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Right, we did our message to some Facebook.

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This is a little collapse to many people don't pay their taxes if you get grease.

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And it's attention to us as individuals and us collectively to society.

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So we might individually want each other's stuff, but we all are better off living as side of

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no one steals.

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Right, we might individually not want to pay our taxes, but we all are better off living

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to side of everybody else.

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And actually, one of the points, we're better off living as side of whatever cooperates

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except us.

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I'm sorry.

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You know, I want to say, I want to do this idea where I can steal, but I'm better off living

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as side of whether there's no theft because I can do benefits of living in a theft

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or if you're siding.

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But I'm way better off if I can live in a society where no one steals and steal.

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I get the benefits of the theft or if you're siding and I get your stuff.

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But again, everybody acts this way, society collapses, it goes to things property.

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Right, society doesn't work.

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Now, to make most of us recognize this, most of us recognize that it's not in our long-term

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best interest to act in our short-term self-enthusiasticity.

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Right, most of us don't steal.

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Not everyone recognizes that, and that's why you have security.

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And fundamentally, in society, that's why security exists.

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At the point of security is to keep the number of defectors down to some acceptable

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vignal, but low enough that society functions.

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Now notice, of course, that acceptable minimum is not zero.

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And the goal isn't to have zero defectors.

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And goals have it low enough.

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Right, so we get a crime rate that's low enough.

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We get a murder rate that's low enough.

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We get a crooked taxi driver rate that's low enough that everyone file a rate of food poisoning

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at conference lunches.

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Right, you want that to be low enough.

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Right, then we all are willing to eat the conference lunch without thinking.

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So that's the mechanism.

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Right, security is how we induce cooperation.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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That's how we do this.

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The first category at a cold morals.

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By that I mean it's like very general.

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I mean anything happens inside your head.

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And a lot of security, a lot of conformity, a lot of, of

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Compliety social norms, is enabled by by our,

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What goes on in our, they're wholly in our heads.

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Most of us don't steal, not because it's against the law,

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but because stealing is wrong.

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So senses of guilt, senses of shame,

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Oh, cuckoo, senses of wanting to be compliant or obedient.

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It's a lot of stuff going on here.

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It's a combination of innate and social factors.

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A lot of really good research in neuro, neuropsychology.

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On where the brain, we feel these things,

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They do it a lot of the does seem to be innate.

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And some of it, not, I, it seems sort of similar to the way

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Choms, he looks at language that we have some innate capacity

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from morals, and then there are our external world codes that are imposed

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on that, so like external languages.

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But a lot of it seems to be, you know, very, very human.

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The second type of societal pressure is reputation.

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And this is a very different, also comes from our heads.

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But it's very different, because it has to do with how others respond to our actions.

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And this is a much bigger and much stronger type of societal pressure.

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And in every basic level, we get praised for good behavior and stuff for their behavior.

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You know, if a friend, if a friend, if a friend over these feels my sweater,

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not going to call up police, he's not going to invite him over anymore.

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And if one of you jumped up and attacked the person to the next then,

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you probably wouldn't call, please, who just gets you out of the room.

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And that sort of, of social consequences, both short-term and long-term,

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is what I think of as reputation.

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And, and for human, this is actually a really big deal.

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And we are very, very sensitive reputation information about ourselves,

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about others, and there are theories of language that evolved to help us scale an reputation

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information.

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And they've visualized that there's no order to gossip information about other people.

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And, I mean, humans are unique here.

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There are other animals that deal in reputation.

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Of all primates, a lot of mammals, some birds, recognize individuals and respond to,

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based on the history with those individuals.

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We are the only species that can transfer reputation to a nation.

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Right? I can tell you about him.

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And that's a huge deal.

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Right? That allows the reputation to scale,

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in a way that no other species can imagine, that's even before we invented the newspaper.

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Which is another way that reputation scales nationally, you know, in our globally.

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Right?

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And, I mean, we are, so, it was actually one great experiment to all of all,

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I'll tell you about it.

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It really shows how a sense of your reputation reputation for the nation.

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This was done.

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I think it was on the United States.

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It was done at a university psychology department at an honesty coffee station.

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And again, I'm sure you have these here.

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There's a coffee pot in the apartment somewhere.

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And there's a box.

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From my hand, you just need to take a cup of coffee and you put a coin in the box.

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And I think about this system.

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My big couple of things.

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Nobody's watching, right? It's purely a system that's going to be secured by walls.

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There's no reason why someone can't steal, they don't want to.

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But because you've got cash box, you have very easy way to measure in,

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how honest the group is.

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And then you can do, you know, measuring the amount of coffee, draw the Kathleen box.

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You know exactly what your, what your best greatest.

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So the researchers did, I actually love this experiment.

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They took a photograph from a pair of eyes and put a behind the cash box.

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Not making this up.

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And they found that that photograph increased compliance,

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dramatic, that smithet, it simply reminded that someone might be watching.

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So I didn't even someone watching.

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It's a reminder that there are a few eyes in this world.

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They might be looking at you.

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Make people more honest.

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Meaning, think of this in terms of religion.

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And the notion that a, you know, some higher power indeed is,

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watching individuals and judging that morality.

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And just that belief makes people more.

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So these two societal pressures, walls and reputation are very old.

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Right?

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There's all this human society.

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You can see them in other animals.

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The morality is not only in human, you see the same brain function in other primates.

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And I think of this as our primitive societal pressure tool gets on them.

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I mean, this is how we, as, you know, in early species,

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kept people honest and kept security.

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How we got our small societies to function through those two things.

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The problem with them is, is they don't scale very well.

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A lot of really interesting research done on the natural sizes of human groups.

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Robin Dunbar is a great work in looking at natural group sizes.

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And find that group's kept one more journey.

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And the number of heat in whites to use is 150, you know, plus or minus.

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But a lot of these mechanisms start failing.

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You know, that groups, the groups can't keep security when they get much larger than that.

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There's a larger communities that we have developed,

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and that could have been a deal with that.

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And some of it is a specialization in delegation.

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And some of it is through technology.

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You know, so we will allow our societies to scale even larger numbers.

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So the third type of societal pressure I like to think about is institutional.

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You can think of it as laws, but not a word of laws because,

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I mean, you think of let's say the criminal organization.

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And not really making laws, they have rules.

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It's sort of, they're less formal in laws.

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Laws are on our, and how the government, government prescribed rules as opposed to just rules of any group.

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But if you're thinking of what they really are,

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the warms that have been codified, and it's the force that has been delegated.

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So we codify our rules about theft, and then we delegate the force into the police.

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And we get a force of two of the rest, right?

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We can enforce through rewards or sanctions.

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And just like in a gravitational scare,

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we've been able to have rewards to follow social norms and sanctions for not.

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As you scale though, you tend to rely on sanctions more.

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But if you think about it, it just tends to be cheaper and more efficient.

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And if you have a group, and you've got most everybody

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compliant with the norm, a few people defecting.

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It's much cheaper to penalize a few defectors that is to reward the many people that are compliant,

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many of the many cooperators.

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It's just more efficient that way.

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There are occasional exceptions, right?

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I know United States, there are some tax incentives,

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which I look at, as a mechanism that reward cooperators.

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But in general, we tend to be all about punishing defectors.

254
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You get at the institutional level.

255
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It's because it's large enough.

256
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The last type of societal pressure, I talk about our security systems.

257
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And by this I mean any mechanisms, artificial mechanisms designed to reduce cooperation

258
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or prevent defection or reduce trust directly or account compliance.

259
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So I mean you can think of a door locks and door locks and gates and fences,

260
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a lot of systems in the bottom.

261
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Forensic systems, audit systems, mitigation systems for recovery systems.

262
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So in my field, anything we do for a living,

263
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may falls under this category of security systems.

264
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What I think is really important, interesting,

265
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is that in the real world, all four of these work together.

266
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It's never one or the other.

267
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You know, so out of the field, the lack of steel.

268
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And most of us don't steel because we know it's wrong.

269
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A lot of us don't steel because we're our friends, they.

270
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Some of us don't steel because we're a jail.

271
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And way up here, if you don't steel because we can't pick a door lock.

272
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But, you know, when I give this talk to security people,

273
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what's interesting is my entire audience is only ever working right up here.

274
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I've all eaten a think about, are these artificial mechanisms?

275
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How do they pass towards water?

276
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That's where they are.

277
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But really, this entire gamut is important.

278
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We go back to the eyes, experience.

279
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We wouldn't be true that I would put the picture of people

280
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on their bank website.

281
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We're doing a banking fraud.

282
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If I don't know whether it would work to be like the cheap security measure ever in this regard.

283
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So, you do see them all.

284
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You see them all.

285
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286
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287
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288
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289
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290
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291
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292
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293
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294
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295
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296
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297
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298
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299
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300
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301
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302
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303
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304
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305
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306
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307
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308
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309
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310
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311
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312
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313
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314
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You see, eBay is a great example.

315
00:14:51,280 --> 00:14:56,280
eBay feedback of a reputation-based security mechanism.

316
00:14:56,280 --> 00:15:03,280
It does reduce fraud, but it does it wholly based on repetition.

317
00:15:03,280 --> 00:15:06,280
If you cheat somebody, it right-bed feedback imagine.

318
00:15:06,280 --> 00:15:11,280
And it's different now, but back in the early days of eBay.

319
00:15:11,280 --> 00:15:17,280
It was really interesting to see how that worked, how jealously dealers would go on their reputation.

320
00:15:17,280 --> 00:15:24,280
A lot of their way to refund money when buyers are satisfied because they want to very much have a perfect feedback rating.

321
00:15:24,280 --> 00:15:27,280
That was valuable.

322
00:15:27,280 --> 00:15:31,280
That perfect reputation was very valuable.

323
00:15:31,280 --> 00:15:34,280
Really interesting.

324
00:15:34,280 --> 00:15:44,280
So, what I think about this, I think of it very much in terms of a balance.

