real thing.

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But tonight we're going to cover a number of threats.

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We've always started with a funny idea here.

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So I hacker in Montana hacked into a local TV station.

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And you get into the emergency alert system there.

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And he sent out the message that the zombies are attacking right now.

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So sometimes it's malicious hacking.

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Sometimes it's just for fun.

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It's like a prank.

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And we've seen many examples of that.

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One thing you might not know is the prevalence of this.

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How often this is happening.

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So for the audience, you might wonder what these four things have in question.

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The picture in the screen.

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The New York Times, Twitter, the Bush family, and the US Federal Reserve.

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Well, the answer is that last week these guys were all subjects to massive hacking intrusions.

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And so it's a wide range of targets.

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And this is going on so frequently.

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We hear about it.

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So frequently we kind of get numb too.

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And it's interesting.

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It's a different people in each case.

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You know, we believe New York Times was Chinese.

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The Bush family was, I think, politically motivated.

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Federal Reserve was the anonymous group.

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So as some kind of political statement, Twitter I don't know.

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Let's pretend it was a criminal.

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You've got an array of different threats here.

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So the paranoia of justified a little bit.

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We hear about the hackers.

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But let's turn to another subject which is these Chinese intrusions.

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Because we heard so much.

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Coming out of Davos.

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We heard so many companies grumble, complain.

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In some ways they were a little bit ashamed to admit that they have this problem.

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Kind of a growing problem.

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That they're being hacked constantly.

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And it seems to be true.

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I mean, everyone's pretty much hack constantly all the time.

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There's a lot of hacking coming out of China.

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Largely politically motivated.

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The attack gets in New York Times.

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The attackers were looking for names of informants.

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A very political thing.

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Presumably for government reprisal.

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We don't know if the attacks were done by the government.

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They were done by independent people working.

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They were in China with nationalistic.

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It's a weird China.

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We don't know.

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It sounds like it's the government.

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There's no way to prove that allegation.

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It actually is no way to prove it's China.

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What the problems we have is you don't know where attacks are coming from.

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You can't trace and attack backwards.

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Often when we know we know from other channels.

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One of the things that's most chilling about that New York Times hack is that

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more than 50 computers were actually penetrated.

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And they stole all the passwords.

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Which means it's probably likely that some of those computers have a Trojan horse

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and them somewhere or a back door that's been opened up.

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They can come back in anytime.

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It's hard to tell.

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If you read the reports and it turns out everyone gets hacked.

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If you hack the New York Times, you end up with 2400 word.

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Newspaper article about it.

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So we know a lot about this.

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They say they they quite an early.

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They let it go on for a couple of months to track exactly what's happening.

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They knew we're all the back doors and they closed them.

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Where they perfect.

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We have no idea.

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They think they were and they look like they did a good job.

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We don't know but that certainly is a problem.

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The Wall Street Journal admitted they were hacked as well.

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And when you're talking about the Wall Street Journal, you know they're going to be

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others.

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Yeah that's true.

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Some that might not have even realized it.

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And some companies couldn't really reveal that information.

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And newspaper can because it's news for them.

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But it's also embarrassing.

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And a lot of cases if you're a bank, if you're a big company,

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you admit this, you stock price might go down, you might lose customers.

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Yeah customers worry how safe is my data.

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How much can I relive this partner?

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Now some people characterize this as cyber warfare.

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And I've actually read where people people say we have a massive cyber war that's under way right now.

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And it's the US versus China but other countries are involved as well.

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Iran sometimes they mention Israel or France.

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How serious do you think this cyber war counts up this?

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Now I think a cyber war is largely rhetoric.

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I mean it's not war.

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We know what war looks like.

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I mean this is espionage.

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It's not a military action that involves guns and bombs and people dying.

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The cyber war rhetoric I actually think is largely put in place by the US,

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by government corporations that are profiting from it.

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The US cyber command announced last month they're expanding from 900 people to about 5,000 people.

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We can kind of stir up people and get support for a massive excuse.

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Well because you think about, we're really weird with war.

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We love to use the word war in this no war.

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We're on terror war and crime war on drugs.

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We love rhetorical wars.

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We hate using the word war in this actual war.

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We'll use it with say anything else other than war.

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And this is a metaphorical war is accepted.

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It's what it's like.

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But what's going on here is kind of aspects of both.

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So what's, I mean the war on drugs is clearly not a war.

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The cyber attacks, well you know there's some kind of stuff going on and involves military.

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And it involves nations and some respect and there's some, there's, there's books.

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You know so in a way it is kind of war but it's a shadow war.

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My fear is that we're in the early years of a cyber war arms race.

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That there's a lot, and not just China, the US too.

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NATO, other countries, we're pouring a lot of money into cyber attacks, cyber defense.

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It's a huge growth industry.

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That's true.

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And if you think about,

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the Trump Begith law, or every single day, you coined the term wholesale surveillance to describe the way governments are kind of hovering up data.

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And in the US, in the US, it's frankly because of the massive expansion of Homeland Security after 9.11.

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Let's take a look at wholesale surveillance by the numbers.

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So the first number I'm going to show you is 300.

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This is the number of times a citizen of the United Kingdom is videotaped on average every single day as it passed through the UK.

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There are about 5 million CCTV cameras in the UK, the most heavily surveyed country in the world.

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One third, this number represents the percentage of US Air Force craft that our autonomous drones.

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Most people are unaware that we have 7,500 drone aircraft in the US Air Force right now.

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That number is increasing rapidly.

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And by the way, the Air Force isn't the only government branch that has drone aircraft.

238
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We'll get into drones a bit more.

239
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But the number that struck me was 40.

240
00:13:52,360 --> 00:13:58,360
40 is the number of attacks every single day by drones in Afghanistan.

241
00:13:58,360 --> 00:14:01,360
I was unaware of this until I started putting together the research for this show.

242
00:14:01,360 --> 00:14:05,360
So last year on average every day there were 40 drone attacks in Afghanistan.

243
00:14:06,360 --> 00:14:13,360
76, this is the number of nations that are rapidly scrambling to get their own drone Air Force fleet.

244
00:14:13,360 --> 00:14:16,360
So still in the United States won't be the only country that has drone aircraft.

245
00:14:16,360 --> 00:14:21,360
And they're seeking to either develop the technology themselves or acquire it on the market.

246
00:14:21,360 --> 00:14:24,360
Now this big number, 878,000.

247
00:14:24,360 --> 00:14:32,360
That's a number of hours of audio that have been recorded in 2012 by the FBI in surveillance here in the United States.

248
00:14:32,360 --> 00:14:41,360
And this number is staggering 29 million electronic files that were gathered by the FBI last year in surveillance in the United States.

249
00:14:41,360 --> 00:14:48,360
So this is that some of these numbers reflect the massive expansion of electronic surveillance that's happening right now.

250
00:14:48,360 --> 00:14:54,360
And to help us talk about this, let me introduce our next guest, who comes to us from Washington DC folks.

251
00:14:54,360 --> 00:14:57,360
It's Julian Sanchez from the K to the Institute.

252
00:14:57,360 --> 00:15:04,360
Hi, welcome to the show. Thanks for joining us.

253
00:15:04,360 --> 00:15:10,360
So Julian, you actually have been covering these topics on the web as part of your responsibility at the K to the Institute.

254
00:15:10,360 --> 00:15:18,360
But also as a journalist for some time, you're an expert in the subject of privacy and law and the electronic surveillance.

255
00:15:18,360 --> 00:15:20,360
As far as anyone can be.

256
00:15:20,360 --> 00:15:22,360
Well that's a rapidly evolving topic.

257
00:15:22,360 --> 00:15:29,360
One of the things we talked about earlier today, and we're getting ready, was the expansion really began after 9-11.

258
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We had kind of a state of emergency. My observation is it's a permanent state of emergency. Doesn't seem like there's any end in sight.

259
00:15:35,360 --> 00:15:39,360
Well that's right. It's not a conventional war where you beat the enemy and then they're gone.

260
00:15:39,360 --> 00:15:42,360
It's a war and a sense on a concept terror.

261
00:15:42,360 --> 00:15:49,360
And as long as there are angry young men somewhere who, 18-90 states, still be a justification for that threat.

262
00:15:49,360 --> 00:15:52,360
And we keep lobbying in predator drones with Tomahawk.

263
00:15:52,360 --> 00:15:57,360
Misses will probably create a whole new generation of terrorists who wish to get them to run out.

264
00:15:57,360 --> 00:15:58,360
Yeah, that's right.

265
00:15:58,360 --> 00:16:06,360
Now, tell me a little bit about Homeland Security, which really is a relatively new thing, but that's been the locus of this big government expansion.

266
00:16:06,360 --> 00:16:11,360
And what they really do is they combine the whole bunch of different government departments together under one mandate.

267
00:16:11,360 --> 00:16:14,360
Tell me a little bit about the growth of that, and then some of the other organizations.

268
00:16:14,360 --> 00:16:23,360
Well, that's one part of it. The DHS gets a lot of attention. They're perhaps the most visible in the form of TSA, the people who are grouping you as you get on a plane.

269
00:16:23,360 --> 00:16:29,360
It's really though, I think, not the biggest expansion of the surveillance states since 9-11.

270
00:16:29,360 --> 00:16:36,360
The problem is that a lot of this stuff happens below this surface. It's hard to get numbers, frankly, about a lot of the activity that's going on.

271
00:16:36,360 --> 00:16:47,360
And on widening the senator from Oregon has been trying to get data from the national security agency about how many Americans they've gotten their database, and they essentially refuse to provide even an estimate.

272
00:16:47,360 --> 00:16:52,360
They say they can't even provide a ballpark guess as to how many Americans are sitting in their database.

273
00:16:52,360 --> 00:17:05,360
And that's a database that is enormous because they're actually required them to build a multi-yata-bites data center in Utah to store the products of the 1.6-year-old.

274
00:17:05,360 --> 00:17:17,360
And that's one point seven billion communications they're intercepting every day. A yada by the way is about a quadrillion gigabytes. They don't actually have a higher unit than that.

275
00:17:17,360 --> 00:17:26,360
So one thing that's having we talked about is that the price of storage has dropped so much that we can now do something that's totally unprecedented, which is store everything.

276
00:17:26,360 --> 00:17:32,360
So in the past, if you were going to do surveillance or wear a tab, you had to be kind of selective about it because there wasn't a way to record it easily.

277
00:17:32,360 --> 00:17:40,360
They can and they can also do analysis later after the fact to find out if there was any evidence of a crime or even a pattern that might suggest illegal behavior.

278
00:17:40,360 --> 00:17:45,360
Well, this fundamentally changes how surveillance works. We used to how we see it on television, follow that car.

279
00:17:45,360 --> 00:17:46,360
That's surveillance.

280
00:17:46,360 --> 00:17:55,360
But now it's follow every car. And actually it's follow every car all the time and we can follow that car six months ago because we've saved the data.

281
00:17:55,360 --> 00:18:01,360
So surveillance changes and it's a lot of ways it's not because of malice.

282
00:18:01,360 --> 00:18:04,360
Computers produce data.

283
00:18:04,360 --> 00:18:12,360
Whenever you use your credit card, your cell phone, your computer, data about what you're doing and where is produced.

284
00:18:12,360 --> 00:18:19,360
And as data storage drops to free as data processing drops to free, it's easy to save it.

285
00:18:19,360 --> 00:18:26,360
And so you have company saving it, like a Facebook, a Google, it's their saving and governments are saving it. They're trading data.

286
00:18:26,360 --> 00:18:31,360
Right. You know, a Google provides data to governments when asked on their social media.

287
00:18:31,360 --> 00:18:32,360
Sometimes not.

288
00:18:32,360 --> 00:18:46,360
Sometimes not. And often we don't know. I mean, a last month a bunch of human rights individuals asked politely Microsoft to tell them who they're letting spy on Skype video calls.

289
00:18:46,360 --> 00:18:48,360
Right. So we're asking.

290
00:18:48,360 --> 00:18:49,360
Do you think it in answer?

291
00:18:49,360 --> 00:18:50,360
We did not yet.

292
00:18:50,360 --> 00:18:54,360
This is one of the concerns. There's a growing world of surveillance. We know that a lot of it's happening.

293
00:18:54,360 --> 00:18:57,360
We know a lot of money is being spent. We don't know where. We don't know what the recording.

294
00:18:57,360 --> 00:19:06,360
And we often have no choice. I mean, I like to think, you know, I don't like to think this, but it's true that a Google knows more about my interest than my wife does.