325
00:15:44,280 --> 00:15:50,280
So, individual has to make an individual make a cooperative analysis.

326
00:15:50,280 --> 00:15:55,280
Should I see what I'm at?

327
00:15:55,280 --> 00:16:00,280
And these societal pressures are how society puts its finger on the scales.

328
00:16:00,280 --> 00:16:06,280
How do we affect that cooperative analysis?

329
00:16:06,280 --> 00:16:11,280
How do we make it so most people decide to cooperate?

330
00:16:11,280 --> 00:16:13,280
Now, how does this work?

331
00:16:13,280 --> 00:16:17,280
I mean, the details depends a lot on context.

332
00:16:17,280 --> 00:16:20,280
I mean, I think that I can ask pretty regularly, not at all.

333
00:16:20,280 --> 00:16:24,280
Which one is more important, what kind of mix is ideal?

334
00:16:24,280 --> 00:16:26,280
It all depends on context.

335
00:16:26,280 --> 00:16:30,280
I mean, there's no one answer.

336
00:16:30,280 --> 00:16:35,280
And in general, society will use these pressures to find

337
00:16:35,280 --> 00:16:40,280
on optimal balance being cooperating with effect.

338
00:16:40,280 --> 00:16:44,280
Remember, the goal is not to get the effect straight down to zero.

339
00:16:44,280 --> 00:16:46,280
It doesn't make sense.

340
00:16:46,280 --> 00:16:50,280
But then there's going to be some optimal level.

341
00:16:50,280 --> 00:16:58,280
Too many defectors are too damaging and too few detectors are too extensive.

342
00:16:58,280 --> 00:17:01,280
And we as a society determine that balance.

343
00:17:01,280 --> 00:17:03,280
It's sort of organically.

344
00:17:03,280 --> 00:17:07,280
You think about other chiroate in your community.

345
00:17:07,280 --> 00:17:09,280
The primary gets too high.

346
00:17:09,280 --> 00:17:11,280
People's not saying, the primary gets too high.

347
00:17:11,280 --> 00:17:13,280
We need more police.

348
00:17:13,280 --> 00:17:15,280
The primary gets too low.

349
00:17:15,280 --> 00:17:17,280
People's not saying, why are we spending so much money on police?

350
00:17:17,280 --> 00:17:19,280
We have these other social problems to solve.

351
00:17:19,280 --> 00:17:20,280
All right?

352
00:17:20,280 --> 00:17:21,280
So, you'll get that.

353
00:17:21,280 --> 00:17:24,280
And there's not just one level.

354
00:17:24,280 --> 00:17:26,280
It depends on culture.

355
00:17:26,280 --> 00:17:29,280
It depends on what euro we're living in.

356
00:17:29,280 --> 00:17:35,280
You know, what's right for me today is not the same as what's right for someone else.

357
00:17:35,280 --> 00:17:37,280
That's why for years ago or 50 years ago.

358
00:17:37,280 --> 00:17:39,280
What's right in the United States is different.

359
00:17:39,280 --> 00:17:43,280
What's right in France or Australia or Japan or when it saw us.

360
00:17:43,280 --> 00:17:45,280
It might be different.

361
00:17:45,280 --> 00:17:47,280
It will be different.

362
00:17:47,280 --> 00:17:57,280
So, I maintain and I do a lot more in the book that this way of looking at society.

363
00:17:57,280 --> 00:18:00,280
I think has some broad explanatory powers.

364
00:18:00,280 --> 00:18:07,480
And I use examples to talk about terrorism or the recent global financial crisis or organized

365
00:18:07,480 --> 00:18:10,280
crime or crime in the internet.

366
00:18:10,280 --> 00:18:24,280
And what really intrigues me, and this came up in the discussion I was having outside earlier, that a lot of this is very interrelated and very interdisciplinary.

367
00:18:24,280 --> 00:18:32,280
But in writing my book, I was going to talk about access to journals in some of the universities.

368
00:18:32,280 --> 00:18:37,280
And I think it's the right book actually got university access to journals from my colleague.

369
00:18:37,280 --> 00:18:39,280
And it was really important.

370
00:18:39,280 --> 00:18:46,280
I think I downloaded a little of the thousands of papers looking at these issues.

371
00:18:46,280 --> 00:18:53,280
And that a clenched off of psychology, economics, and game theory, and evolution of biology, and neuroscience, philosophy, and

372
00:18:53,280 --> 00:19:00,280
the biology law of political science, the theology in there.

373
00:19:00,280 --> 00:19:12,280
And I remember from my days at the university, as these journals were just on other places in the library, they were in other libraries.

374
00:19:12,280 --> 00:19:18,280
And I actually believe it's a totally side point that the availability of journals on the internet.

375
00:19:18,280 --> 00:19:22,280
I think we'll cause our renaissance in a disciplinary work.

376
00:19:22,280 --> 00:19:30,280
It's simply because it's so much easier to read what some other discipline has to say about what you're thinking.

377
00:19:30,280 --> 00:19:36,280
Now I hope it is that we'll also mean that these papers will become more readable.

378
00:19:36,280 --> 00:19:45,280
Maybe there's people now inside there feel we'll now be meeting them and citing them.

379
00:19:45,280 --> 00:19:52,280
So there's a lot of complications in this model in this research.

380
00:19:52,280 --> 00:19:56,280
There's notion of self-interest versus group interest.

381
00:19:56,280 --> 00:19:59,280
Think about it's actually very simplistic.

382
00:19:59,280 --> 00:20:05,280
But really what goes on is I think if any decision there are multiple competing interests.

383
00:20:05,280 --> 00:20:10,280
So you might think of you as a family member versus you as a community member.

384
00:20:10,280 --> 00:20:13,280
You as a play versus you as a citizen.

385
00:20:13,280 --> 00:20:16,280
Just different aspects of yourself.

386
00:20:16,280 --> 00:20:24,280
And you find when you start looking at real examples of how those works, different groups each year to try to pressure,

387
00:20:24,280 --> 00:20:27,280
to try to influence the individuals one way or the other.

388
00:20:27,280 --> 00:20:36,280
And a lot has been meeting out of states about about corporate governance and corporations trying to do the lawful,

389
00:20:36,280 --> 00:20:41,280
the moral thing and how we have individuals in corporations can.

390
00:20:41,280 --> 00:20:45,280
And do things that are against society's interests.

391
00:20:45,280 --> 00:20:52,280
Really that that's a tension between that individual looking at him as a member of that,

392
00:20:52,280 --> 00:20:57,280
that proper making corporations really versus a member of his community.

393
00:20:57,280 --> 00:21:02,280
And how those polls are different and how that comes out and whistleblowers.

394
00:21:02,280 --> 00:21:06,280
And in a certain other way it's been a lot of good writing on this.

395
00:21:06,280 --> 00:21:11,280
There's a lot of good research on interplains and worlds and reputation.

396
00:21:11,280 --> 00:21:12,280
I pulled them apart.

397
00:21:12,280 --> 00:21:22,280
You're doing a stark separation between things that happen in your head just from you and your head based on the reactions of others.

398
00:21:22,280 --> 00:21:28,280
But those two evolved simultaneously and it can be a part of a part.

399
00:21:28,280 --> 00:21:33,280
And there are people writing you say that it's really just one thing.

400
00:21:33,280 --> 00:21:41,280
Some other, but yeah, Metro Colle use that guilt of something you feel in your head and shame is something you feel based on other.

401
00:21:41,280 --> 00:21:42,280
You see that.

402
00:21:42,280 --> 00:21:45,280
People say that's going to be nonsense distinction.

403
00:21:45,280 --> 00:21:48,280
And so I think this is a lot there.

404
00:21:48,280 --> 00:21:55,280
And I kind of gave a pretty much a character description of a law, right, is codifying a social norm.

405
00:21:55,280 --> 00:21:57,280
You know, you know, that is a always true.

406
00:21:57,280 --> 00:22:08,280
And very often the law is going against society in which they're operating, right, that rulers do not just codify new norms that they consolidate power.

407
00:22:08,280 --> 00:22:10,280
You know, how that works.

408
00:22:10,280 --> 00:22:12,280
I think it's really interesting.

409
00:22:12,280 --> 00:22:18,280
And I talked a bit about scaling and I think scaling is one of the critical things.

410
00:22:18,280 --> 00:22:22,280
I just come back to the later on how societal pressures work.

411
00:22:22,280 --> 00:22:28,280
That different aspects of this have different natural scalars.

412
00:22:28,280 --> 00:22:30,280
And rules and reputation.

413
00:22:30,280 --> 00:22:33,280
It's a lot written about in-group versus out-group.

414
00:22:33,280 --> 00:22:38,280
And how we as humans are very attuned to in-group versus out-group.

415
00:22:38,280 --> 00:22:42,280
And that when the group's don't exist, we tend to invent that.

416
00:22:42,280 --> 00:22:45,280
Uh, blank on that.

417
00:22:45,280 --> 00:22:50,280
Is it, what my David Verberia, the white man, the name, right, us and us and them, it's called.

418
00:22:50,280 --> 00:22:54,280
And he writes about the sort of in-group versus out-group distinction.

419
00:22:54,280 --> 00:22:59,280
And, you know, and rules are intended to have strong moral feelings for those close to us.

420
00:22:59,280 --> 00:23:05,280
You know, our immediate family, our extended family, our community, our city, our country.

421
00:23:05,280 --> 00:23:10,280
The countries that speak our language, the countries that look, they would be like us.

422
00:23:10,280 --> 00:23:13,280
And, and, and, morals tend to tail off.

423
00:23:14,280 --> 00:23:19,280
You don't feel as much sympathy with, you know, people look differently,

424
00:23:19,280 --> 00:23:24,280
they can have language of natural disaster, then if it happens, uh, closer to us, cognitively.

425
00:23:24,280 --> 00:23:28,280
Now, in the other hand, you know, we are the only species that has universal morals.

426
00:23:28,280 --> 00:23:32,280
So, you're also tailed down and go up at the edges.