295
00:19:06,360 --> 00:19:07,360
Yeah.

296
00:19:07,360 --> 00:19:08,360
That's a little freaky.

297
00:19:08,360 --> 00:19:11,360
And they're able to predict better what you might do next because of the pattern.

298
00:19:11,360 --> 00:19:13,360
It can match your pattern against another cohort.

299
00:19:13,360 --> 00:19:16,360
And I've kind of never even met Google. That alone got out of it.

300
00:19:16,360 --> 00:19:19,360
Here's a question from Twitter.

301
00:19:19,360 --> 00:19:24,360
And the question is minority report. How long until we can predict when people will commit crimes?

302
00:19:24,360 --> 00:19:27,360
So how soon do you see that coming in the future?

303
00:19:27,360 --> 00:19:30,360
Well, what do we ask? How long before we can predict probably never?

304
00:19:30,360 --> 00:19:32,360
I mean, that's I don't think of the things we can predict.

305
00:19:32,360 --> 00:19:36,360
How long before we're going to start using the ability that we think we can predict?

306
00:19:36,360 --> 00:19:37,360
We're doing it today.

307
00:19:37,360 --> 00:19:39,360
That's true. That's what the rate the environment for.

308
00:19:39,360 --> 00:19:41,360
That's what the no fly list is.

309
00:19:41,360 --> 00:19:46,360
When we predict that you are so dangerous that you're not allowed to fly for any reason,

310
00:19:46,360 --> 00:19:48,360
yet so innocent we can't arrest you.

311
00:19:48,360 --> 00:19:50,360
Kind of a weird mixed bag of people.

312
00:19:50,360 --> 00:19:54,360
So those things are coming and I think they're going to become more and more.

313
00:19:54,360 --> 00:20:01,360
I think as technology gets more dangerous as the things a bad guy can do increase.

314
00:20:01,360 --> 00:20:04,360
To me think about bio printers, think about homemade.

315
00:20:04,360 --> 00:20:07,360
I mean, all the things we're scared of homemade nuclear weapons.

316
00:20:07,360 --> 00:20:09,360
Some of the topics we've covered on the show.

317
00:20:09,360 --> 00:20:14,360
So those things get scarier, the desire to stop someone before the fact.

318
00:20:14,360 --> 00:20:18,360
And the only normal crime prevention is they have to the fact.

319
00:20:18,360 --> 00:20:20,360
Right? We're going to let you murder somebody.

320
00:20:20,360 --> 00:20:25,360
And I'm going to arrest you after the fact that only works if I can live with the murder rate.

321
00:20:25,360 --> 00:20:31,360
But that's not going to work if you're able to print a pathogen that drops a species.

322
00:20:31,360 --> 00:20:36,360
So would there will be an incredible push for this before the fact?

323
00:20:36,360 --> 00:20:40,360
Preemptive strike. Right. Which is the minority port type of future.

324
00:20:40,360 --> 00:20:43,360
It's going to be loud so it's not going to work, but people are going to want it.

325
00:20:43,360 --> 00:20:46,360
I don't think that's what's going on in Yemen today.

326
00:20:46,360 --> 00:20:48,360
Right? So we now ask the signature strikes.

327
00:20:48,360 --> 00:20:54,360
Exactly. NBC released this, you know, this perwine document from the attorneys that basically

328
00:20:54,360 --> 00:21:01,360
goes Obama permission slip to go ahead and assassinate American citizens off US soil using a robot and sky.

329
00:21:01,360 --> 00:21:10,360
Okay. So that occurred. What are they actually aiming for? They're not going for people who are in the process of conducting some sort of terrorist incidents or building a bomb or something.

330
00:21:10,360 --> 00:21:14,360
They're targeting people who are at home. They're targeting people who are at a celebration, a wedding party or something.

331
00:21:14,360 --> 00:21:17,360
People aren't actually doing anything necessarily criminals.

332
00:21:17,360 --> 00:21:22,360
The intent, the possibility, as you say, they're targeting and based on behavior in some measure of prediction.

333
00:21:22,360 --> 00:21:30,360
Well, it's interesting. I mean, they're as moderately higher bar for American citizens. This is a strict standard, right?

334
00:21:30,360 --> 00:21:40,360
They have to be an imminent threat and captures infeasible, except imminent. It turns out doesn't really mean imminent because it doesn't have to be any kind of particular plot that they know is ongoing.

335
00:21:40,360 --> 00:21:48,360
So imminent means something other than imminent. And capture being infeasible means, I mean, I think basically it would be easier to kill them.

336
00:21:48,360 --> 00:21:50,360
Yeah, it could be convenient. I think rather than infeasible.

337
00:21:50,360 --> 00:21:58,360
You know, if you had the bad taste to be born somewhere other than United States, you know, you don't even get that level of protection.

338
00:21:58,360 --> 00:22:11,360
Again, most of the drone strikes are happening now or so called signature strikes, meaning it's not. There's a particular person who's targeted, but, you know, five, twenty-year-old, you know, Arab males are congregated somewhere.

339
00:22:11,360 --> 00:22:15,360
And well, that's either a terrorist, clot or a wedding, but better be safe than sorry.

340
00:22:15,360 --> 00:22:16,360
Take them out.

341
00:22:16,360 --> 00:22:25,360
Tell me a little bit of a total information awareness. This program that Admiral Poindex, you're proposed more than a decade ago, but I thought it went away, but it seems maybe it's coming back.

342
00:22:25,360 --> 00:22:34,360
Wait, no, I mean the problem there was that terrible branding. They called it total information awareness, which sounds creepy, and then they had a logo that was like an eye and a pyramid with beams coming down the earth.

343
00:22:34,360 --> 00:22:38,360
So this time to terrifying the South-Fyre Road to column, you know, freaking out about it.

344
00:22:38,360 --> 00:22:48,360
Everyone was duly alarmed, Congress, nominally killed it, but ended up getting essentially fragmented into a bunch of different programs that were farmed out to parts of DHS or DARPA.

345
00:22:48,360 --> 00:23:01,360
I think the NSA's Pinwheel Databases, in some sense, an offshoot of that. Pinwheel is, again, on this model, a kind of vast database that allows kind of googling for communications.

346
00:23:01,360 --> 00:23:19,360
They've shifted from that kind of targeted model, get a warrant, have an individual wire tap their conversations, much more toward a model than those, some people have called it sitting on the wire, sucking everything, and then after the fact, figure out the search parameters are interested, go through, pull stuff up.

347
00:23:19,360 --> 00:23:28,360
And that's concerning anything, because, you know, when Jay had Gervouver ran the FBI and was abusing surveillance for political purposes, at least he had to target particular people.

348
00:23:28,360 --> 00:23:34,360
You know, he's going to decide that Martin Luther King is going to be spied on and then they're going to try and drive into suicide.

349
00:23:34,360 --> 00:23:45,360
Now, this stuff is sitting in a database for 30 years. If they happen to sweep you up and then in 10 years you're running for Congress, someone can after the fact decide you're worth scrutinizing.

350
00:23:45,360 --> 00:23:54,360
It's even, it's even that behavior that's legal today could change in the future and there'll be some record of it, and that could be embarrassing on the one hand, but it might be that after the fact it's illegal.

351
00:23:54,360 --> 00:23:58,360
Or even not, I mean, we all do things that are embarrassing because we're human.

352
00:23:58,360 --> 00:24:04,360
Yeah. You know, if everything is swept up, then the likelihood of being untoubled by somebody.

353
00:24:04,360 --> 00:24:14,360
And if you can selectively edit it, and we see this now in political campaigns, you know, you're now living in a world where pretty much every candidate is followed 24-7 by the opposing party with a camera.

354
00:24:14,360 --> 00:24:17,360
Because the goodness say something that's embarrassing.

355
00:24:17,360 --> 00:24:21,360
Literally, then we've got 10 seconds, and it's a beautiful embarrassing quote, and you run with it.

356
00:24:21,360 --> 00:24:22,360
They run like crazy.

357
00:24:22,360 --> 00:24:30,360
We know one of the things the intelligence agencies like to do with the fruits of surveillance information is use it to coerce people into becoming informants.

358
00:24:30,360 --> 00:24:43,360
You know, FBI now has 15,000 informants, like 10 times more than Hoover ever added the peak of Cointel Pro, the kind of vast spying and infiltration network, you know, looking at civil rights on anti-war groups.

359
00:24:43,360 --> 00:24:50,360
And one way to do that is to say, hey, we found out that you're having an affair. Why don't you spying your mask for us?

360
00:24:50,360 --> 00:24:54,360
There was a case here in Chicago, a good guy named Ibrahim Mishol, I think.

361
00:24:54,360 --> 00:25:03,360
They said, look, we know that you had communications with a cleric in the Middle East. They were innocuous, but that's enough of a pretext to get someone put on the no-fly list.

362
00:25:03,360 --> 00:25:07,360
If your business requires you to travel, that's a huge obstacle.

363
00:25:07,360 --> 00:25:11,360
And they said, well, we can get you off the no-fly list if you're willing to cooperate.

364
00:25:11,360 --> 00:25:17,360
If you're willing to tell us what people are saying at your mask, and he's currently now suing the Justice Department over this.

365
00:25:17,360 --> 00:25:20,360
So the information is gathered up in this kind of broad sweep.

366
00:25:20,360 --> 00:25:27,360
Sometimes without a worth, in any case, Warren's a targeted individual here, we're taking information wholesale as you footage.

367
00:25:27,360 --> 00:25:33,360
Hoovering it up, and then it's analyzed later, and then if something embarrassing, awkward emerges, now they've got leverage on somebody.

368
00:25:33,360 --> 00:25:40,360
It might not even be illegal activities, you point out, but it's leverage to coerce them into cooperating with the government and doing the government's bidding.

369
00:25:40,360 --> 00:25:50,360
And this is our government, now I'm assuming that this is happening all around the world, and probably countries that don't have the same due process and constitutional rights and privileges that we have in this country.

370
00:25:50,360 --> 00:25:57,360
And I mean, it's certainly true, and we know that US technologies being exported to totalitarian regimes for reburberry purposes.

371
00:25:57,360 --> 00:26:00,360
Government of Syria, government of Egypt, government of Iran.

372
00:26:00,360 --> 00:26:08,360
We know those technologies are being used to identify people who are blogging, who are tweeting anti-government.

373
00:26:08,360 --> 00:26:18,360
That's right, after the Arab Spring, it's almost a certain bet that every authoritarian government now has a system in place to track those people who are outspoken, bloggers, tweeters, and so forth.

374
00:26:18,360 --> 00:26:21,360
Now, Bruce, I put this picture in for you.

375
00:26:22,360 --> 00:26:26,360
So why don't we go to this picture fall, kind of if we can show this to the audience.

376
00:26:26,360 --> 00:26:30,360
It says premises protected by a false sense of security.

377
00:26:30,360 --> 00:26:33,360
You claim the term security feeder.

378
00:26:33,360 --> 00:26:42,360
It tells me a little bit about that, because this is how most Americans experience the federal government, most frequently now, as we go through an airport, we get an encounter with a federal official.

379
00:26:42,360 --> 00:26:49,360
It's actually amazing that for most of us are the way we interact with national security is the TSA at airports.

380
00:26:49,360 --> 00:26:54,360
So security feeder is security that looks good but doesn't do anything.

381
00:26:54,360 --> 00:27:00,360
So great examples, I don't have people to remember, right after 9-11, if you were flying, you saw national guard troops at airports.

382
00:27:00,360 --> 00:27:05,360
They would just have to security checkpoints, they were on a rubber map, they had uniforms, carrying a big gun.

383
00:27:05,360 --> 00:27:06,360
They were like 20.

384
00:27:06,360 --> 00:27:08,360
I mean, their kids.

385
00:27:08,360 --> 00:27:10,360
Those guns had no bullets.

386
00:27:10,360 --> 00:27:12,360
Because, I mean, they were kids.

387
00:27:12,360 --> 00:27:14,360
They would not have, they would be dangerous.

388
00:27:14,360 --> 00:27:16,360
That's right, security feeder.

389
00:27:16,360 --> 00:27:21,360
It looks good, it might make you feel better, but it's not going to do anything.

390
00:27:21,360 --> 00:27:23,360
Has the TSA program been effective?

391
00:27:23,360 --> 00:27:27,360
I mean, are there that many people trying to smuggle weapons on airplanes?

392
00:27:27,360 --> 00:27:29,360
Are they going to repeat the same attacks at 9-11?