427
00:23:32,280 --> 00:23:39,280
And we have morals that apply to all humans, we are all species of life for some of us.

428
00:23:39,280 --> 00:23:41,280
Which is really interesting.

429
00:23:42,280 --> 00:23:46,280
I mean, laws, you know, scaled differently, of course, technology scale differently.

430
00:23:46,280 --> 00:23:52,280
And there's a lot, I think that's where I can be talked about in the effects of group decision making,

431
00:23:52,280 --> 00:23:53,280
on all of us.

432
00:23:53,280 --> 00:23:59,280
You know, a lot of time to not us as individuals being cooperative decisions, it's us as groups.

433
00:23:59,280 --> 00:24:06,280
If something we might not do individually, we might do, if there's a group of us, reaching consensus.

434
00:24:06,280 --> 00:24:10,280
A lot of great work in psychology of group decisions.

435
00:24:11,280 --> 00:24:14,280
So, I think it is really interesting and applicable.

436
00:24:14,280 --> 00:24:21,280
Uh, you know, how does a place out in common groups, in corporate structure, in a government structure?

437
00:24:21,280 --> 00:24:23,280
I think it's also interesting.

438
00:24:23,280 --> 00:24:29,280
Well, what I think and I talk about here, and so, the more depth, because the sense of role

439
00:24:29,280 --> 00:24:32,280
technologists is how technology affects us.

440
00:24:32,280 --> 00:24:42,280
Like, it's fundamentally, I'm also a technologist, and the value to me is to look at how technology at the moment is changing things,

441
00:24:42,280 --> 00:24:46,280
and how we can possibly get ahead of it.

442
00:24:46,280 --> 00:24:54,280
So, technology, when thinking about security, thinking about trust, I think it's fundamentally about scale.

443
00:24:54,280 --> 00:24:59,280
Technology allows societies to scale.

444
00:24:59,280 --> 00:25:03,280
And that affects these pressures in very real ways.

445
00:25:03,280 --> 00:25:11,280
So, I mean, it's so, we scale a lot of dimensions, right, more people, increase complexity, new social systems, like Facebook,

446
00:25:11,280 --> 00:25:18,280
increase technological intensity, increase frequency, increase distance.

447
00:25:18,280 --> 00:25:26,280
I mean, you're at a conference talking about artificial persons, which is a huge other scaling and complexity.

448
00:25:26,280 --> 00:25:30,280
And so, so, so scale happens.

449
00:25:30,280 --> 00:25:36,280
And, you know, if you think about soil pressures as is something in a balance in cooperatives and factors,

450
00:25:36,280 --> 00:25:40,280
what technology does is it upsets the balance.

451
00:25:40,280 --> 00:25:44,280
And it changes something.

452
00:25:44,280 --> 00:25:47,280
You know, maybe a crime becomes easier.

453
00:25:47,280 --> 00:25:50,280
Maybe a law enforcement becomes easier.

454
00:25:50,280 --> 00:25:56,280
So, technology changes something, and response society has to rebalance them.

455
00:25:56,280 --> 00:26:00,280
You know, maybe some new laws or some new technologies.

456
00:26:00,280 --> 00:26:03,280
Maybe some of this new group norms, and good, because interesting example of that,

457
00:26:03,280 --> 00:26:06,280
we're seeing right now is copyright.

458
00:26:06,280 --> 00:26:14,280
Technology drastically changed the scale in which you could copy music or movies.

459
00:26:15,280 --> 00:26:24,280
And their response is either we're seeing both of them at the same time as the industry fighting back with the economy and copying.

460
00:26:24,280 --> 00:26:28,280
And all other people say, no, no, the social norms have changed.

461
00:26:28,280 --> 00:26:37,280
That the notion of copyright doesn't really apply in the same way in the world of this new technology.

462
00:26:37,280 --> 00:26:39,280
And, you know, we're going to see who's right.

463
00:26:39,280 --> 00:26:42,280
I have my bets on new social norms.

464
00:26:43,280 --> 00:26:46,280
But we're the midst of that change.

465
00:26:48,280 --> 00:26:51,280
So this is an iterative process.

466
00:26:51,280 --> 00:26:55,280
So you mean you have these feedback loops,

467
00:26:55,280 --> 00:26:58,280
where technology changes something, and then you have to rebalance,

468
00:26:58,280 --> 00:27:00,280
and how it changes again.

469
00:27:00,280 --> 00:27:05,280
And the idea is that stability is the result and has to go.

470
00:27:05,280 --> 00:27:10,280
What's interesting is I'm not sure that's achievable anymore.

471
00:27:11,280 --> 00:27:17,280
Because in this feedback system, attackers have a natural advantage.

472
00:27:17,280 --> 00:27:28,280
I mean some of it's a basic first move or advantage, but most of it is because attackers tend to be more agile.

473
00:27:28,280 --> 00:27:32,280
I mean, they don't have the institutional inertia that society does.

474
00:27:32,280 --> 00:27:35,280
So I look to ease the example.

475
00:27:35,280 --> 00:27:38,280
Someone invents the motor car.

476
00:27:38,280 --> 00:27:41,280
And please say, well, that looks like a good idea.

477
00:27:41,280 --> 00:27:44,280
And they have a study move to study the car.

478
00:27:44,280 --> 00:27:47,280
And they produce an R and a P, you have to bid an acceptor proposal.

479
00:27:47,280 --> 00:27:49,280
It's a choosing manufacturer and buy a car.

480
00:27:49,280 --> 00:27:51,280
They have a training procedure.

481
00:27:51,280 --> 00:27:53,280
And a usage manual.

482
00:27:53,280 --> 00:27:57,280
And I mean all the burglar says, oh, look, and do get away with the vehicle.

483
00:27:57,280 --> 00:28:05,280
And it doesn't have the, there's no institutional inertia that prevents the burglar using it immediately.

484
00:28:06,280 --> 00:28:08,280
And we saw this on the internet.

485
00:28:08,280 --> 00:28:11,280
Right, and in a commerce appears in the mid-90s.

486
00:28:11,280 --> 00:28:15,280
And really within moments, you have this new breed of cybercriminal.

487
00:28:15,280 --> 00:28:22,280
And appear on a nowhere, then new habitat advantage of the internet is still new.

488
00:28:22,280 --> 00:28:27,280
And meanwhile, the police who trained on act of a christian apples.

489
00:28:27,280 --> 00:28:32,280
I took a lot of seven to 10 years to catch up.

490
00:28:33,280 --> 00:28:37,280
And, you know, at some of the communities here, I remember those seven to 10 years.

491
00:28:37,280 --> 00:28:39,280
They were really painful.

492
00:28:39,280 --> 00:28:44,280
As a police said, no, we can clue how they get it at work.

493
00:28:44,280 --> 00:28:46,280
And it had a crime work for a computer buzz.

494
00:28:46,280 --> 00:28:48,280
It was a kind of embarrassing.

495
00:28:48,280 --> 00:28:53,280
They did catch up, but it took time.

496
00:28:53,280 --> 00:28:58,280
Now, they can see what is happening right now in Syria.

497
00:28:59,280 --> 00:29:01,280
It's worth looking up.

498
00:29:01,280 --> 00:29:14,280
John Perry Barlow, who's a, he's a famous internet fighter from the, he was decade, wrote a great essay in 1995 called The Declaration of Freedom of the Cyberspace.

499
00:29:14,280 --> 00:29:18,280
Basically said things like, you know, cyberspace will transcend to all governments.

500
00:29:18,280 --> 00:29:23,280
Freedom is organic and in yet, we're all over you.

501
00:29:23,280 --> 00:29:26,280
And we will believe that back then.

502
00:29:27,280 --> 00:29:36,280
You know, fast forward to today, and we're seeing in countries like Syria, the government is using the internet to surveil the identifying the rest of the citizens.

503
00:29:36,280 --> 00:29:38,280
They're using it to pump out propaganda.

504
00:29:38,280 --> 00:29:46,280
And they're shutting it down when it looks like it'll benefit the protesters, their episodes.

505
00:29:46,280 --> 00:29:54,280
Now, it's not that, it's not that they internet favored the, the, the factor,

506
00:29:54,280 --> 00:30:03,280
the bad guy in this scenario that the citizens is that they weren't able to make use of the technologies first and fastest.

507
00:30:03,280 --> 00:30:09,280
They're, but in the end, technologies tend to magnify power.

508
00:30:09,280 --> 00:30:19,280
And those who have power will get more power through technology, but just it's slower for them.

509
00:30:19,280 --> 00:30:26,280
Interesting question is, how slow is, is too slow?

510
00:30:26,280 --> 00:30:30,280
Because you've got something, you've got sort of a security gap here, right?

511
00:30:30,280 --> 00:30:35,280
And that time between when the defectors can make use of new technology.

512
00:30:35,280 --> 00:30:44,280
And when the cooperators, what society can, and that time delay is a security gap.

513
00:30:44,280 --> 00:30:51,280
And if you think about it, that gap tends to be larger in time to this more technology.

514
00:30:51,280 --> 00:31:01,280
And in times of rapid technological change, actually, in times of rapid social change, do the rapid technological change.

515
00:31:01,280 --> 00:31:11,280
And we are living in a time of, well, one more technology, before, and to greater social change in the technology, before.

516
00:31:11,280 --> 00:31:16,280
Which means this society of security, this security gap, is greater than it's ever been before.

517
00:31:16,280 --> 00:31:23,280
You can see the same kind of dynamic when you look at the enlightenment.

518
00:31:23,280 --> 00:31:33,280
The enlightenment does your illusion, does it mean that in there, you'll see a lot of the same thing, but not some degree you're seeing today.

519
00:31:33,280 --> 00:31:40,280
Is more, more faster, faster technological change, which is driving.

520
00:31:40,280 --> 00:31:45,280
I think very rapid change in how defectors operate.

521
00:31:45,280 --> 00:31:50,280
You follow something like ATM fraud. It's a really interesting way of watching that.