393
00:27:29,360 --> 00:27:30,360
You know, so it seems not.

394
00:27:30,360 --> 00:27:32,360
I always think of the game this way, right?

395
00:27:32,360 --> 00:27:34,360
It's kind of us diverse to the terrorists.

396
00:27:34,360 --> 00:27:38,360
So we screen for guns and bombs, the terrorists use box cutters.

397
00:27:38,360 --> 00:27:42,360
We take away box cutters, they put a bomb in their shoes.

398
00:27:42,360 --> 00:27:44,360
We screen shoes, they use liquids.

399
00:27:44,360 --> 00:27:47,360
They put a bomb in their underwear.

400
00:27:47,360 --> 00:27:50,360
We have full-body scanners that are going to do something else.

401
00:27:50,360 --> 00:27:52,360
This is actually a dumb game.

402
00:27:52,360 --> 00:27:55,360
It is dumb game in the way it is like shutting the gate after the horse is going.

403
00:27:55,360 --> 00:27:58,360
I mean, so the smart game is you pick your attack.

404
00:27:58,360 --> 00:28:00,360
I pick my defense and we see who wins.

405
00:28:00,360 --> 00:28:03,360
The dumb game is, I pick my defense.

406
00:28:03,360 --> 00:28:04,360
You look at my defense.

407
00:28:04,360 --> 00:28:07,360
You pick your attack to bypass the defense.

408
00:28:07,360 --> 00:28:12,360
And so it seems that the TSA has largely been irrelevant.

409
00:28:12,360 --> 00:28:16,360
And they will talk about their success stories.

410
00:28:16,360 --> 00:28:20,360
And it's how many knives they take away and they find,

411
00:28:20,360 --> 00:28:24,360
they found somebody wearing a fake garment uniform and they confiscated a snake.

412
00:28:24,360 --> 00:28:27,360
It's not just actually on their website and they're proud of it.

413
00:28:27,360 --> 00:28:30,360
They used to show some of the confiscated weapons in the early days,

414
00:28:30,360 --> 00:28:31,360
but I think that's tapered off.

415
00:28:31,360 --> 00:28:33,360
No, because most people have learned don't bring a weapon.

416
00:28:33,360 --> 00:28:34,360
Or people do forget.

417
00:28:34,360 --> 00:28:37,360
People do bring guns on airplanes because they forget.

418
00:28:37,360 --> 00:28:39,360
It is kind of weird.

419
00:28:39,360 --> 00:28:42,360
You'd think everyone would know by now.

420
00:28:42,360 --> 00:28:47,360
But also, you know, people buy souvenirs and there's like a knife in the wood and the marrow.

421
00:28:47,360 --> 00:28:49,360
They didn't realize it.

422
00:28:49,360 --> 00:28:52,360
You know, snow globes are now legal again.

423
00:28:52,360 --> 00:28:54,360
You couldn't bring snow globes on airplanes.

424
00:28:54,360 --> 00:28:56,360
We're not actually sure why, but now they're okay.

425
00:28:56,360 --> 00:28:58,360
So, you know, the snow globes.

426
00:28:58,360 --> 00:29:02,360
No collectors can, I mean, the elephant, not in the room here.

427
00:29:02,360 --> 00:29:04,360
There's just a limited number of terrorists.

428
00:29:04,360 --> 00:29:08,360
This is like a line of work where if you're really competent, you blow yourself up.

429
00:29:08,360 --> 00:29:10,360
You know, you know, you can't really do that.

430
00:29:10,360 --> 00:29:12,360
You know, you can't really do that.

431
00:29:12,360 --> 00:29:14,360
You know, you can't really do that.

432
00:29:14,360 --> 00:29:16,360
You know, you can't really do that.

433
00:29:16,360 --> 00:29:18,360
You know, you can't really do that.

434
00:29:18,360 --> 00:29:20,360
You know, you can't really do that.

435
00:29:20,360 --> 00:29:22,360
You know, you can't really do that.

436
00:29:22,360 --> 00:29:24,360
You know, you can't really do that.

437
00:29:24,360 --> 00:29:26,360
You know, you can't really do that.

438
00:29:26,360 --> 00:29:28,360
You know, you can't really do that.

439
00:29:28,360 --> 00:29:30,360
You know, you can't really do that.

440
00:29:30,360 --> 00:29:32,360
You can't really do that.

441
00:29:32,360 --> 00:29:34,360
You can't really do that.

442
00:29:34,360 --> 00:29:36,360
You can't really do that.

443
00:29:36,360 --> 00:29:38,360
You can't really do that.

444
00:29:38,360 --> 00:29:40,360
You can't really do that.

445
00:29:40,360 --> 00:29:42,360
You can't really do that.

446
00:29:42,360 --> 00:29:44,360
You can't really do that.

447
00:29:44,360 --> 00:29:46,360
You can't really do that.

448
00:29:46,360 --> 00:29:48,360
You can't really do that.

449
00:29:48,360 --> 00:29:50,360
You can't really do that.

450
00:29:50,360 --> 00:29:52,360
You can't really do that.

451
00:29:52,360 --> 00:29:54,360
You can't really do that.

452
00:29:54,360 --> 00:29:56,360
You can't really do that.

453
00:29:56,360 --> 00:29:58,360
You can't really do that.

454
00:29:58,360 --> 00:30:00,360
You can't really do that.

455
00:30:00,360 --> 00:30:02,360
You can't really do that.

456
00:30:02,360 --> 00:30:04,360
You can't really do that.

457
00:30:04,360 --> 00:30:06,360
You can't really do that.

458
00:30:06,360 --> 00:30:08,360
You can't really do that.

459
00:30:08,360 --> 00:30:10,360
You can't really do that.

460
00:30:10,360 --> 00:30:12,360
You can't really do that.

461
00:30:12,360 --> 00:30:14,360
You can't really do that.

462
00:30:14,360 --> 00:30:16,360
You can't really do that.

463
00:30:16,360 --> 00:30:18,360
You can't really do that.

464
00:30:18,360 --> 00:30:20,360
You can't really do that.

465
00:30:20,360 --> 00:30:22,360
You can't really do that.

466
00:30:22,360 --> 00:30:24,360
You can't really do that.

467
00:30:24,360 --> 00:30:26,360
You can't really do that.

468
00:30:26,360 --> 00:30:28,360
You can't really do that.

469
00:30:28,360 --> 00:30:30,360
You can't really do that.

470
00:30:30,360 --> 00:30:32,360
You can't really do that.

471
00:30:32,360 --> 00:30:40,360
If all we do by spending billions on shoe scanning is to force the terrorist to make a minor change in their tactic.

472
00:30:40,360 --> 00:30:42,360
We're wasting our money.

473
00:30:42,360 --> 00:30:44,360
That's fundamentally the problem.

474
00:30:44,360 --> 00:30:48,360
It's inefficient on a massive scale.

475
00:30:48,360 --> 00:30:52,360
Speaking of inefficiency, these scanners that we're looking at the rapist scans,

476
00:30:52,360 --> 00:30:56,360
now I guess they're going to phase them out of the airports because they've been proven to be ineffective.

477
00:30:56,360 --> 00:30:58,360
After radiating us for a couple of years,

478
00:30:58,360 --> 00:31:01,360
now they're finding out that doesn't actually fart any kind of criminal activity.

479
00:31:01,360 --> 00:31:03,360
And because of these makers of these things,

480
00:31:03,360 --> 00:31:11,360
felt through on contracts that were supposed to allow them to just use a blob to show objects instead of actually showing unique it.

481
00:31:11,360 --> 00:31:13,360
But there's a bit of poetic justice.

482
00:31:13,360 --> 00:31:17,360
They're apparently being repurposed at the entrances to various federal agencies.

483
00:31:17,360 --> 00:31:19,360
So, right, they're actually not going away.

484
00:31:19,360 --> 00:31:21,360
That's important.

485
00:31:21,360 --> 00:31:23,360
And all the full body scanners aren't going away.

486
00:31:23,360 --> 00:31:25,360
There are several technologies.

487
00:31:25,360 --> 00:31:29,360
And the millimeter way, the staying, so holding your hands up and being still still not going away.

488
00:31:29,360 --> 00:31:33,360
Just a particular radiation technology because the one company

489
00:31:33,360 --> 00:31:39,360
wasn't able to do some of their anonymization things on the visuals,

490
00:31:39,360 --> 00:31:41,360
which you'll even said.

491
00:31:41,360 --> 00:31:43,360
There was a case in Florida where some of those images did leak out.

492
00:31:43,360 --> 00:31:47,360
And that's all undermind the claim that somehow this information would never get out in the web.

493
00:31:47,360 --> 00:31:50,360
And here we have the pictures right here so you can see them.

494
00:31:50,360 --> 00:31:53,360
But now let's take a look at the local scale.

495
00:31:53,360 --> 00:31:58,360
And so, as it turns out, it isn't just our federal government that's out there.

496
00:31:58,360 --> 00:32:01,360
Combating terrorists or maybe other nations, we don't really know.

497
00:32:01,360 --> 00:32:03,360
And some shadowy cyber war.

498
00:32:03,360 --> 00:32:07,360
But actually, the weird way that the DHS is kind of co-opted, that you're a local police force.

499
00:32:07,360 --> 00:32:12,360
They've turned them into deputies of this national effort to find terrorists.

500
00:32:12,360 --> 00:32:16,360
Talk a little bit about the spread of homeland security dollars to local police forces.

501
00:32:16,360 --> 00:32:19,360
Well, so I mean, we'll maybe get to Fusion Centers in more detail later.

502
00:32:19,360 --> 00:32:21,360
But yeah, there's lots of federal money out there.

503
00:32:21,360 --> 00:32:24,360
If you say you want to want to counter terror program, you may not have terrorists,

504
00:32:24,360 --> 00:32:27,360
but that's no reason to turn down the money.

505
00:32:27,360 --> 00:32:32,360
So we find that Fusion Centers, for example, something like $250 billion in grants to

506
00:32:32,360 --> 00:32:35,360
went out supposedly for counter terror.

507
00:32:35,360 --> 00:32:40,360
A two-year Senate investigation found that they never actually produced a single shred of actionable,

508
00:32:40,360 --> 00:32:43,360
useful intelligence about terrorism.

509
00:32:43,360 --> 00:32:47,360
It didn't end up buying a lot of Range Rover's for local sheriff's departments,

510
00:32:47,360 --> 00:32:54,360
plasma, TVs so that they could display the Fusion Center calendar and watch cable news and in San Diego.

511
00:32:54,360 --> 00:32:59,360
DHS is given out, I think $15 million in grants for local police departments.

512
00:32:59,360 --> 00:33:00,360
It's a photograph license place.

513
00:33:00,360 --> 00:33:07,360
It's a viewpoint earlier in a wholesale level, you know, not going after an individual car or doing it as they drive by a patrol.

514
00:33:07,360 --> 00:33:09,360
But they're setting up cameras now at different places.

515
00:33:09,360 --> 00:33:11,360
I don't understand Diego, they're doing this on a massive scale.

516
00:33:11,360 --> 00:33:14,360
It's just routinely photographing the license plate every car on the freeway.

517
00:33:14,360 --> 00:33:15,360
It goes by.

518
00:33:15,360 --> 00:33:16,360
It's a lot of technology.

519
00:33:16,360 --> 00:33:17,360
It's license plates.

520
00:33:17,360 --> 00:33:19,360
It's all the CCTV cameras.

521
00:33:19,360 --> 00:33:20,360
You produce the UK number.

522
00:33:20,360 --> 00:33:21,360
We know better.

523
00:33:21,360 --> 00:33:23,360
This camera's everywhere in the United States also.

524
00:33:23,360 --> 00:33:24,360
That's right.

525
00:33:24,360 --> 00:33:27,360
A lot of cities have them in intersections with a automatically scooping up camera.

526
00:33:27,360 --> 00:33:30,360
License plates again that's being saved.

527
00:33:30,360 --> 00:33:35,360
The money's being used for other surveillance for cell phone surveillance.

528
00:33:35,360 --> 00:33:39,360
If you're just collecting up lots of data and we'll get you cell phones.

529
00:33:39,360 --> 00:33:42,360
But because it's data, it slashes around.

530
00:33:42,360 --> 00:33:43,360
I mean, this is the fundamental problem.

531
00:33:43,360 --> 00:33:45,360
It doesn't matter if you collect it.

532
00:33:45,360 --> 00:33:48,360
Once it's in the system, it goes into a Fusion Center.

533
00:33:48,360 --> 00:33:50,360
It goes into the NSA's computers.