522
00:31:50,280 --> 00:31:57,280
So an evolution of the fraudsters can be one step ahead of the ATM machine manufacturers and the bankers.

523
00:31:57,280 --> 00:32:03,280
So for many years, the big deal problem were card scimmers. They've gotten very good.

524
00:32:03,280 --> 00:32:06,280
I know that you have in the UK, we have been all over the United States.

525
00:32:06,280 --> 00:32:13,280
And criminals will make these overlays that sit in front of the card slot.

526
00:32:13,280 --> 00:32:18,280
And when you put your card in, they grab a copy of it.

527
00:32:18,280 --> 00:32:27,280
And this is primarily clones of strike cards, but we have started to see chip and pin-clone it.

528
00:32:27,280 --> 00:32:32,280
Because you'll also have a camera that will grab a pin.

529
00:32:32,280 --> 00:32:39,280
And you're a criminal, you set this up on an ATM machine in a way that skies right, is painted correctly.

530
00:32:39,280 --> 00:32:44,280
And then you can skim a bunch of credentials and seal mine.

531
00:32:44,280 --> 00:32:50,280
It's been a problem for years. There are a bunch of half-baked solutions that more or less work.

532
00:32:50,280 --> 00:33:03,280
I read two weeks ago, just read in a security blog, that now criminals are moving towards the locking the cash slot.

533
00:33:03,280 --> 00:33:07,280
And the wallet is Brian Predes and I've got a lot of them.

534
00:33:07,280 --> 00:33:11,280
And there's a picture of a funny, bent paper clip.

535
00:33:11,280 --> 00:33:21,280
But basically, if you don't do it, you stick this in the slot that the money comes out of, and it blocks the cash.

536
00:33:21,280 --> 00:33:27,280
And then you come back an hour later and you'll pull all the cash out.

537
00:33:27,280 --> 00:33:31,280
I wouldn't have thought of this.

538
00:33:31,280 --> 00:33:44,280
Right, but now that it's been thought of, it's going to happen more and more until the machine designers figure out a way to design a jam proof dispenser type system.

539
00:33:44,280 --> 00:33:51,280
Or right, the system where the money can't go out of it, you know, track the backing, come up with you and come up with a ways to seal this.

540
00:33:51,280 --> 00:33:53,280
But it requires a redesign.

541
00:33:54,280 --> 00:34:02,280
Right, there is going to be a delay of retrofitting machines with this new technology, and that new machines might never get to parse the world.

542
00:34:02,280 --> 00:34:08,280
Don't have the money to afford these new technologies.

543
00:34:08,280 --> 00:34:16,280
So, I mean, what this really means is that it's harder and harder to get to the side of the press is right.

544
00:34:16,280 --> 00:34:21,280
And it's funny, in my field of computer security, we're starting to see the realization of this.

545
00:34:21,280 --> 00:34:26,280
There's a big series of conference every year called the RSA Congress in California, and February.

546
00:34:26,280 --> 00:34:35,280
And just this year, I started seeing the more and more examples of this type of thinking.

547
00:34:35,280 --> 00:34:40,280
I've heard a call react to security or agile security or lean security.

548
00:34:40,280 --> 00:34:46,280
And it's just a thing that's used to be that as companies, we would say, you know, buy my widget and you'll be safe.

549
00:34:46,280 --> 00:34:51,280
Complete lie, but we want you to buy our widgets because that's how we make money.

550
00:34:51,280 --> 00:34:53,280
But that's always been the advertising slogan.

551
00:34:53,280 --> 00:34:58,280
We look at any of the various companies, buy my enterprise product and you'll be safe.

552
00:34:58,280 --> 00:35:06,280
Now the slogan is more, you know, we know you're not safe, call us after the bands stuff happens, it will help you get back on your feet.

553
00:35:06,280 --> 00:35:14,280
And recognition that you can't get ahead of the band guys, but it will be very clear enough.

554
00:35:14,280 --> 00:35:19,280
We'll do that again. And if you know an anti-virus product, that's basically how they work.

555
00:35:19,280 --> 00:35:27,280
It's funny, in the early days of anti-virus, in the 80s, you had two competing schools of thought.

556
00:35:27,280 --> 00:35:31,280
One was the signature based.

557
00:35:31,280 --> 00:35:36,280
The moment a virus products would recognize viruses by the signatures of a blocker.

558
00:35:36,280 --> 00:35:42,280
Or smart end of a virus products that would learn virus-like behavior, right?

559
00:35:42,280 --> 00:35:46,280
And block things that didn't virus-like behavior.

560
00:35:46,280 --> 00:35:56,280
The idea being that unknown viruses, right, where there are no signatures, you catch through this war-intelligent way of, of the dead of my viruses.

561
00:35:56,280 --> 00:36:02,280
But it turns out that like a Microsoft software install is indistinguishable from the virus.

562
00:36:02,280 --> 00:36:08,280
And a lot of legitimate things are because a virus is not about the code.

563
00:36:08,280 --> 00:36:12,280
It's about the intentions of a person behind the code.

564
00:36:12,280 --> 00:36:17,280
So the energy is basically settle on this dumb approach.

565
00:36:17,280 --> 00:36:24,280
And right now, if you have any of your bad-a-half antipiruses, you probably have it set to update every day.

566
00:36:24,280 --> 00:36:30,280
Every day it's some time, it goes back to the internet and gets the new signatures of the day.

567
00:36:30,280 --> 00:36:34,280
And most days there are new signatures.

568
00:36:34,280 --> 00:36:48,280
So if there's thinking about what this type of security regime is, or we're saying is that, you know, we as a community will stay safe by sacrificing a few of us.

569
00:36:48,280 --> 00:36:52,280
Right, the few early victims get caught by the virus.

570
00:36:52,280 --> 00:37:02,280
But the antipiruses companies very quickly see it, identify it right a signature and push it out.

571
00:37:02,280 --> 00:37:08,280
And so my is similar to the herd of half a million gazelles wandering on these African planes.

572
00:37:08,280 --> 00:37:14,280
I mean, it's okay that there are, you know, five hundred lines circling their herd.

573
00:37:14,280 --> 00:37:26,280
And the herd will survive because because the group will react even though a few individuals will get hurt.

574
00:37:26,280 --> 00:37:32,280
Now I'm finally starting to see this type of thinking in terrorist airplanes security.

575
00:37:32,280 --> 00:37:41,280
And if you think about this to the history of the, of the airplane terrorism security, it's all about react.

576
00:37:41,280 --> 00:37:47,280
And I think what happened last time, right, we screened for guns and bombs, terrorist use box cutters.

577
00:37:47,280 --> 00:37:51,280
Take with box cutters and didn't eat those when they put bomb in their shoes.

578
00:37:51,280 --> 00:37:53,280
We shoot the shoes, they use the liquid.

579
00:37:53,280 --> 00:37:55,280
Take away liquids, they put a bomb in the underwear.

580
00:37:55,280 --> 00:37:59,280
Right, you use full body scanners, they're going to do something else.

581
00:37:59,280 --> 00:38:01,280
This is a stupid game.

582
00:38:01,280 --> 00:38:07,280
And a game would be that that would make sense not to play.

583
00:38:07,280 --> 00:38:17,280
But it's much more, it's much smarter to be able to react quickly against what happens versus to try to prevent what happened last time,

584
00:38:17,280 --> 00:38:25,280
especially when you have an intelligent and adaptive adversaire.

585
00:38:25,280 --> 00:38:31,280
So because so some most technologies benefit the defenders, sometimes the benefits, the, the,

586
00:38:31,280 --> 00:38:35,280
Sorry, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a, it's a benefit of the defenders.

587
00:38:35,280 --> 00:38:43,280
I mean, think of pentagnology, good example of the radio, which changed policing, or that anything else in the history of the planet.

588
00:38:43,280 --> 00:38:49,280
Because it used to be police and were alone actors, you know, being able to radio that radio for that kind of,

589
00:38:49,280 --> 00:38:51,280
made a huge difference.

590
00:38:51,280 --> 00:38:57,280
And so a couple of final points.

591
00:38:57,280 --> 00:39:03,280
One, you know, no matter how much the side of pressure you deploy, there always will be defectors.

592
00:39:03,280 --> 00:39:09,280
This is important, right increasing side of pressure isn't always worth it.

593
00:39:09,280 --> 00:39:15,280
And you have a basic low-pandishing returns, side of pressure is also to prevent cooperations.

594
00:39:15,280 --> 00:39:23,280
And to get more your force alarm rate goes up and then the base rate penalty kicks in and you have a lot more problems.

595
00:39:23,280 --> 00:39:27,280
So there always is some optimal level to sign it and it's never a person cooperation.

596
00:39:27,280 --> 00:39:32,280
It's sooner or later at some academic conference, one of you will jump up and attack the person's index.

597
00:39:32,280 --> 00:39:42,280
It's probably happens. Probably at an anthropology conference.

598
00:39:42,280 --> 00:39:47,280
Okay, other points will be all defect at some times in some things.

599
00:39:47,280 --> 00:39:55,280
Nobody's 100% cooperating. Nobody cooperates all the time. Nobody cooperates 0% of the time.

600
00:39:55,280 --> 00:40:04,280
Nobody cooperates all the time. And really, I always think of security as attacks.

601
00:40:04,280 --> 00:40:07,280
Security is attacks on the ox.

602
00:40:07,280 --> 00:40:15,280
It's attacks we pay not to get a benefit but to prevent a problem.

603
00:40:15,280 --> 00:40:23,280
It's attacks we pay the pay the guard over there that keeps people still in the locker room.

604
00:40:23,280 --> 00:40:27,280
And lastly, society needs defectors.

605
00:40:27,280 --> 00:40:35,280
This is important. The groups benefit from the fact that some people don't follow social norms.

606
00:40:35,280 --> 00:40:41,280
Because not following social norms gives the seed for societal change.

607
00:40:41,280 --> 00:40:49,280
To tapterian state might be lower low-bying but it's not more fun.