534
00:33:50,360 --> 00:33:53,360
It goes into some marketing computer.

535
00:33:53,360 --> 00:33:54,360
The data stays.

536
00:33:54,360 --> 00:33:57,360
And it's very hard to get rid of it.

537
00:33:57,360 --> 00:34:00,360
And now it's being used for all sorts of purposes.

538
00:34:00,360 --> 00:34:02,360
And we have no control over it.

539
00:34:02,360 --> 00:34:04,360
Really even any visibility into what they do.

540
00:34:04,360 --> 00:34:07,360
We don't know how it's being used or who's using it.

541
00:34:07,360 --> 00:34:09,360
We also don't know when it's going to come back to Hauntas.

542
00:34:09,360 --> 00:34:10,360
Because it may turn out a few years later.

543
00:34:10,360 --> 00:34:12,360
Something that you did was of interest to them.

544
00:34:12,360 --> 00:34:14,360
They may have been tracking you for quite some time.

545
00:34:14,360 --> 00:34:16,360
You're probably taping the show.

546
00:34:16,360 --> 00:34:18,360
I'm sure we are.

547
00:34:18,360 --> 00:34:21,360
So there are billions at stake.

548
00:34:21,360 --> 00:34:23,360
And it's a rapidly growing business.

549
00:34:23,360 --> 00:34:26,360
We know now that the surveillance business itself,

550
00:34:26,360 --> 00:34:29,360
just that segment of it is now something like a $5 billion

551
00:34:29,360 --> 00:34:31,360
on the outside of government to private corporations.

552
00:34:31,360 --> 00:34:34,360
I thought it might be nice to take a look at the supermarket.

553
00:34:34,360 --> 00:34:36,360
Take a look at all the devices.

554
00:34:36,360 --> 00:34:38,360
Some of the devices that are on sale.

555
00:34:38,360 --> 00:34:41,360
For instance, the watchhound, which allows people to use forces

556
00:34:41,360 --> 00:34:44,360
to listen to cell phone conversations.

557
00:34:44,360 --> 00:34:47,360
The same way you might if you were using a radio band

558
00:34:47,360 --> 00:34:48,360
scanner.

559
00:34:48,360 --> 00:34:50,360
So you're actually tuning into the cell phone conversations.

560
00:34:50,360 --> 00:34:53,360
You probably didn't think that people could hear you when you're talking

561
00:34:53,360 --> 00:34:54,360
to your cell phone.

562
00:34:54,360 --> 00:34:55,360
In fact, that's widely available.

563
00:34:55,360 --> 00:34:56,360
These are widely used.

564
00:34:56,360 --> 00:34:57,360
The stingray.

565
00:34:57,360 --> 00:34:59,360
This is an interesting device.

566
00:34:59,360 --> 00:35:02,360
It could be mounted in a van in a police van and driven around

567
00:35:02,360 --> 00:35:03,360
a neighborhood.

568
00:35:03,360 --> 00:35:05,360
And if you're trying to find a particular individual,

569
00:35:05,360 --> 00:35:08,360
even if that individual is not using a cell phone,

570
00:35:08,360 --> 00:35:11,360
what it does is the stingray pretends to be a cell phone tower.

571
00:35:11,360 --> 00:35:13,360
And so it'll find that phone connect with it.

572
00:35:13,360 --> 00:35:15,360
And then they could drive a few more blocks.

573
00:35:15,360 --> 00:35:18,360
And eventually triangulate the location of that particular phone.

574
00:35:18,360 --> 00:35:19,360
So they can find you with your phone.

575
00:35:19,360 --> 00:35:23,360
In a weird way, your cell phone is like a little spy that's in your pocket,

576
00:35:23,360 --> 00:35:25,360
leaking out information about you.

577
00:35:25,360 --> 00:35:26,360
And then cell bright.

578
00:35:26,360 --> 00:35:28,360
This is one that troubles me the most.

579
00:35:28,360 --> 00:35:32,360
So for a routine traffic incident, moving vehicle violation,

580
00:35:32,360 --> 00:35:35,360
you can be pulled over by a policeman.

581
00:35:35,360 --> 00:35:37,360
And if you have your cell phone on your body or if you're using it,

582
00:35:37,360 --> 00:35:41,360
when they pull you over, then they have the right to take your cell phone.

583
00:35:41,360 --> 00:35:43,360
And they plug it into this thing, cell bright,

584
00:35:43,360 --> 00:35:46,360
and it's about two minutes, it's a download, everything that's on your phone.

585
00:35:46,360 --> 00:35:47,360
Now think about that.

586
00:35:47,360 --> 00:35:52,360
That technology is actually accessing my whole life in my cell phone.

587
00:35:52,360 --> 00:35:54,360
I, you're with the K-12 Institute.

588
00:35:54,360 --> 00:35:57,360
At this point, I need to disclose that the K-12 Institute is known as a libertarian organization,

589
00:35:57,360 --> 00:35:58,360
a libertarian thinktake.

590
00:35:58,360 --> 00:36:01,360
What's your take on this device, this cell bright?

591
00:36:01,360 --> 00:36:02,360
Are you outraged by this?

592
00:36:02,360 --> 00:36:04,360
This is a little bit of an intrusion.

593
00:36:04,360 --> 00:36:07,360
I think it's, uh, the question, of course, is whether this is actually,

594
00:36:07,360 --> 00:36:09,360
like it happens routinely.

595
00:36:09,360 --> 00:36:11,360
We don't know what a court would say about it.

596
00:36:11,360 --> 00:36:13,360
But certainly the setup is there.

597
00:36:13,360 --> 00:36:15,360
There's a pre-imported held that it's not just, you know,

598
00:36:15,360 --> 00:36:17,360
felonies that a police officer can arrest you for.

599
00:36:17,360 --> 00:36:20,360
It's any crime, including not having your seat belt buckled.

600
00:36:20,360 --> 00:36:21,360
Or a traffic violation.

601
00:36:21,360 --> 00:36:24,360
It's up to their discretion, whether it's a performing arrest.

602
00:36:24,360 --> 00:36:26,360
And then once they've decided to arrest you,

603
00:36:26,360 --> 00:36:29,360
there's a fourth-and-a-und exemption for searches in situ arrest.

604
00:36:29,360 --> 00:36:32,360
It's certainly not beyond their own possibility that they could,

605
00:36:32,360 --> 00:36:37,360
decide that that is covered within the scope of a search engine to arrest.

606
00:36:37,360 --> 00:36:43,360
And effectively use a pre-textual stop to gather a full record of your electronic life.

607
00:36:43,360 --> 00:36:46,360
I've also heard that when you enter the US,

608
00:36:46,360 --> 00:36:50,360
sometimes customs and boarding security will do the same with laptop computers, cell phones,

609
00:36:50,360 --> 00:36:51,360
and so forth.

610
00:36:51,360 --> 00:36:54,360
And usually, you're right, it's a foreign individual of interest to them.

611
00:36:54,360 --> 00:36:58,360
Not necessarily a suspect, but it might be someone we know of documentary filmmakers

612
00:36:58,360 --> 00:37:03,360
and volunteers who work on organizations, you know, even people affiliated with Aaron Swartz

613
00:37:03,360 --> 00:37:06,360
have been detained in this way and seen their election last month.

614
00:37:06,360 --> 00:37:13,360
And the privacy watchdog at DHS actually just issued a finding that suspicion-less searches of laptops,

615
00:37:13,360 --> 00:37:17,360
and other electronic devices, basically, should be allowed to continue,

616
00:37:17,360 --> 00:37:20,360
no reasonable suspicion of any kind is necessary.

617
00:37:20,360 --> 00:37:24,360
And they concluded bizarrely that there would be no civil liberties benefit

618
00:37:24,360 --> 00:37:27,360
to curtailing these searches at the border.

619
00:37:27,360 --> 00:37:29,360
And border search here, sort of a term of art,

620
00:37:29,360 --> 00:37:34,360
it's also their view that the sort of constitution free zone extends

621
00:37:34,360 --> 00:37:37,360
for about 100 miles in from the border.

622
00:37:37,360 --> 00:37:40,360
And because it's a free zone, that a phrase that heard before.

623
00:37:40,360 --> 00:37:42,360
This is all temporary.

624
00:37:42,360 --> 00:37:44,360
I mean, so what does he got right here?

625
00:37:44,360 --> 00:37:48,360
That my phone has my email, my contacts, my calendar, my life.

626
00:37:48,360 --> 00:37:51,360
But essentially, my credit card information could be stored.

627
00:37:51,360 --> 00:37:53,360
But think about what's really happening.

628
00:37:53,360 --> 00:37:54,360
I have a smartphone.

629
00:37:54,360 --> 00:37:58,360
It's probably that Google has my email, my calendar.

630
00:37:58,360 --> 00:37:59,360
That's true.

631
00:37:59,360 --> 00:38:00,360
My contacts.

632
00:38:00,360 --> 00:38:04,360
It's just in a convenient cell phone shaped package

633
00:38:04,360 --> 00:38:05,360
we'd carry around with me.

634
00:38:05,360 --> 00:38:07,360
It's the police wanted it.

635
00:38:07,360 --> 00:38:09,360
They could just go get it elsewhere.

636
00:38:09,360 --> 00:38:11,360
So data's moving around.

637
00:38:11,360 --> 00:38:15,360
When the problems with these debates is we're always focused on one thing.

638
00:38:15,360 --> 00:38:17,360
We focus on cameras, focus on cell phones.

639
00:38:17,360 --> 00:38:19,360
We focus on CCTV.

640
00:38:19,360 --> 00:38:22,360
Where's the problem is everything put together.

641
00:38:22,360 --> 00:38:25,360
It's not drones, it's drones with cameras.

642
00:38:25,360 --> 00:38:28,360
It's drones with cameras and face recognition.

643
00:38:28,360 --> 00:38:31,360
The ability to track between different drones and day-to-day,

644
00:38:31,360 --> 00:38:33,360
tied that back to databases.

645
00:38:33,360 --> 00:38:37,360
So you can see in real time from a drone everybody's name and income level

646
00:38:37,360 --> 00:38:39,360
as they walk around town.

647
00:38:39,360 --> 00:38:40,360
It's a terrible thing.

648
00:38:40,360 --> 00:38:43,360
In a way, getting your data from the phone is super inefficient.

649
00:38:43,360 --> 00:38:46,360
Because one, the person knows that you've done it, probably.

650
00:38:46,360 --> 00:38:48,360
They see you plugging their phone into something.

651
00:38:48,360 --> 00:38:52,360
And you have to get one person at a time, it's data.

652
00:38:52,360 --> 00:38:54,360
What a drag.

653
00:38:55,360 --> 00:38:59,360
Unfortunately since a series of misguided ruling from the late 70s,

654
00:38:59,360 --> 00:39:05,360
Fourth Amendment doctrine is that once your data is in third party hands,

655
00:39:05,360 --> 00:39:09,360
once it's Google or Facebook holding onto it, in principle,

656
00:39:09,360 --> 00:39:11,360
that's now their business records.

657
00:39:11,360 --> 00:39:14,360
You've surrendered your Fourth Amendment privacy interest.

658
00:39:14,360 --> 00:39:18,360
A lot of that data that we naturally expect to be protected by the Fourth Amendment's

659
00:39:18,360 --> 00:39:22,360
requirement of a warrant issued by a judge isn't protected in that way.

660
00:39:22,360 --> 00:39:23,360
And it's not way.

661
00:39:23,360 --> 00:39:24,360
And it's not way.

662
00:39:24,360 --> 00:39:25,360
And it's not way.

663
00:39:25,360 --> 00:39:26,360
And it's not way.

664
00:39:26,360 --> 00:39:27,360
And it's not way.

665
00:39:27,360 --> 00:39:28,360
And it's not way.

666
00:39:28,360 --> 00:39:30,360
But it's not way.

667
00:39:30,360 --> 00:39:31,360
But it's not way.

668
00:39:31,360 --> 00:39:32,360
But it's not way.

669
00:39:32,360 --> 00:39:33,360
But it's not way.

670
00:39:33,360 --> 00:39:34,360
But it's not way.

671
00:39:34,360 --> 00:39:35,360
But it's not way.

672
00:39:35,360 --> 00:39:36,360
But it's not way.

673
00:39:36,360 --> 00:39:37,360
But it's not way.

674
00:39:37,360 --> 00:39:38,360
But it's not way.

675
00:39:38,360 --> 00:39:39,360
But it's not way.