608
00:40:49,280 --> 00:41:01,280
But so in the end, having a system that allows for defections is a very valuable society.

609
00:41:01,280 --> 00:41:04,280
So that's the talk of habitat questions.

610
00:41:04,280 --> 00:41:09,280
I don't know what to do.

611
00:41:09,280 --> 00:41:14,280
I don't know what to do.

612
00:41:14,280 --> 00:41:19,280
I don't know what to do.

613
00:41:19,280 --> 00:41:24,280
I don't know what to do.

614
00:41:24,280 --> 00:41:29,280
I'm just kidding.

615
00:41:29,280 --> 00:41:38,280
When you mentioned scaling up scaling up punishment and reward,

616
00:41:38,280 --> 00:41:44,280
I was thinking about how people react better to reward than 100-50 minutes.

617
00:41:44,280 --> 00:41:47,280
I think that's a standard type of challenge for result.

618
00:41:47,280 --> 00:41:54,280
And also there's the type of reinforcement learning where even if the reward is somewhat randomly distributed

619
00:41:55,280 --> 00:42:01,280
or randomly given, the person will still often perform the behavior.

620
00:42:01,280 --> 00:42:09,280
So it seems like we could randomly reward block writers even if we're writing all of them would be too much.

621
00:42:09,280 --> 00:42:11,280
We could reward a few of them randomly.

622
00:42:11,280 --> 00:42:14,280
And that would increase the rate of block operations.

623
00:42:14,280 --> 00:42:16,280
Okay, it's just a work of gambling.

624
00:42:17,280 --> 00:42:22,280
It's just, I think that the basic law of sex, you could get that, again, I'm just a work like that.

625
00:42:22,280 --> 00:42:25,280
And it's just obvious it was gambling as profitable for the consumers.

626
00:42:25,280 --> 00:42:28,280
But you don't see a lot of that.

627
00:42:28,280 --> 00:42:31,280
I mean, somebody needs to see some of it socially.

628
00:42:31,280 --> 00:42:37,280
You're nice all the time and once in a while you get a great benefit for me, guys.

629
00:42:37,280 --> 00:42:41,280
But as it gets more institutionalized,

630
00:42:42,280 --> 00:42:44,280
side is ten knots alike.

631
00:42:44,280 --> 00:42:47,280
That's sort of, you know, if you do a good thing, then you allow your attention.

632
00:42:47,280 --> 00:42:51,280
Just basically, what the system here, you're talking about.

633
00:42:51,280 --> 00:42:54,280
You tend not to see it, institutionally.

634
00:42:54,280 --> 00:42:56,280
Although I agree it makes perfect sense.

635
00:42:56,280 --> 00:43:03,280
And you will see it when, in the United States, I've seen it as done for advertisers.

636
00:43:03,280 --> 00:43:07,280
You've done to try to try to get social norms that, you know,

637
00:43:07,280 --> 00:43:11,280
the basic for profit social norms, then instead of giving someone a benefit that

638
00:43:11,280 --> 00:43:17,280
give them a chance of the price, I answer our survey and you'll get enrolled in our toy.

639
00:43:17,280 --> 00:43:18,280
Kind of thing.

640
00:43:18,280 --> 00:43:21,280
But yeah, I agree, I think that's actually a really interesting way to make things work.

641
00:43:21,280 --> 00:43:24,280
I bet it would work better than that much.

642
00:43:24,280 --> 00:43:25,280
Right.

643
00:43:25,280 --> 00:43:29,280
So, so, we'll pick 20 people to rob anxious here and give them a lot of money.

644
00:43:29,280 --> 00:43:32,280
Right, paid for by the cost and very awesome.

645
00:43:32,280 --> 00:43:35,280
Action as well as sense.

646
00:43:36,280 --> 00:43:39,280
Thanks for the very rich end, I was talking.

647
00:43:39,280 --> 00:43:43,280
I'm wondering what I'm going to ask you about.

648
00:43:43,280 --> 00:43:48,280
Well, we tried to mention the construction relations between security and trust.

649
00:43:48,280 --> 00:43:52,280
And I'm actually wondering how it works in that direction,

650
00:43:52,280 --> 00:43:56,280
because now that we heard a lot of news on increasing security,

651
00:43:56,280 --> 00:43:58,280
actually decrease threats.

652
00:43:58,280 --> 00:44:03,280
So, the safer I've come, the increasing security and airport actually decrease threats for this

653
00:44:03,280 --> 00:44:05,280
and increasing the particular country.

654
00:44:05,280 --> 00:44:09,280
And how are you in your case or how are you in your field where you will explain this kind of

655
00:44:09,280 --> 00:44:13,280
relations inside of a positive correlation of that?

656
00:44:13,280 --> 00:44:17,280
Yeah, and it's actually a really complex view that comes from a lot.

657
00:44:17,280 --> 00:44:22,280
I don't hear a question actually, but you can understand because for some people,

658
00:44:22,280 --> 00:44:27,280
where you increase the police presence in airports on the streets,

659
00:44:27,280 --> 00:44:29,280
decreases the feeling of trust.

660
00:44:29,280 --> 00:44:32,280
Right, it makes people wondering why are all the police here,

661
00:44:32,280 --> 00:44:34,280
I guess I should be scared.

662
00:44:34,280 --> 00:44:35,280
Are you right?

663
00:44:35,280 --> 00:44:37,280
Yeah, and that's also very cultural.

664
00:44:37,280 --> 00:44:40,280
I'm not a great sample as Israel, but Israel,

665
00:44:40,280 --> 00:44:42,280
that police permission does everywhere.

666
00:44:42,280 --> 00:44:47,280
And that makes me nervous, but most of the people I talk to from Israel say,

667
00:44:47,280 --> 00:44:48,280
no, no, we like that.

668
00:44:48,280 --> 00:44:50,280
That makes us feel better.

669
00:44:50,280 --> 00:44:52,280
So, when there's a lot of cultural stuff right now,

670
00:44:52,280 --> 00:44:55,280
some of that I believe is different between

671
00:44:55,280 --> 00:44:58,280
reality of security and perceived security.

672
00:44:58,280 --> 00:45:00,280
And it's a phrase I've come on calls to carry through,

673
00:45:00,280 --> 00:45:03,280
it's a security theater, it's security designed to look at those actually

674
00:45:03,280 --> 00:45:04,280
doing anything.

675
00:45:04,280 --> 00:45:11,280
I think there are mechanisms of security that don't work

676
00:45:11,280 --> 00:45:15,280
and people tend to see through that and then get more scared.

677
00:45:15,280 --> 00:45:19,280
Right, there are different ways to security that increase trust in their ways

678
00:45:19,280 --> 00:45:20,280
that don't.

679
00:45:20,280 --> 00:45:23,280
Some of it is learned helplessness.

680
00:45:24,280 --> 00:45:28,280
That, and we'll see this in the United States,

681
00:45:28,280 --> 00:45:33,280
that over a lie and so on, a organizational defense,

682
00:45:33,280 --> 00:45:38,280
people's individual sense of defense tends to actually.

683
00:45:38,280 --> 00:45:41,280
So if you expect a government will bail you out and then that will last

684
00:45:41,280 --> 00:45:43,280
or you'll let's prepare for yourself.

685
00:45:43,280 --> 00:45:46,280
So you have a lot of different things.

686
00:45:46,280 --> 00:45:48,280
And I think that is really interesting.

687
00:45:48,280 --> 00:45:52,280
And this is a bunch going on there.

688
00:45:52,280 --> 00:45:55,280
I mean, again shows another this as soon.

689
00:45:55,280 --> 00:45:58,280
Right.

690
00:45:58,280 --> 00:46:02,280
Right now, I'm sorry much for the talk.

691
00:46:02,280 --> 00:46:07,280
There are about, in this room, I reckon about half the room

692
00:46:07,280 --> 00:46:09,280
to do with artificial intelligence,

693
00:46:09,280 --> 00:46:12,280
are very often asked about the benefits of this particular technology.

694
00:46:12,280 --> 00:46:16,280
And half of us are quite concerned about potential risks involved.

695
00:46:16,280 --> 00:46:20,280
And I'd like to talk about that in context of the

696
00:46:20,280 --> 00:46:22,280
factors where some cooperators.

697
00:46:22,280 --> 00:46:26,280
Now, the baseline of the factors is fine in most contexts.

698
00:46:26,280 --> 00:46:30,280
Only about 50% of the Irish government is corrupt and we just just fine.

699
00:46:30,280 --> 00:46:36,280
However, there are some circumstances in which this doesn't work.

700
00:46:36,280 --> 00:46:40,280
I mean, for example, if you're developing a technology that might,

701
00:46:40,280 --> 00:46:44,280
if you get out of hand, have potentially disastrous consequences,

702
00:46:44,280 --> 00:46:46,280
all you need is the war.

703
00:46:46,280 --> 00:46:49,280
Now, for all the people who are skeptical about AI risk,

704
00:46:49,280 --> 00:46:52,280
and if you don't believe that one, how about the USA,

705
00:46:52,280 --> 00:46:54,280
probably, cause an online damage, all on its own,

706
00:46:54,280 --> 00:46:57,280
that if the rest of the world agreed not to do it,

707
00:46:57,280 --> 00:46:59,280
the world would still be in trouble,

708
00:46:59,280 --> 00:47:01,280
saying could be a flat-to-synthetic,

709
00:47:01,280 --> 00:47:03,280
but that all you think could be a flat-to-sage,

710
00:47:03,280 --> 00:47:06,280
engineering could decide to build a giant club up into the sky

711
00:47:06,280 --> 00:47:07,280
and share it with the particles,

712
00:47:07,280 --> 00:47:10,280
and that would be a decision made by one that affects everyone.

713
00:47:10,280 --> 00:47:16,280
Now, is there any way of dealing with a situation

714
00:47:16,280 --> 00:47:21,280
where you need full cooperation of where one single defector

715
00:47:21,280 --> 00:47:24,280
can ruin the whole game or open-to-ours block?

716
00:47:24,280 --> 00:47:27,280
See, at a stage where you're actually not really thinking about it,

717
00:47:27,280 --> 00:47:30,280
right? If you think about the way it's appearing normally works,

718
00:47:30,280 --> 00:47:32,280
I think that the basic insurance market,

719
00:47:32,280 --> 00:47:37,280
you multiply the percent chance you have of getting whack,

720
00:47:37,280 --> 00:47:39,280
time is the damage if you are whack,

721
00:47:39,280 --> 00:47:42,280
and that's the annualized loss in spec that you're expecting to see,

722
00:47:42,280 --> 00:47:45,280
and then you can build a shared risk model around that.

723
00:47:46,280 --> 00:47:48,280
I mean, that's the way it works.

724
00:47:48,280 --> 00:47:51,280
What you're talking about are the edge cases,

725
00:47:51,280 --> 00:47:55,280
the probability of the damage drops is zero.

726
00:47:55,280 --> 00:47:57,280
The damage goes up to infinity.

727
00:47:57,280 --> 00:48:00,280
Zero times infinity lasts time, I took class,

728
00:48:00,280 --> 00:48:02,280
and that equals every number,

729
00:48:02,280 --> 00:48:04,280
and number, like half the same time.

730
00:48:04,280 --> 00:48:10,280
Which means all your conventional risk measurements don't work.

731
00:48:10,280 --> 00:48:11,280
Nothing works.

732
00:48:11,280 --> 00:48:17,280
So there's really no way to deal with that.

733
00:48:17,280 --> 00:48:20,280
I mean, there's just isn't.

734
00:48:20,280 --> 00:48:24,280
You know, short of nothing.

735
00:48:24,280 --> 00:48:26,280
So it's not working.

736
00:48:26,280 --> 00:48:29,280
And this is why this is one,

737
00:48:29,280 --> 00:48:31,280
and the problem of weapons of action,

738
00:48:31,280 --> 00:48:33,280
that's why the soul can ski regular.

739
00:48:33,280 --> 00:48:34,280
We can go.

740
00:48:34,280 --> 00:48:39,280
Right because one defector does so much damage,

741
00:48:40,280 --> 00:48:43,280
and any time you're dealing with a systemic.

742
00:48:43,280 --> 00:48:46,280
So I'm afraid of it, someone can jump and drop the internet,

743
00:48:46,280 --> 00:48:47,280
set that up by analogy.

744
00:48:47,280 --> 00:48:52,280
All of these things where one lone defector can

745
00:48:52,280 --> 00:48:58,280
can affect things for outside his sphere of concern.

746
00:48:58,280 --> 00:49:00,280
I think the answer is no,

747
00:49:00,280 --> 00:49:02,280
I was reading no way to deal with that.

748
00:49:02,280 --> 00:49:05,280
That's not optimistic.

749
00:49:05,280 --> 00:49:08,280
On the other hand, I actually am optimistic,

750
00:49:08,280 --> 00:49:11,280
so you might ask how the hell you spend the night.

751
00:49:11,280 --> 00:49:14,280
You know, I think in general,

752
00:49:14,280 --> 00:49:19,280
that really is a species tend to figure this stuff out.

753
00:49:19,280 --> 00:49:23,280
That's not right.

754
00:49:23,280 --> 00:49:25,280
It's a problem, it's better stuff.

755
00:49:25,280 --> 00:49:29,280
If you think of a math ways of visualizing things,

756
00:49:29,280 --> 00:49:32,280
you think of a tax as the noise,

757
00:49:32,280 --> 00:49:34,280
and then you have a noise in your system,

758
00:49:34,280 --> 00:49:38,280
but your system stays on a fairly even queue.

759
00:49:38,280 --> 00:49:42,280
The problem is once your noise gets so large

760
00:49:42,280 --> 00:49:44,280
than this function of an oil system,

761
00:49:44,280 --> 00:49:48,280
and that noise can come from a lot of defectors

762
00:49:48,280 --> 00:49:50,280
of a very powerful effect.

763
00:49:50,280 --> 00:49:53,280
And how we build one very powerful effector,

764
00:49:53,280 --> 00:49:57,280
we don't know, it really is no big question.

765
00:49:57,280 --> 00:49:59,280
And I think it is a scare.

766
00:49:59,280 --> 00:50:01,280
Did I help?

767
00:50:02,280 --> 00:50:05,280
You don't pay so far.

768
00:50:05,280 --> 00:50:08,280
Well, it happens.

769
00:50:08,280 --> 00:50:10,280
You refer to societal change.

770
00:50:10,280 --> 00:50:15,280
Then it famously argued that three demand or else you've all.

771
00:50:15,280 --> 00:50:18,280
From a security viewpoint,

772
00:50:18,280 --> 00:50:22,280
can you give examples of beneficial and

773
00:50:23,280 --> 00:50:26,280
harmful societal change?

774
00:50:26,280 --> 00:50:28,280
Yeah, it all depends on society.

775
00:50:28,280 --> 00:50:31,280
For a lot of, for spite of this plan,

776
00:50:31,280 --> 00:50:35,280
the internet is the internet is a harmful style change.

777
00:50:35,280 --> 00:50:38,280
It's essentially the internet is going up every year.

778
00:50:38,280 --> 00:50:41,280
And for a lot of us, the internet is a great beneficial change.

779
00:50:41,280 --> 00:50:43,280
It's all in its same technologies.

780
00:50:43,280 --> 00:50:45,280
And it's a great change.

781
00:50:45,280 --> 00:50:48,280
It's all in its same technologies.

782
00:50:48,280 --> 00:50:52,280
And there are beneficial, our harmful.

783
00:50:52,280 --> 00:50:55,280
And so I agree, so really is contextual.

784
00:50:55,280 --> 00:51:00,280
I think it's certainly true that morals evolve.

785
00:51:00,280 --> 00:51:03,280
And then they have evolved in a good direction.

786
00:51:03,280 --> 00:51:08,280
They're fantastic book, why violence is decline.

787
00:51:08,280 --> 00:51:10,280
A better angel's of our nature, papers book.

788
00:51:10,280 --> 00:51:13,280
It's a really good discussion.

789
00:51:13,280 --> 00:51:20,280
A really how our morals have changed dramatically over the past,

790
00:51:20,280 --> 00:51:23,280
not to a thousand words.

791
00:51:23,280 --> 00:51:27,280
And generally towards the more inclusive, more moral.

792
00:51:27,280 --> 00:51:29,280
And as Martin Luther continues,

793
00:51:29,280 --> 00:51:32,280
the Archivist who is law of the defense to adjust us.

794
00:51:32,280 --> 00:51:37,280
And then they, so I'm, I'm, I've affirmed the lever in,

795
00:51:37,280 --> 00:51:42,280
as a species, our ability to become more moral.

796
00:51:42,280 --> 00:51:47,280
And I think that in the end, you know, any of the stages will be that.

797
00:51:47,280 --> 00:51:51,280
The problem is that technology is now moving so fast.

798
00:51:51,280 --> 00:51:56,280
Now I, I mean, if I work for BT, don't ask.

799
00:51:56,280 --> 00:51:58,280
But they have slogan.

800
00:51:58,280 --> 00:52:01,280
I don't know this will have it called change of the speed of life.

801
00:52:01,280 --> 00:52:05,280
And I think they meant it as change really fast.

802
00:52:05,280 --> 00:52:09,280
I think it as slow down the change.

803
00:52:10,280 --> 00:52:14,280
Because the speed of life is actually slower now than the pace of technology.

804
00:52:14,280 --> 00:52:19,280
But my father is not good in anybody who knew technologies.

805
00:52:19,280 --> 00:52:21,280
Right? I'm better.

806
00:52:21,280 --> 00:52:24,280
But my kids' generations are way better.

807
00:52:24,280 --> 00:52:29,280
I mean, the internet is the greatest generation of absolute rock and roll.

808
00:52:29,280 --> 00:52:32,280
And, you know, and this is the pace of change.

809
00:52:32,280 --> 00:52:36,280
I think it is outpacing our ability to integrate it.

810
00:52:36,280 --> 00:52:42,280
We see that in the way laws seem to be obsolete by technology,

811
00:52:42,280 --> 00:52:45,280
not just your computer technology.

812
00:52:45,280 --> 00:52:48,280
The global, the financial crisis of 2008,

813
00:52:48,280 --> 00:52:54,280
we really was financial technology outskripping the laws in place to break their financial literature.

814
00:52:54,280 --> 00:52:57,280
And I think you said everywhere.

815
00:52:57,280 --> 00:52:59,280
Thank you.

816
00:52:59,280 --> 00:53:02,280
So a lot of people here are way better.

817
00:53:02,280 --> 00:53:05,280
I'm not going to be familiar with the way.

818
00:53:05,280 --> 00:53:12,280
I'm not going to be familiar with trying to design a ton of us and tell ourselves that

819
00:53:12,280 --> 00:53:15,280
it's a tool that's learning themselves.

820
00:53:15,280 --> 00:53:20,280
I'm doing tips for making them be co-operators, not defectors.

821
00:53:20,280 --> 00:53:23,280
How do you make a co-operator?

822
00:53:23,280 --> 00:53:26,280
I mean, is your co-protection in?

823
00:53:26,280 --> 00:53:28,280
I mean, what does affection come from?

824
00:53:28,280 --> 00:53:31,280
It comes from individual self-interested units.

825
00:53:31,280 --> 00:53:39,280
Not a ton of us units, but a ton of self-interested units trying to maximize their own survival.

826
00:53:39,280 --> 00:53:45,280
I mean, I mean, I mean, shouldn't as a lot of people as a robotics solve the problem.

827
00:53:45,280 --> 00:53:47,280
I mean, follow that.

828
00:53:47,280 --> 00:53:51,280
But it should be you, if you don't.

829
00:53:51,280 --> 00:53:57,280
If you don't build in the capability to optimize in that way.