676
00:39:39,360 --> 00:39:40,360
But it's not way.

677
00:39:40,360 --> 00:39:41,360
But it's not way.

678
00:39:41,360 --> 00:39:42,360
But it's not way.

679
00:39:42,360 --> 00:39:43,360
But it's not way.

680
00:39:43,360 --> 00:39:44,360
But it's not way.

681
00:39:44,360 --> 00:39:45,360
But it's not way.

682
00:39:45,360 --> 00:39:46,360
But it's not way.

683
00:39:46,360 --> 00:39:47,360
But it's not way.

684
00:39:47,360 --> 00:39:48,360
But it's not way.

685
00:39:48,360 --> 00:39:49,360
But it's not way.

686
00:39:49,360 --> 00:39:50,360
But it's not way.

687
00:39:50,360 --> 00:39:51,360
But it's not way.

688
00:39:51,360 --> 00:39:52,360
But it's not way.

689
00:39:52,360 --> 00:39:53,360
But it's not way.

690
00:39:53,360 --> 00:39:54,360
But it's not way.

691
00:39:54,360 --> 00:39:55,360
But it's not way.

692
00:39:55,360 --> 00:39:56,360
But it's not way.

693
00:39:56,360 --> 00:39:57,360
But it's not way.

694
00:39:57,360 --> 00:39:58,360
But it's not way.

695
00:39:58,360 --> 00:39:59,360
But it's not way.

696
00:39:59,360 --> 00:40:00,360
But it's not way.

697
00:40:00,360 --> 00:40:01,360
But it's not way.

698
00:40:01,360 --> 00:40:02,360
But it's not way.

699
00:40:02,360 --> 00:40:03,360
But it's not way.

700
00:40:03,360 --> 00:40:04,360
But it's not way.

701
00:40:04,360 --> 00:40:05,360
But it's not way.

702
00:40:05,360 --> 00:40:06,360
But it's not way.

703
00:40:06,360 --> 00:40:07,360
But it's not way.

704
00:40:07,360 --> 00:40:08,360
But it's not way.

705
00:40:08,360 --> 00:40:09,360
But it's not way.

706
00:40:09,360 --> 00:40:10,360
But it's not way.

707
00:40:10,360 --> 00:40:11,360
But it's not way.

708
00:40:11,360 --> 00:40:12,360
But it's not way.

709
00:40:12,360 --> 00:40:13,360
But it's not way.

710
00:40:13,360 --> 00:40:14,360
But it's not way.

711
00:40:14,360 --> 00:40:15,360
But it's not way.

712
00:40:15,360 --> 00:40:16,360
But it's not way.

713
00:40:16,360 --> 00:40:17,360
But it's not way.

714
00:40:17,360 --> 00:40:18,360
But it's not way.

715
00:40:18,360 --> 00:40:19,360
But it's not way.

716
00:40:19,360 --> 00:40:20,360
But it's not way.

717
00:40:20,360 --> 00:40:21,360
But it's not way.

718
00:40:21,360 --> 00:40:22,360
But it's not way.

719
00:40:22,360 --> 00:40:23,360
But it's not way.

720
00:40:23,360 --> 00:40:25,360
But it's not way.

721
00:40:25,360 --> 00:40:26,360
But it's not way.

722
00:40:26,360 --> 00:40:27,360
But it's not way.

723
00:40:27,360 --> 00:40:28,360
But it's not way.

724
00:40:28,360 --> 00:40:29,360
But it's not way.

725
00:40:29,360 --> 00:40:30,360
But it's not way.

726
00:40:30,360 --> 00:40:31,360
But it's not way.

727
00:40:31,360 --> 00:40:32,360
But it's not way.

728
00:40:32,360 --> 00:40:33,360
But it's not way.

729
00:40:33,360 --> 00:40:34,360
But it's not way.

730
00:40:34,360 --> 00:40:35,360
But it's not way.

731
00:40:35,360 --> 00:40:36,360
But it's not way.

732
00:40:36,360 --> 00:40:37,360
But it's not way.

733
00:40:37,360 --> 00:40:38,360
But it's not way.

734
00:40:38,360 --> 00:40:39,360
But it's not way.

735
00:40:39,360 --> 00:40:40,360
But it's not way.

736
00:40:40,360 --> 00:40:41,360
But it's not way.

737
00:40:41,360 --> 00:40:42,360
But it's not way.

738
00:40:42,360 --> 00:40:43,360
But it's not way.

739
00:40:43,360 --> 00:40:44,360
But it's not way.

740
00:40:44,360 --> 00:40:45,360
But it's not way.

741
00:40:45,360 --> 00:40:46,360
But it's not way.

742
00:40:46,360 --> 00:40:47,360
But it's not way.

743
00:40:47,360 --> 00:40:48,360
But it's not way.

744
00:40:48,360 --> 00:40:49,360
But it's not way.

745
00:40:49,360 --> 00:40:51,360
But it's not way.

746
00:40:51,360 --> 00:40:53,360
But it's not way.

747
00:40:53,360 --> 00:40:54,360
But it's not way.

748
00:40:54,360 --> 00:40:55,360
But it's not way.

749
00:40:55,360 --> 00:40:56,360
But it's not way.

750
00:40:56,360 --> 00:40:57,360
But it's not way.

751
00:40:57,360 --> 00:40:58,360
But it's not way.

752
00:40:58,360 --> 00:40:59,360
But it's not way.

753
00:40:59,360 --> 00:41:00,360
But it's not way.

754
00:41:00,360 --> 00:41:01,360
But it's not way.

755
00:41:01,360 --> 00:41:02,360
But it's not way.

756
00:41:02,360 --> 00:41:03,360
But it's not way.

757
00:41:03,360 --> 00:41:04,360
But it's not way.

758
00:41:04,360 --> 00:41:05,360
But it's not way.

759
00:41:05,360 --> 00:41:06,360
But it's not way.

760
00:41:06,360 --> 00:41:07,360
But it's not way.

761
00:41:07,360 --> 00:41:08,360
But it's not way.

762
00:41:08,360 --> 00:41:09,360
But it's not way.

763
00:41:09,360 --> 00:41:10,360
But it's not way.

764
00:41:10,360 --> 00:41:11,360
But it's not way.

765
00:41:11,360 --> 00:41:12,360
But it's not way.

766
00:41:12,360 --> 00:41:13,360
But it's not way.

767
00:41:13,360 --> 00:41:17,360
But you've got a lot of people looking for something that doesn't appear to be there.

768
00:41:17,360 --> 00:41:26,360
This is a history of intelligence suggests that unfortunately the problem is if the thing that you are convinced is there isn't there, you just keep looking harder.

769
00:41:26,360 --> 00:41:27,360
That's true.

770
00:41:27,360 --> 00:41:32,360
And Redouble your efforts and argue in the future we need more resources to go after this.

771
00:41:32,360 --> 00:41:35,360
You know, one of the funny ironies that I think has emerged here.

772
00:41:35,360 --> 00:41:37,360
The statement actually is made by Julian Assange.

773
00:41:37,360 --> 00:41:39,360
And we put on this picture here.

774
00:41:39,360 --> 00:41:40,360
We got this picture from the web.

775
00:41:40,360 --> 00:41:42,360
But it's actually worth zooming into.

776
00:41:42,360 --> 00:41:44,360
So we can put this on screen for the folks at home.

777
00:41:44,360 --> 00:41:47,360
You have Julian Assange of WikiLeaks.

778
00:41:47,360 --> 00:41:51,360
And he's saying I give private information to the public for free.

779
00:41:51,360 --> 00:41:52,360
And I'm a villain.

780
00:41:52,360 --> 00:41:55,360
Meanwhile Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook will he's taking your personal information.

781
00:41:55,360 --> 00:41:59,360
And he's providing it to private enterprise for money.

782
00:41:59,360 --> 00:42:01,360
And he's the man of the year.

783
00:42:01,360 --> 00:42:03,360
You're taking on this slightly different.

784
00:42:03,360 --> 00:42:06,360
I think you're not going to go with this parody a hundred percent.

785
00:42:06,360 --> 00:42:08,360
Wow, it's funny or than it is true.

786
00:42:08,360 --> 00:42:12,360
I mean, just to for for for reasons of of greed, basically.

787
00:42:12,360 --> 00:42:14,360
Zuckerberg would want to keep your information.

788
00:42:14,360 --> 00:42:18,360
So the corporations have to keep coming back to him to target their energy.

789
00:42:18,360 --> 00:42:20,360
Give out all that information.

790
00:42:20,360 --> 00:42:23,360
But these companies and it's not just Facebook.

791
00:42:23,360 --> 00:42:24,360
It's also Google.

792
00:42:24,360 --> 00:42:25,360
It's also Apple.

793
00:42:25,360 --> 00:42:28,360
They're subject to literally thousands of subpoenas.

794
00:42:28,360 --> 00:42:31,360
And and these really creepy national security letters.

795
00:42:31,360 --> 00:42:31,360

796
00:42:31,360 --> 00:42:34,360
Can you tell us a little bit about that because I think a lot of people are unaware what

797
00:42:34,360 --> 00:42:36,360
in NSL actually is.

798
00:42:36,360 --> 00:42:37,360
So national security letters.

799
00:42:37,360 --> 00:42:40,360
There are a tool that existed in a much more limited form before 911.

800
00:42:40,360 --> 00:42:42,360
We're in a series of stages expanded.

801
00:42:42,360 --> 00:42:44,360
They allow FBI agents.

802
00:42:44,360 --> 00:42:52,360
Basically the head of anyone of 52 FBI field offices to authorize without judicial supervision or approval.

803
00:42:52,360 --> 00:42:59,360
The seizure basically of non-content telecommunications records and financial records.

804
00:42:59,360 --> 00:43:03,360
And financial records now has been expanded to me in any record from any one that uses money.

805
00:43:03,360 --> 00:43:04,360
Essentially.

806
00:43:04,360 --> 00:43:08,360
And you know Obama when he was campaigning said he wanted to do away with these.

807
00:43:08,360 --> 00:43:14,360
He wanted to do away with national security letters being used to see sensitive information about people who are not even suspected of a crime.

808
00:43:14,360 --> 00:43:19,360
They're really used in a kind of six degrees of separation way to say, well we have one target.

809
00:43:19,360 --> 00:43:24,360
Let's look at everyone there friends with and let's look at who they're emailing and what websites they're visiting.

810
00:43:24,360 --> 00:43:28,360
So we can get a kind of social graph or pattern out of it.

811
00:43:28,360 --> 00:43:36,360
Actually in 2010 the Obama administration broke Bush's record for the number issued was about 26,000.

812
00:43:36,360 --> 00:43:38,360
Only this is a stat pertaining to Americans.

813
00:43:38,360 --> 00:43:41,360
And the number of people affected it was more than 14,000.

814
00:43:41,360 --> 00:43:49,360
Again that's only Americans and it doesn't include national security letters for basic information like who is associated with a certain IP address.

815
00:43:49,360 --> 00:43:52,360
This is only more detailed transactional laws.

816
00:43:52,360 --> 00:43:54,360
There's no judge and no other.

817
00:43:54,360 --> 00:43:57,360
The secret court that you have to go to you don't have to show any evidence.

818
00:43:57,360 --> 00:44:02,360
In fact you can use these to troll for evidence and then go back to the court and say well now we've got the evidence we're looking for.

819
00:44:02,360 --> 00:44:03,360
Thanks to the NSL.

820
00:44:03,360 --> 00:44:06,360
And now please give us the warrant so we can go after these people.

821
00:44:06,360 --> 00:44:06,360

822
00:44:06,360 --> 00:44:12,360
There's a lot of belief that's happening and to Google's credit they will tell say quarterly how much of these they're getting.

823
00:44:12,360 --> 00:44:14,360
They per day they'll tell us.

824
00:44:14,360 --> 00:44:16,360
Don't give us details Twitter is also put back.

825
00:44:16,360 --> 00:44:19,360
Act right and even some tacos have not are very big ones.

826
00:44:19,360 --> 00:44:22,360
They seem to have kind of been co-opted by the guy.

827
00:44:22,360 --> 00:44:26,360
A lot of companies will not tell us at all how many in they get whether they comply.

828
00:44:26,360 --> 00:44:27,360
How much they comply.

829
00:44:27,360 --> 00:44:34,360
It is well very secret Google and Twitter are rare in sort of volunteering some of this information about how much they get.

830
00:44:34,360 --> 00:44:43,360
There's no aggregate reporting as there is with wire tasks that would give us a kind of overall picture of how much these different electronic surveillance tools are used.

831
00:44:43,360 --> 00:44:51,360
The telcos normally are not so forthcoming but congressman had marquee to request the major cell phone carriers to give a tally of how many

832
00:44:51,360 --> 00:44:57,360
requests from different kinds of law enforcement agencies they got added up to about 1.3 million a year.

833
00:44:57,360 --> 00:45:01,360
A lot of that is cell phone tracking a lot of that is calling patterns.

834
00:45:01,360 --> 00:45:04,360
Also just a compliance with that think of those number of requests.

835
00:45:04,360 --> 00:45:10,360
I'm certain that the person receiving those requests that that family would just automate the process and not even pay attention.

836
00:45:10,360 --> 00:45:15,360
Well sprint is done that they created a back end called L site because they said we're getting so many requests.

837
00:45:15,360 --> 00:45:17,360
We couldn't deal with them.

838
00:45:17,360 --> 00:45:21,360
It's like the information smart as for the images dial straight in.

839
00:45:21,360 --> 00:45:24,360
We've heard rumors about that too with some of the other social networking sites.

840
00:45:24,360 --> 00:45:26,360
Kind of a creepy thought.

841
00:45:26,360 --> 00:45:32,360
One question here comes if you develop your own ways to come back or accept this new world order of constant surveillance.

842
00:45:32,360 --> 00:45:37,360
I guess the question for tans to you guys what are you doing your own lives to keep your lives private and secret.

843
00:45:37,360 --> 00:45:39,360
I mean what we do is around the edges.

844
00:45:39,360 --> 00:45:40,360
What can you do?

845
00:45:40,360 --> 00:45:41,360
You can not have a credit card.

846
00:45:41,360 --> 00:45:42,360
You can not have a cell phone.

847
00:45:42,360 --> 00:45:43,360
You can not go outside.

848
00:45:43,360 --> 00:45:44,360
You can live in a cave.

849
00:45:44,360 --> 00:45:46,360
They kind of make no sense.

850
00:45:47,360 --> 00:45:48,360
I don't have a Facebook account.

851
00:45:48,360 --> 00:45:50,360
That makes me kind of a freak.

852
00:45:50,360 --> 00:45:52,360
I keep all my email on my computer.

853
00:45:52,360 --> 00:45:54,360
That makes me a double-free.

854
00:45:54,360 --> 00:45:57,360
So I'm doing some things around the edges.

855
00:45:57,360 --> 00:46:00,360
But by and large there's not a lot we can do.

856
00:46:00,360 --> 00:46:08,360
You have to accept it simply because you're being surveilled with what we learn from the general portrayal scandal.

857
00:46:08,360 --> 00:46:14,360
Is it even the director of the CIA can't keep email secret.

858
00:46:14,360 --> 00:46:17,360
But if he can't do it I don't stand a chance.

859
00:46:17,360 --> 00:46:23,360
You know that actually that is a very troubling case isn't it that Gmail hacking it's major intrusion.

860
00:46:23,360 --> 00:46:29,360
Not just the fact that it was kind of a comedy of errors with our two generals and they're flirting with this woman in Florida and so forth.

861
00:46:29,360 --> 00:46:32,360
That was funny and had a comic helmet to it.

862
00:46:32,360 --> 00:46:41,360
But in fact this Gmail hacking by the FBI with really no pretext no evidence of criminal and they trolled through until they found some evidence of something that they could hold him accountable.

863
00:46:41,360 --> 00:46:48,360
I mean bizarre in a couple levels is not only started as an investigation into cyber stalking meaning she'd sense them harassing.

864
00:46:48,360 --> 00:46:53,360
Paula Broadwell has sent some harassing emails to a woman who was friends with betrayers.

865
00:46:53,360 --> 00:46:58,360
This is not normally the kind of thing the FBI would involve itself in at all.

866
00:46:58,360 --> 00:47:04,360
Having tracked these emails back to Broadwell because again, you never private she had used an anonymous Gmail account.

867
00:47:04,360 --> 00:47:08,360
But then logged in from the same IP address to her real Gmail account.

868
00:47:08,360 --> 00:47:18,360
Even if you're using stuff like something like tour usually the IP address is persistent over times if you log into anything that's connected to you within that window you can be traced back again.

869
00:47:18,360 --> 00:47:23,360
They can link to those two things and then having figured out who sent the emails.

870
00:47:23,360 --> 00:47:29,360
If that was like they decided it and ultimately that actually the emails didn't rise to the level of criminal harassment.

871
00:47:29,360 --> 00:47:37,360
But having identified who sent them instead of then confronting Broadwell, they decided to do a fishing expedition.

872
00:47:37,360 --> 00:47:46,360
Through all of her email and it's not there what conceivable connection that had to the thing that they were supposed to be investigating.

873
00:47:46,360 --> 00:47:52,360
So at that point the supervisors when they found no evidence of criminality they should have called the investigation off and they didn't.

874
00:47:52,360 --> 00:47:53,360
That seems like a real brief.

875
00:47:53,360 --> 00:47:55,360
We'll probably hear more about that story.

876
00:47:55,360 --> 00:47:57,360
I need to move on to the conversation.

877
00:47:57,360 --> 00:47:59,360
We have to get into what's next.

878
00:47:59,360 --> 00:48:02,360
So in this show we'd like to talk about what's now and what's next and then what comes next.

879
00:48:02,360 --> 00:48:09,360
The next things we're going to talk about are drones, phones and super cookies and these it gets creepier folks.

880
00:48:09,360 --> 00:48:10,360
So check this out.

881
00:48:10,360 --> 00:48:14,360
Predator drone you're familiar with these but they've been in use since 2001.

882
00:48:14,360 --> 00:48:19,360
There's one on display at the National Air and Science Museum so they're already kind of a part of American history.

883
00:48:19,360 --> 00:48:21,360
Massive expansion to that program.

884
00:48:21,360 --> 00:48:27,360
But as Bruce mentioned just a minute ago the scientists from DARPA has been experimenting with different ways to modify these.

885
00:48:27,360 --> 00:48:31,360
We've also talked about all sorts of new weird versions of drones that will be coming out in the near future.

886
00:48:31,360 --> 00:48:36,360
One of them is called Argus and what they've done is they've taken 3608 of those cell phone cameras.

887
00:48:36,360 --> 00:48:39,360
The camera, the 5 or 10 megapixel camera that's on your cell phone today.

888
00:48:39,360 --> 00:48:43,360
And they've assembled those into sort of a beach ball shape mounting.

889
00:48:43,360 --> 00:48:45,360
And they can put that at the front of one of these drones.

890
00:48:45,360 --> 00:48:53,360
And this Argus program then allows that drone to hover over particular place and record everything that's happening on the ground.

891
00:48:53,360 --> 00:48:59,360
Now the device itself, the drone itself has literally millions of terabytes of storage onboard.

892
00:48:59,360 --> 00:49:02,360
But they're also streaming that data out down to the ground.

893
00:49:02,360 --> 00:49:07,360
And so in real time someone who's back in the base station can see an image kind of like this.

894
00:49:07,360 --> 00:49:10,360
It's a composite image of all those different eyes in the sky.

895
00:49:10,360 --> 00:49:17,360
And they can start to see what's happening on the ground but what's even more troubling because of the degree of accuracy of those cameras is that they can zoom in.

896
00:49:17,360 --> 00:49:23,360
And they can actually today get to a level of detail that allows them to see from 14,000 feet in the air.

897
00:49:23,360 --> 00:49:25,360
They six inch long object.

898
00:49:25,360 --> 00:49:29,360
They can also using gadenelysis technology, face recognition.

899
00:49:29,360 --> 00:49:34,360
Some of the other technologies you mentioned, they can actually start to identify the people on the ground.

900
00:49:34,360 --> 00:49:39,360
Today these technologies are being used in Afghanistan to fight the war there.

901
00:49:39,360 --> 00:49:43,360
Tomorrow those drones will be in the United States.

902
00:49:43,360 --> 00:49:51,360
It seems to be a near certainty more than 358 different law enforcement groups and counterterrorism groups in the United States.

903
00:49:51,360 --> 00:49:59,360
Have asked the FAA for permission to start to fly their own autonomous drone unit drone units and we can expect those to be mounted with similar surveillance technology.

904
00:49:59,360 --> 00:50:01,360
This is clearly coming.

905
00:50:01,360 --> 00:50:07,360
Now when we chat about this you gave what was a really chilling prediction to me which is that basically you're like it's here.

906
00:50:07,360 --> 00:50:09,360
It's happening.

907
00:50:09,360 --> 00:50:11,360
Yeah I mean coming seems like an overstatement.

908
00:50:11,360 --> 00:50:19,360
We use drones this week to hunt down that California cop killer was holed up in his mountain hideout.

909
00:50:19,360 --> 00:50:23,360
And there are there being used in cities.

910
00:50:23,360 --> 00:50:29,360
And the picture here of the, well these are some of the cheap ones that are coming but here we have the border patrol.

911
00:50:29,360 --> 00:50:33,360
And they have 10, they have a fleet of 10 and they've asked for 14 more.

912
00:50:33,360 --> 00:50:35,360
So you're right it's already here.

913
00:50:35,360 --> 00:50:41,360
What's coming is, I mean what's coming next right they're going to get better at resolution.

914
00:50:41,360 --> 00:50:45,360
They're able to be able to read documents, be able to better identify faces.

915
00:50:45,360 --> 00:50:51,360
And once you identify faces you have a lot of good public face databases in Facebook.

916
00:50:51,360 --> 00:50:53,360
Has a phenomenal database of tag photos.

917
00:50:53,360 --> 00:50:57,360
Thanks to your friends who tagged you you'll now be identified by the drone in the sky.

918
00:50:57,360 --> 00:51:03,360
Even if you're not on Facebook but it's not like you're their customer.

919
00:51:03,360 --> 00:51:05,360
I don't have a Facebook account.

920
00:51:05,360 --> 00:51:07,360
They're a tag photos of me on Facebook.

921
00:51:07,360 --> 00:51:13,360
They have a network of my friends there because they'll pull people's cow.

922
00:51:13,360 --> 00:51:13,360

923
00:51:13,360 --> 00:51:15,360
So five years now what do you expect to be the case?

924
00:51:15,360 --> 00:51:17,360
They'll be drones in every city.

925
00:51:17,360 --> 00:51:21,360
And there will be, so my expectation is that there will be drones everywhere 24, 7.

926
00:51:21,360 --> 00:51:25,360
I mean it's not going to make sense for companies to fly their own drone

927
00:51:25,360 --> 00:51:26,360
Feets.

928
00:51:26,360 --> 00:51:29,360
There's going to be drones over America ink.

929
00:51:29,360 --> 00:51:31,360
And they'll have drones everywhere.

930
00:51:31,360 --> 00:51:35,360
And like Google Street view it'll be drones sky view real time.

931
00:51:35,360 --> 00:51:37,360
And you just rent time on it.

932
00:51:37,360 --> 00:51:37,360

933
00:51:37,360 --> 00:51:39,360
Like a backbone internet provider.

934
00:51:39,360 --> 00:51:41,360
You just lease capacity on the drone.

935
00:51:41,360 --> 00:51:43,360
Because that's going to best.

936
00:51:43,360 --> 00:51:43,360

937
00:51:43,360 --> 00:51:45,360
But that's a smart way to do it.

938
00:51:45,360 --> 00:51:47,360
You ready to have that now with satellites.

939
00:51:47,360 --> 00:51:49,360
So if you're a company that I'm making this up once.

940
00:51:49,360 --> 00:51:51,360
So a long care products.

941
00:51:51,360 --> 00:51:55,360
You can get a map, you can overlay with addresses.

942
00:51:55,360 --> 00:51:57,360
So you have crappy lawns.

943
00:51:57,360 --> 00:51:58,360
So you now can call them.

944
00:51:58,360 --> 00:52:01,360
So it's all the data being collected and overlayed with other data.

945
00:52:01,360 --> 00:52:03,360
So we can identify people.

946
00:52:03,360 --> 00:52:04,360
We can collect it.

947
00:52:04,360 --> 00:52:06,360
Mark it with databases.

948
00:52:06,360 --> 00:52:11,360
We can collect integrated with cell phone data, which is you mentioned is location data.

949
00:52:11,360 --> 00:52:15,360
And also data about who you're interacting with.

950
00:52:15,360 --> 00:52:18,360
And now whether you're a government or a corporation.

951
00:52:18,360 --> 00:52:20,360
You can collect.