830
00:53:58,280 --> 00:54:06,280
But I would argue that any general purpose intelligence will optimize in that way naturally.

831
00:54:06,280 --> 00:54:10,280
So it means you're constantly going to fight the tide.

832
00:54:10,280 --> 00:54:16,280
People defect from personal advantage.

833
00:54:16,280 --> 00:54:17,280
Why does someone steal?

834
00:54:17,280 --> 00:54:20,280
There's the benefits of stealing outweigh the deadrons.

835
00:54:20,280 --> 00:54:23,280
And some of it is my bad analytics.

836
00:54:23,280 --> 00:54:29,280
And great work, I don't know, I'm a conversation, you can a couple of years ago, to show that the,

837
00:54:29,280 --> 00:54:35,280
basically a life of bank robbery was really crappy when you make a living.

838
00:54:35,280 --> 00:54:39,280
You're gonna look at, you know, how much money you get, how like you are, the jail.

839
00:54:39,280 --> 00:54:41,280
And it gives me these a stupid career path.

840
00:54:41,280 --> 00:54:43,280
I mean, it makes no sense.

841
00:54:43,280 --> 00:54:44,280
Right?

842
00:54:44,280 --> 00:54:48,280
So the people who are choosing it are have faulty analysis.

843
00:54:48,280 --> 00:54:49,280
Right?

844
00:54:49,280 --> 00:54:51,280
On the day, they're not getting it.

845
00:54:52,280 --> 00:54:57,280
So some of it's that, some of it is, you know, we're looking at games versus bosses.

846
00:54:57,280 --> 00:55:00,280
Those are the bottom of nothing to lose.

847
00:55:00,280 --> 00:55:02,280
The math is different, right?

848
00:55:02,280 --> 00:55:04,280
You've got some lower balance here.

849
00:55:04,280 --> 00:55:07,280
So they're whole lot of reason why I think it's used to defect.

850
00:55:07,280 --> 00:55:09,280
They get that they have done a standard.

851
00:55:09,280 --> 00:55:13,280
But also there are analysis different than the norm.

852
00:55:13,280 --> 00:55:16,280
This is a social path, it's a really interesting example.

853
00:55:16,280 --> 00:55:20,280
And then they're worth studying, social path, unnatural effectors.

854
00:55:20,280 --> 00:55:27,280
Because a lot of the things, a lot of the benefits we get from cooperate, they don't get.

855
00:55:27,280 --> 00:55:34,280
So their calculus is just going to be different because their values exist in this different.

856
00:55:34,280 --> 00:55:37,280
These are an object of mentions.

857
00:55:37,280 --> 00:55:41,280
Some of us might feel really good when we don't steal an effort like us.

858
00:55:41,280 --> 00:55:46,280
Some of us, you know, might be a doer, you don't get the thing.

859
00:55:47,280 --> 00:55:49,280
Okay.

860
00:55:49,280 --> 00:55:54,280
So I mean, we're living in around out of battery.

861
00:55:54,280 --> 00:55:56,280
So just speak loud.

862
00:55:56,280 --> 00:56:00,280
So we live in an age where we can see increasing technology.

863
00:56:00,280 --> 00:56:05,280
Maybe get into a stage where not only are we carrying out around our mobile phones and portable

864
00:56:05,280 --> 00:56:13,280
Organizers and internet portals, but will also be logging, life-lugging, everything that goes on around us.

865
00:56:13,280 --> 00:56:18,280
And there's a bit of attention between privacy and transparency.

866
00:56:18,280 --> 00:56:21,280
And so people can control their information.

867
00:56:21,280 --> 00:56:25,280
They want to be the arbiters of themselves, the who they are.

868
00:56:25,280 --> 00:56:32,280
And they may not want some sort of top-down approach where faith book decides who you are and how you represent it.

869
00:56:32,280 --> 00:56:37,280
But I mean, when it comes to defection,

870
00:56:38,280 --> 00:56:45,280
and you're willing to defect while standing in plain sight from so many different points of view,

871
00:56:45,280 --> 00:56:48,280
how do you see that happening?

872
00:56:48,280 --> 00:56:53,280
I mean, like, it will be so obvious to people when they're eyes looking at them all the time.

873
00:56:53,280 --> 00:56:58,280
If they lie, it's going to be hard to cover up later by you know.

874
00:56:58,280 --> 00:57:03,280
Yeah, and so I'm going to be in dream to see the effects of a big issue about our wireless.

875
00:57:04,280 --> 00:57:05,280
I mean, the anonymous.

876
00:57:05,280 --> 00:57:08,280
The only surveillance, the surveillance, the little button that's been sent to the radio.

877
00:57:08,280 --> 00:57:12,280
The anonymous movement, the real issue being example of this.

878
00:57:12,280 --> 00:57:16,280
So how does what a civil disobedience look like in your nation?

879
00:57:16,280 --> 00:57:17,280
In some ways, it's a question.

880
00:57:17,280 --> 00:57:19,280
Don't know who anonymous is.

881
00:57:19,280 --> 00:57:20,280
This right.

882
00:57:20,280 --> 00:57:24,280
And so there are ways that they're preserving.

883
00:57:24,280 --> 00:57:26,280
And then more or less effective, right?

884
00:57:26,280 --> 00:57:29,280
And then individuals tend to get them rounded up by the police.

885
00:57:29,280 --> 00:57:31,280
And you know, so it works here.

886
00:57:32,280 --> 00:57:35,280
I think what would these are, I think, interesting social experiments.

887
00:57:35,280 --> 00:57:38,280
The first time we've ever lived in this time of society,

888
00:57:38,280 --> 00:57:42,280
I'm trying to really know the answers of, you know,

889
00:57:42,280 --> 00:57:50,280
is there going to be less affection in a world where you're every move is noticed?

890
00:57:50,280 --> 00:57:56,280
I mean, Dean of Solops written a book on public shaming on the internet.

891
00:57:56,280 --> 00:58:00,280
And there's a really, you know, powerful examples of someone does something.

892
00:58:00,280 --> 00:58:04,280
In public, someone else takes a Facebook, it takes a cell phone staff,

893
00:58:04,280 --> 00:58:05,280
it goes on Facebook.

894
00:58:05,280 --> 00:58:09,280
And so the a million people know what this person did.

895
00:58:09,280 --> 00:58:12,280
And then how that changes, you know, it's going on.

896
00:58:12,280 --> 00:58:17,280
In China, a lot of the, I mean, there is surveillance.

897
00:58:17,280 --> 00:58:21,280
There is the great firewall of China, but the most of the censorship is self-sense.

898
00:58:21,280 --> 00:58:24,280
Because people know they might be launched.

899
00:58:24,280 --> 00:58:29,280
And so how the threat of observation changed behavior,

900
00:58:29,280 --> 00:58:31,280
even if it's not there.

901
00:58:31,280 --> 00:58:34,280
I mean, this is the, the panoptic happening.

902
00:58:34,280 --> 00:58:38,280
Oh, I think we are, we are in the early days of this.

903
00:58:38,280 --> 00:58:40,280
It's, I mean, I use some good words.

904
00:58:40,280 --> 00:58:43,280
I, because a lot of people look at this as privacy versus security,

905
00:58:43,280 --> 00:58:45,280
that's the balance.

906
00:58:45,280 --> 00:58:49,280
And the real balance is liberty versus control.

907
00:58:49,280 --> 00:58:53,280
And the way to think of these, I think, makes sense.

908
00:58:53,280 --> 00:58:56,280
And the way to think of these is the balance.

909
00:58:56,280 --> 00:58:59,280
And the way to think of these is the balance.

910
00:58:59,280 --> 00:59:02,280
And the way to think of these is the balance.

911
00:59:02,280 --> 00:59:05,280
And the way to think of these is the balance.

912
00:59:05,280 --> 00:59:08,280
And the way to think of these is the balance.

913
00:59:08,280 --> 00:59:11,280
And the way to think of these is the balance.

914
00:59:11,280 --> 00:59:14,280
And the way to think of these is the balance.

915
00:59:14,280 --> 00:59:17,280
And the way to think of these is the balance.

916
00:59:17,280 --> 00:59:20,280
And the way to think of these is the balance.

917
00:59:20,280 --> 00:59:22,280
And when you're walking the doctor's office,

918
00:59:22,280 --> 00:59:25,280
doctor says take off your clothes, you can't say when you first.

919
00:59:25,280 --> 00:59:29,280
And here in the neck does it work.

920
00:59:29,280 --> 00:59:34,280
So think of privacy as as power increasing.

921
00:59:34,280 --> 00:59:37,280
Right? So, so, god, man, let's think of govern versus individual.

922
00:59:37,280 --> 00:59:42,280
So secrecy and governance, right, increases their power.

923
00:59:42,280 --> 00:59:45,280
So it's more differential, less liberty.

924
00:59:45,280 --> 00:59:49,280
Open governance laws, decrease government power, less differential, more liberty.

925
00:59:49,280 --> 00:59:54,280
Right? Privacy and the individual increase of the digital power, less differential, more liberty.

926
00:59:54,280 --> 00:59:56,280
Right?

927
00:59:56,280 --> 01:00:00:02,280
Force openness and individuals, more surveillance increases the power differential, which makes that bad.

928
01:00:02,280 --> 01:00:04,280
That's the way it might look at it.

929
01:00:04,280 --> 01:00:07,280
Actually, an hour-long talk on that question.

930
01:00:07,280 --> 01:00:10,280
So, but, let's say that.

931
01:00:10,280 --> 01:00:13,280
I should have already over time.

932
01:00:13,280 --> 01:00:14,280
All right.

933
01:00:14,280 --> 01:00:18,280
Just to go back to a distinction between slow, slow, and down that.

934
01:00:18,280 --> 01:00:21,280
You think you're going to be constantly somehow dynamic institutions,

935
01:00:21,280 --> 01:00:24,280
the sense that you're trying to be the criminals of the very game.