952
00:52:20,360 --> 00:52:23,360
People aren't your customers or for everybody.

953
00:52:23,360 --> 00:52:26,360
A lot of data about them, which allows you to market to them.

954
00:52:26,360 --> 00:52:27,360
And it's true.

955
00:52:27,360 --> 00:52:29,360
For commercial purposes, many good uses.

956
00:52:29,360 --> 00:52:30,360
Right?

957
00:52:30,360 --> 00:52:31,360
Real estate.

958
00:52:31,360 --> 00:52:32,360
People want to understand where traffic patterns are going.

959
00:52:32,360 --> 00:52:34,360
Retailers want to see how much.

960
00:52:34,360 --> 00:52:35,360
They're a career for you.

961
00:52:35,360 --> 00:52:36,360
Right?

962
00:52:36,360 --> 00:52:38,360
I mean, there's a lot being talked about now about personalized billboards.

963
00:52:38,360 --> 00:52:40,360
That a billboard will see you walk by.

964
00:52:40,360 --> 00:52:42,360
Now they can recognize your gender really quickly.

965
00:52:42,360 --> 00:52:45,360
And they can give you an ad that you might like better.

966
00:52:45,360 --> 00:52:47,360
But they now know you by name.

967
00:52:47,360 --> 00:52:50,360
The same ad that follows you around town.

968
00:52:50,360 --> 00:52:51,360
That is.

969
00:52:51,360 --> 00:52:53,360
And then onto Facebook and onto Google.

970
00:52:53,360 --> 00:52:54,360
And it gets really weird.

971
00:52:54,360 --> 00:52:55,360
It sounds like science fiction.

972
00:52:55,360 --> 00:52:58,360
So for one of the things you're leading up to, you've already foreshadowed a little bit.

973
00:52:58,360 --> 00:53:00,360
It's the combination of these eyes and the sky.

974
00:53:00,360 --> 00:53:01,360
And frankly, eyes everywhere.

975
00:53:01,360 --> 00:53:03,360
Every building will have cameras on and so forth.

976
00:53:03,360 --> 00:53:05,360
All that information now is going to be networked.

977
00:53:05,360 --> 00:53:07,360
Previously, the CCTV cameras weren't networked.

978
00:53:07,360 --> 00:53:09,360
But now they're networked.

979
00:53:09,360 --> 00:53:12,360
And we can cross-reference that with your location data.

980
00:53:12,360 --> 00:53:14,360
So your phone and your pocket, as I said, or it's a spy.

981
00:53:14,360 --> 00:53:16,360
It's really like little brother is watching you.

982
00:53:16,360 --> 00:53:18,360
You're carrying a little brother around with you.

983
00:53:18,360 --> 00:53:22,360
That's leading us into this wonderful new world of behavior tracking.

984
00:53:22,360 --> 00:53:26,360
This is the white hot center of online advertising at this point.

985
00:53:26,360 --> 00:53:28,360
Is the hottest field for online marketing?

986
00:53:28,360 --> 00:53:30,360
Or we can actually predict patterns of behavior.

987
00:53:30,360 --> 00:53:32,360
predict who we can market to next.

988
00:53:32,360 --> 00:53:33,360
Some of the things you're just alluding to.

989
00:53:33,360 --> 00:53:36,360
Tell me a little bit about super cookies.

990
00:53:36,360 --> 00:53:38,360
Here we have got a goofy picture of super cookies.

991
00:53:38,360 --> 00:53:42,360
But this is actually kind of a creepy new development in browser technology.

992
00:53:42,360 --> 00:53:46,360
I'm so native here is that people have started to catch on and some of them out of the video.

993
00:53:46,360 --> 00:53:47,360
Right.

994
00:53:47,360 --> 00:53:48,360
It's actually not that new.

995
00:53:48,360 --> 00:53:49,360
Right.

996
00:53:49,360 --> 00:53:50,360
Oh, that's true.

997
00:53:50,360 --> 00:53:51,360
You clear out your cookies so you can't be tracking.

998
00:53:51,360 --> 00:53:52,360
Yeah.

999
00:53:52,360 --> 00:53:53,360
You clear it out.

1000
00:53:53,360 --> 00:53:54,360
There's a lot of other ways.

1001
00:53:54,360 --> 00:53:55,360
You can do that.

1002
00:53:55,360 --> 00:54:00,360
There are plugins like flash that allow separately data to be stored that can be used for tracking purposes.

1003
00:54:00,360 --> 00:54:02,360
And there's stuff like browser fingerprinting.

1004
00:54:02,360 --> 00:54:05,360
Your browser sends a lot of information about how your system is configured.

1005
00:54:05,360 --> 00:54:09,360
It turns out that very often that's enough to uniquely identify you.

1006
00:54:09,360 --> 00:54:12,360
The precise combination of different searches.

1007
00:54:12,360 --> 00:54:13,360
The website that you visit.

1008
00:54:13,360 --> 00:54:14,360
No, no.

1009
00:54:14,360 --> 00:54:15,360
It doesn't even like the fonts on your computer.

1010
00:54:15,360 --> 00:54:19,360
Computers tend to have fingerprints that uniquely identify them.

1011
00:54:19,360 --> 00:54:28,360
But what we're really learning is and it's worse on something like a smartphone that it's really, really hard probably impossible to not be tracked.

1012
00:54:28,360 --> 00:54:31,360
But even if you do all the things right,

1013
00:54:31,360 --> 00:54:36,360
enough happens around you that the data is being collected.

1014
00:54:36,360 --> 00:54:37,360
Right.

1015
00:54:37,360 --> 00:54:38,360
And then of course, wants to collect it.

1016
00:54:38,360 --> 00:54:40,360
And it's a bit of a warehouse.

1017
00:54:40,360 --> 00:54:42,360
It's a bit of the future of advertising.

1018
00:54:42,360 --> 00:54:47,360
Even even the magic kingdom is using a kind of technology.

1019
00:54:47,360 --> 00:54:52,360
This is an example from Disneyland where your family can have a RFID bracelet.

1020
00:54:52,360 --> 00:54:55,360
A little radio frequency tag bracelet.

1021
00:54:55,360 --> 00:54:59,360
But they can wear so your kids can run around Disneyland and you can kind of identify them.

1022
00:54:59,360 --> 00:55:01,360
But that's not the only people who are watching.

1023
00:55:01,360 --> 00:55:05,360
It turns out Disneyland loves this because they can now track traffic flows within the theme park.

1024
00:55:05,360 --> 00:55:09,360
And they can see if you're spending more time in tomorrow and in front of your land and so forth.

1025
00:55:09,360 --> 00:55:14,360
They also know if dad is spending time drinking a beer while his kids are on the rides.

1026
00:55:14,360 --> 00:55:20,360
It also means that the different Disney characters can greet you by name because they'll see your name on some device that they're holding and they can actually say hello.

1027
00:55:20,360 --> 00:55:24,360
Which for parents who talk to the kids not to talk to strangers who address them by name.

1028
00:55:24,360 --> 00:55:27,360
This starts to create kind of a weird situation.

1029
00:55:27,360 --> 00:55:31,360
I don't know if you're not to talk to strangers applies to giant parents.

1030
00:55:31,360 --> 00:55:32,360
Sorry.

1031
00:55:32,360 --> 00:55:33,360
Cinderella.

1032
00:55:33,360 --> 00:55:34,360
Yeah right.

1033
00:55:34,360 --> 00:55:35,360
But not really a stranger.

1034
00:55:35,360 --> 00:55:38,360
You know, my feeling is that this type of technology seems innocuous.

1035
00:55:38,360 --> 00:55:40,360
So come on, it's dizzy how bad could it be.

1036
00:55:40,360 --> 00:55:44,360
I think the problem for this is when you have a six year old kid running around with an RFID tag.

1037
00:55:44,360 --> 00:55:51,360
What you're really doing is conditioning them to submit to this level of surveillance and you're just getting them used to the idea that everything they do is going to be tracked.

1038
00:55:51,360 --> 00:55:53,360
And we see it also in schools.

1039
00:55:53,360 --> 00:55:55,360
Schools are now getting a lot of these.

1040
00:55:55,360 --> 00:55:57,360
And then it often be given to schools for that reason.

1041
00:55:57,360 --> 00:55:58,360
It acclimates people.

1042
00:55:58,360 --> 00:56:03,360
So whether it's face recognition technology or fingerprint technology on buses.

1043
00:56:03,360 --> 00:56:05,360
This is all being sold as.

1044
00:56:05,360 --> 00:56:07,360
So much for your methods is also a part of.

1045
00:56:07,360 --> 00:56:08,360
Schools are very dangerous.

1046
00:56:08,360 --> 00:56:10,360
There's there's shootings every day.

1047
00:56:10,360 --> 00:56:13,360
Your kid has a one and two chance of dying and a shooting.

1048
00:56:13,360 --> 00:56:15,360
You know, whatever state you know, whatever our fears are.

1049
00:56:15,360 --> 00:56:18,360
They're being sold to us to to modify them.

1050
00:56:18,360 --> 00:56:22,360
And it doesn't get kids used to this sort of a ubiquitous surveillance.

1051
00:56:22,360 --> 00:56:23,360
That is normal.

1052
00:56:23,360 --> 00:56:28,360
I mean, this is one of the the things that the TSA security theater actually is effective ad.

1053
00:56:28,360 --> 00:56:36,360
I mean, if you think about the opening seems to that George Clooney movie up in the air where he's just absolutely seamlessly almost ballet like.

1054
00:56:36,360 --> 00:56:39,360
You know, whipping his laptop out sliding his shoes off.

1055
00:56:39,360 --> 00:56:42,360
I mean, it's all this sort of choreographed dance.

1056
00:56:42,360 --> 00:56:49,360
And it reminds me of this idea that the French philosopher of Michelle Foucault talked about that there's forms of surveillance that create.

1057
00:56:49,360 --> 00:56:50,360
Dossau bodies.

1058
00:56:50,360 --> 00:56:58,360
They that by being observed that we are trained to follow the path of of least resistance, which is to say train ourselves to automatically.

1059
00:56:58,360 --> 00:57:04,360
Goes through the procedures that expose us to the TSA guy with the least amount of hassle.

1060
00:57:04,360 --> 00:57:07,360
I mean, they they do a good job of encouraging this right?

1061
00:57:07,360 --> 00:57:09,360
Well, you don't have to go through the naked scanner.

1062
00:57:09,360 --> 00:57:11,360
You can instead get terribly grumped.

1063
00:57:11,360 --> 00:57:14,360
Well, now the easier thing to do is submit to the naked scanner.

1064
00:57:14,360 --> 00:57:16,360
And it's a form of training.

1065
00:57:16,360 --> 00:57:17,360
That's true.

1066
00:57:17,360 --> 00:57:18,360
I think that's very true.

1067
00:57:18,360 --> 00:57:19,360
I was young man.

1068
00:57:19,360 --> 00:57:20,360
I had the opportunity to live in Berlin.

1069
00:57:20,360 --> 00:57:24,360
And I spent time in East Berlin and East Germany and elsewhere in the East Black.

1070
00:57:24,360 --> 00:57:29,360
And this was the one thing I took away from that experience is when you live under constant surveillance.

1071
00:57:29,360 --> 00:57:31,360
And you don't know who's working for the government.

1072
00:57:31,360 --> 00:57:33,360
And they say they all might be spies.

1073
00:57:33,360 --> 00:57:34,360
You never really know.

1074
00:57:34,360 --> 00:57:36,360
People become apathetic and they stop and try.

1075
00:57:36,360 --> 00:57:39,360
Well, but also you change.

1076
00:57:39,360 --> 00:57:43,360
I mean, I remember in the years of 9-11, I'll be talking to a friend on the phone.

1077
00:57:43,360 --> 00:57:45,360
We say something because we're talking about security.

1078
00:57:45,360 --> 00:57:47,360
One of us says, wow, I hope the NSA is in listening.

1079
00:57:47,360 --> 00:57:49,360
We both laugh because it's a funny joke.

1080
00:57:49,360 --> 00:57:51,360
But you know, the conversation changes.

1081
00:57:51,360 --> 00:57:56,360
You know, the fact that you might be observed in all things changes how you act.

1082
00:57:56,360 --> 00:57:58,360
It makes you less of a free person.

1083
00:57:58,360 --> 00:58:01,360
I mean, yeah, I mean, this probably less crime in East Berlin.

1084
00:58:01,360 --> 00:58:03,360
But you didn't want to live there.

1085
00:58:03,360 --> 00:58:04,360
You sure did one of those.

1086
00:58:04,360 --> 00:58:12,360
One of those Saturday things I remember reading in the art times reporting on the NYPD's sort of Muslim infiltration program was,

1087
00:58:12,360 --> 00:58:18,360
there was a student union at I think Columbia or another New York University where they posted in the room where the student,

1088
00:58:18,360 --> 00:58:24,360
Muslim Association met a sign saying, please do not discuss controversial politics in this room.

1089
00:58:24,360 --> 00:58:26,360
We don't want trouble.

1090
00:58:26,360 --> 00:58:30,360
And that doesn't seem like healthy environment for a free society.

1091
00:58:30,360 --> 00:58:31,360
It's right.

1092
00:58:31,360 --> 00:58:33,360
Please keep your free thinking at home.

1093
00:58:33,360 --> 00:58:34,360
Don't bring it here.

1094
00:58:34,360 --> 00:58:36,360
And unfortunately, you don't know these things with our goth.

1095
00:58:36,360 --> 00:58:38,360
freedoms are hard to value.

1096
00:58:38,360 --> 00:58:40,360
You only value them when they're missing.

1097
00:58:40,360 --> 00:58:41,360
When they're gone, that's really true.

1098
00:58:41,360 --> 00:58:46,360
And more than a decade ago, Phil Zimmerman, the creator of Pretty Good Privacy, he said,

1099
00:58:46,360 --> 00:58:49,360
he liked in personal privacy to the environment.

1100
00:58:49,360 --> 00:58:55,360
He said, there's been a time where it becomes kind of a privilege for a certain group of people who can afford to have access to it.

1101
00:58:55,360 --> 00:58:57,360
Okay, so that's pretty scary and pretty depressing.

1102
00:58:57,360 --> 00:58:59,360
I don't want to end on a dark note like that.

1103
00:58:59,360 --> 00:59:01,360
I guess the question is what can we do?

1104
00:59:01,360 --> 00:59:03,360
What are some of the things we can do?

1105
00:59:03,360 --> 00:59:05,360
Now, we had some encouraging news.

1106
00:59:05,360 --> 00:59:11,360
Perhaps the mayor of Seattle recently decreed that there will be no drones surveillance in the city of Seattle.

1107
00:59:11,360 --> 00:59:15,360
Perhaps that'll start to roll out on a local level more cities might follow.

1108
00:59:15,360 --> 00:59:19,360
Some people are starting to have together their own way to avoid police surveillance.

1109
00:59:19,360 --> 00:59:24,360
Here's the kind of homemade version of a licensed plate scanner of order.

1110
00:59:24,360 --> 00:59:32,360
And when it comes to face recognition and face tagging, there's an artist in the UK who created a series of make-ups that you can purchase.

1111
00:59:32,360 --> 00:59:34,360
And if you put these make-ups on, they look a little funny.

1112
00:59:34,360 --> 00:59:39,360
But you can see in the picture here is it makes it difficult for a computer to recognize your face as a face.

1113
00:59:39,360 --> 00:59:42,360
Because it actually distorts the image for the computer who knows, maybe in the future.

1114
00:59:42,360 --> 00:59:45,360
You'll see some people walking around with the ad or some kind of tattoo.

1115
00:59:45,360 --> 00:59:47,360
That artist is Adam Harvey.

1116
00:59:47,360 --> 00:59:51,360
He's actually introduced a fashion line, which we have here and we'll show a little bit later on.

1117
00:59:51,360 --> 00:59:53,360
And Marley's got a few of them over there.

1118
00:59:53,360 --> 00:59:55,360
Here are a couple examples of these.

1119
00:59:55,360 --> 00:59:59,360
It's a little fanciful, maybe a little hypothetical at this point.

1120
00:59:59,360 --> 01:00:00:06,360
But these are garments designed to help you protect yourself from surveillance cameras, from thermal scanners and from surveillance cameras.

1121
01:00:06,360 --> 01:00:11,360
And you can see they might even have a chance to bring in the burka back into style here in the western world.

1122
01:00:11,360 --> 01:00:16,360
One thing actually that they sent to me, I thought was probably had some use to it, which is this bag.

1123
01:00:16,360 --> 01:00:18,360
It's a little case for your cell phone.

1124
01:00:18,360 --> 01:00:23,360
And when your cell phone is inside of it, it doesn't emit any signal and those things can get in and nobody can track it.

1125
01:00:23,360 --> 01:00:26,360
But you know, nobody can call you either.

1126
01:00:26,360 --> 01:00:30,360
So they could just turn off your cell phone and save $100.

1127
01:00:30,360 --> 01:00:33,360
I'll tell me a little bit about this act.

1128
01:00:33,360 --> 01:00:37,360
So this is an act that was proposed by Ram time of Texas.

1129
01:00:37,360 --> 01:00:40,360
This is the preserving freedom from unwarranted surveillance act.

1130
01:00:40,360 --> 01:00:43,360
It's a big title, but actually kind of an e-principal.

1131
01:00:43,360 --> 01:00:50,360
Yeah, I mean, the only possible member of Congress who I could ever say might go a little further than I actually would as Rand Paul.

1132
01:00:50,360 --> 01:00:56,360
This was the idea here was to require a warrant full blown forth amendment, probable cause warrant,

1133
01:00:56,360 --> 01:01:02,360
anytime law enforcement or intelligence wants records about you from a third party like Google or Facebook.

1134
01:01:02,360 --> 01:01:09,360
Not just the contents of communications, federal law sometimes allows those to be gotten without a search warrant,

1135
01:01:09,360 --> 01:01:12,360
although courts are increasingly saying the fourth amendment requires it.

1136
01:01:12,360 --> 01:01:18,360
You wanted to say all records, your IP logs, your basic subscriber information, everything would acquire a full blown warrant.

1137
01:01:18,360 --> 01:01:27,360
That seems like a little much, I mean, they need something that they can get first so they can build the evidence they need to go to a judge for a warrant.

1138
01:01:27,360 --> 01:01:32,360
But it's actually a very hard question where to draw those lines, what is sensitive information?

1139
01:01:32,360 --> 01:01:40,360
Because even something like an IP address or email headers can reveal stuff about your political associations,

1140
01:01:40,360 --> 01:01:44,360
which the Supreme Court has said is protected under certain circumstances.

1141
01:01:44,360 --> 01:01:52,360
You can't force a controversial political organization like the NAACP to reveal who their members are to the government.

1142
01:01:52,360 --> 01:01:54,360
That's a pretty, that's a pretty order.

1143
01:01:54,360 --> 01:01:57,360
But of course, they might be this bill died.

1144
01:01:57,360 --> 01:01:58,360
Diadmetic, right?

1145
01:01:58,360 --> 01:01:59,360
That's the guy.

1146
01:01:59,360 --> 01:02:04,360
I mean, the bill and all of the technologies you talked about, if you think about it, they're really around the edges.

1147
01:02:04,360 --> 01:02:09,360
When you think about what we can do, the unfortunate answer is kind of not much.

1148
01:02:09,360 --> 01:02:11,360
And these those are happening.

1149
01:02:11,360 --> 01:02:14,360
There's a drone lobby, there's now a big surveillance technology lobby.

1150
01:02:14,360 --> 01:02:16,360
Now what we can do is what we're doing here.

1151
01:02:16,360 --> 01:02:20,360
We need to talk about issues, we need to make people aware of them and we need to agitate.

1152
01:02:20,360 --> 01:02:23,360
This is going to require real social and political change.

1153
01:02:23,360 --> 01:02:25,360
You know, we're not up for it now.

1154
01:02:25,360 --> 01:02:28,360
The hope is that we will be eventually.

1155
01:02:28,360 --> 01:02:30,360
Like there's what it gives you.

1156
01:02:30,360 --> 01:02:34,360
The poll bill is one of several, they got shot down as the Fizem Edmens Act,

1157
01:02:34,360 --> 01:02:36,360
which empowers the NSA, which we authorized.

1158
01:02:36,360 --> 01:02:38,360
A lot of this stuff was a lot milder.

1159
01:02:38,360 --> 01:02:44,360
So a proposal that the NSA has to make an estimate of how many Americans are being swept into its database.

1160
01:02:44,360 --> 01:02:45,360
Shot down.

1161
01:02:45,360 --> 01:02:50,360
A proposal that before, if they were doing foreign collection and they soup up Americans,

1162
01:02:50,360 --> 01:02:54,360
and they want to search for a particular American, they need to search warrant for that.

1163
01:02:54,360 --> 01:02:55,360
Shot down.

1164
01:02:55,360 --> 01:02:59,360
It's sort of troubling how little will there is for a shooting done.

1165
01:02:59,360 --> 01:03:00,360
Everybody is.

1166
01:03:00,360 --> 01:03:01,360
Everybody is.

1167
01:03:01,360 --> 01:03:01,360

1168
01:03:01,360 --> 01:03:02,360
Everybody is.

1169
01:03:02,360 --> 01:03:03,360
It's not even a bit violent.

1170
01:03:03,360 --> 01:03:04,360
It's violent.

1171
01:03:04,360 --> 01:03:05,360
Hard as anism is alive in Washington.

1172
01:03:05,360 --> 01:03:07,360
When it comes to stopping legislation.

1173
01:03:07,360 --> 01:03:11,360
The problem is there isn't the political,

1174
01:03:11,360 --> 01:03:14,360
if you think about who won, you got to go get to the police,

1175
01:03:14,360 --> 01:03:18,360
you got to go against national security, you're going to go against corporate lobby.

1176
01:03:18,360 --> 01:03:22,360
There's not a lot of power arrayed against these things,

1177
01:03:22,360 --> 01:03:23,360
and that's why this is hard.

1178
01:03:23,360 --> 01:03:24,360
The giant issue.

1179
01:03:24,360 --> 01:03:28,360
Well, it's time for me to start to bring the show to a wind down now.

1180
01:03:28,360 --> 01:03:30,360
We will have an open Q and A afterwards.

1181
01:03:30,360 --> 01:03:31,360
I hope you'll stick around for that.

1182
01:03:31,360 --> 01:03:34,360
But now it's time for me to talk about what's next after what's next and folks.

1183
01:03:34,360 --> 01:03:35,360
It's simple.

1184
01:03:35,360 --> 01:03:37,360
You face a difficult choice ahead.

1185
01:03:37,360 --> 01:03:40,360
We have to decide what kind of society we want to live in this country,

1186
01:03:40,360 --> 01:03:44,360
a society where we can expect a reasonable degree of privacy,

1187
01:03:44,360 --> 01:03:48,360
or a society where transparency is forced upon us,

1188
01:03:48,360 --> 01:03:50,360
without any possibility of resisting it.

1189
01:03:50,360 --> 01:03:52,360
That's a decision we're going to have to make.

1190
01:03:52,360 --> 01:03:56,360
We do have the ability to hold our electric representatives accountable.

1191
01:03:56,360 --> 01:03:59,360
We do have the ability to speak up and object

1192
01:03:59,360 --> 01:04:03,360
when corporations impose some transparency on a forced surveillance

1193
01:04:03,360 --> 01:04:05,360
upon us that we don't wish to have.

1194
01:04:05,360 --> 01:04:07,360
And we have the ability to speak up.

1195
01:04:07,360 --> 01:04:08,360
So it is forms like these.

1196
01:04:08,360 --> 01:04:11,360
They give us the opportunity to have that kind of an exchange.

1197
01:04:11,360 --> 01:04:13,360
Well, I want to thank you both Bruce Schneider.

1198
01:04:13,360 --> 01:04:16,360
Thank you for joining me on the show tonight at Julian Sanchas.

1199
01:04:16,360 --> 01:04:17,360
The K&W Institute.

1200
01:04:17,360 --> 01:04:18,360
Thank you.

1201
01:04:18,360 --> 01:04:20,360
You sure to check out Bruce's book.

1202
01:04:20,360 --> 01:04:21,360
Lyrs and outliers.

1203
01:04:21,360 --> 01:04:25,360
I want to give a big shout out to the crew here at LiveLab.

1204
01:04:25,360 --> 01:04:27,360
And very thank you very much for making this show possible.

1205
01:04:27,360 --> 01:04:29,360
It's going to pleasure doing the show with you.

1206
01:04:29,360 --> 01:04:32,360
And a big shout out to our live being led by Paul Wartico.

1207
01:04:32,360 --> 01:04:33,360
Strike it up, Paul.

1208
01:04:33,360 --> 01:04:34,360
It's here at...