936
01:00:24,280 --> 01:00:26,280
I don't know if you're trying to be false in that.

937
01:00:26,280 --> 01:00:28,280
It's going to be done as a faster.

938
01:00:28,280 --> 01:00:30,280
The question is, no direction. They're running.

939
01:00:30,280 --> 01:00:31,280
Make the opposite.

940
01:00:31,280 --> 01:00:32,280
We don't know what game.

941
01:00:32,280 --> 01:00:37,280
What, when I told you about the exam schemers and now that you think that's the money slot.

942
01:00:37,280 --> 01:00:39,280
What's the next one?

943
01:00:39,280 --> 01:00:41,280
What other than the idea?

944
01:00:41,280 --> 01:00:43,280
Right? It could be in any one of the,

945
01:00:43,280 --> 01:00:45,280
What's the next one in the entire city of Troy?

946
01:00:45,280 --> 01:00:47,280
It could be any of thousands of directions.

947
01:00:48,280 --> 01:00:53,280
If it was just linear, yeah, then I run out of spend them and run a faster.

948
01:00:53,280 --> 01:00:55,280
But it's not linear, it's end-to-mensch.

949
01:00:55,280 --> 01:01:00,280
So, given that we don't know the direction that the next innovation will come,

950
01:01:00,280 --> 01:01:01,280
we can't predict it.

951
01:01:01,280 --> 01:01:03,280
That's the problem.

952
01:01:06,280 --> 01:01:08,280
There was somebody here that just don't count.

953
01:01:08,280 --> 01:01:13,280
So, I can't bear this way, and I'm trying to make a scroll.

954
01:01:13,280 --> 01:01:15,280
Thank you.

955
01:01:15,280 --> 01:01:18,280
With the biggest provision of this subservient lens,

956
01:01:18,280 --> 01:01:21,280
and the censorship, what do you think would be the best method for us

957
01:01:21,280 --> 01:01:25,280
in the society to avoid the type of dystopian worldwide

958
01:01:25,280 --> 01:01:31,280
surveillance society that discourages deviation from currently accepted social growth?

959
01:01:31,280 --> 01:01:33,280
So, I don't know what a car we think of.

960
01:01:33,280 --> 01:01:34,280
And it's three things.

961
01:01:34,280 --> 01:01:37,280
We mentioned, what's surveillance and censorship,

962
01:01:37,280 --> 01:01:39,280
the third one is propaganda.

963
01:01:39,280 --> 01:01:43,280
These are the three, these are the, I think, sort of the

964
01:01:43,280 --> 01:01:47,280
the charm of totalitarian states that are naval by the internet.

965
01:01:47,280 --> 01:01:51,280
It's surveillance, censorship, and propaganda.

966
01:01:51,280 --> 01:01:55,280
And they all have analogs, you know, for liberty and freedom,

967
01:01:55,280 --> 01:01:57,280
which is who's using it.

968
01:01:57,280 --> 01:02:00,280
And it's, I think, a really interesting question of how you enable

969
01:02:00,280 --> 01:02:03,280
with glue down for that, and disable the bad half,

970
01:02:03,280 --> 01:02:06,280
especially because they're interrelated.

971
01:02:06,280 --> 01:02:11,280
It's an anonymity, which hurts surveillance,

972
01:02:11,280 --> 01:02:13,280
helpless propaganda.

973
01:02:13,280 --> 01:02:16,280
You know, so it's really not obvious.

974
01:02:16,280 --> 01:02:19,280
This actually is the thing I am thinking about right now.

975
01:02:19,280 --> 01:02:24,280
There's a great book called the internet delusion

976
01:02:24,280 --> 01:02:26,280
by someone whose name I'm forgetting,

977
01:02:26,280 --> 01:02:29,280
to write about this, really good and worth reading.

978
01:02:29,280 --> 01:02:32,280
I don't think they're at candy museums.

979
01:02:32,280 --> 01:02:35,280
Which you guess is good, right?

980
01:02:35,280 --> 01:02:39,280
But, but, I think it's an important area, so I think about it.

981
01:02:39,280 --> 01:02:42,280
I put myself on the list for a second.

982
01:02:42,280 --> 01:02:47,280
And earlier you talk about this, this, the fact that this

983
01:02:47,280 --> 01:02:51,280
typical security guys are only talking about a very tiny percentage

984
01:02:51,280 --> 01:02:56,280
of the things one can do for security, the looking with the door.

985
01:02:56,280 --> 01:03:05,280
So if we're talking about our special agents, that will be

986
01:03:05,280 --> 01:03:08,280
radically different from us in many ways.

987
01:03:08,280 --> 01:03:11,280
You mentioned that we don't really care so much about people in our

988
01:03:11,280 --> 01:03:14,280
species who are very far away or different from us.

989
01:03:14,280 --> 01:03:19,280
We eat our animals and kill them for that purpose.

990
01:03:19,280 --> 01:03:23,280
So chances are we are not really caring about other biological things,

991
01:03:23,280 --> 01:03:25,280
not to mention non-biological things.

992
01:03:25,280 --> 01:03:28,280
And if you make that with the heads and big eyes of some children,

993
01:03:28,280 --> 01:03:32,280
you say, look cute, and then that's what we had in somebody

994
01:03:33,280 --> 01:03:35,280
and they agree to say, okay?

995
01:03:35,280 --> 01:03:37,280
Although, although they just delivered it, right?

996
01:03:37,280 --> 01:03:40,280
Because it only looked too much like humans, it's disturbing.

997
01:03:40,280 --> 01:03:42,280
It's got to make them just different enough.

998
01:03:42,280 --> 01:03:46,280
And then the Japanese are getting good at it, and it can get window.

999
01:03:46,280 --> 01:03:48,280
They're not disturbed.

1000
01:03:48,280 --> 01:03:51,280
What I'm interested in is the other way around.

1001
01:03:51,280 --> 01:03:58,280
Is there a way that we could have our special agents that don't care about us?

1002
01:03:58,280 --> 01:04:03,280
And just look at me making them secure approach.

1003
01:04:03,280 --> 01:04:07,280
Do you think that's what that's what a burglar on it is?

1004
01:04:07,280 --> 01:04:12,280
A burglar doesn't care about context, it just rings when someone cuts the wire.

1005
01:04:12,280 --> 01:04:15,280
So I think that I think I can see the default.

1006
01:04:15,280 --> 01:04:20,280
Default is not having judgment, and having judgment is the hard thing.

1007
01:04:20,280 --> 01:04:23,280
So I would think that would be easier.

1008
01:04:23,280 --> 01:04:26,280
Maybe I'm going to see some.

1009
01:04:27,280 --> 01:04:34,280
What I'm trying to figure out is, if it's easier, is there a possibility that I think might do the job?

1010
01:04:34,280 --> 01:04:43,280
So, if security has all these components, as you say, and we are just doing, we might be unable to do the trust human's job,

1011
01:04:43,280 --> 01:04:46,280
because I think it doesn't care about humans.

1012
01:04:46,280 --> 01:04:51,280
Is there a possibility that we can get security just by doing the lock part?

1013
01:04:51,280 --> 01:04:54,280
It's hard because security is both that exception.

1014
01:04:54,280 --> 01:04:57,280
It is rare that you have a security problem.

1015
01:04:57,280 --> 01:05:00,280
We have to guard this thing and nobody should ever get to it ever.

1016
01:05:00,280 --> 01:05:01,280
I mean, I can do clear-wastes.

1017
01:05:01,280 --> 01:05:03,280
I want to watch it with the sun.

1018
01:05:03,280 --> 01:05:06,280
It's far away and hard to get this possible.

1019
01:05:06,280 --> 01:05:09,280
Almost all security systems have some exception.

1020
01:05:09,280 --> 01:05:12,280
Nobody should get the things buttoned.

1021
01:05:12,280 --> 01:05:19,280
So you have to build the safe, and then the locking mechanism with the key.

1022
01:05:19,280 --> 01:05:26,280
So, and it is those exceptions that make it difficult and also add the vulnerabilities.

1023
01:05:26,280 --> 01:05:31,280
It's really easy to build a safe, no door that's really secure.

1024
01:05:31,280 --> 01:05:33,280
That's easy.

1025
01:05:33,280 --> 01:05:35,280
But you never want that.

1026
01:05:35,280 --> 01:05:39,280
So, the interesting problems, always have exceptions.

1027
01:05:39,280 --> 01:05:45,280
Even the burglar lawn has five-second time delay in a co-jet type end to turn off.

1028
01:05:45,280 --> 01:05:55,280
So, I think in any real problem, you have to have some judgment and the more judgment the more useful assistance.

1029
01:05:55,280 --> 01:05:57,280
All right.

1030
01:05:57,280 --> 01:06:01,280
Bruce, interestingly, my concern is the knocks.

1031
01:06:01,280 --> 01:06:07,280
And the idea that in 1995, 100% of us using the Internet and all the computer people,

1032
01:06:07,280 --> 01:06:11,280
and now statistically, 100% of the people are not from the computer.

1033
01:06:11,280 --> 01:06:18,280
And it's going to get even more to theoretically different where every person has the opportunity to, all the good things like we're saying.

1034
01:06:18,280 --> 01:06:22,280
And all the stuff that also everybody has in direct access to them.

1035
01:06:22,280 --> 01:06:32,280
So, in terms of the simple of where you pass for default, so the grandmother didn't deal with something that's not a 10 million digit thing or something.

1036
01:06:32,280 --> 01:06:35,280
It's chips that's in the planet and them or something.

1037
01:06:35,280 --> 01:06:39,280
And all the way to when security becomes everyone's concern.

1038
01:06:39,280 --> 01:06:44,280
Or when everyone has an interest in computers to hear.

1039
01:06:44,280 --> 01:06:47,280
So, this is hard. This is one of our problems.

1040
01:06:47,280 --> 01:06:50,280
And it really gives you a lot of usability.

1041
01:06:50,280 --> 01:06:54,280
It means security tends to the butt against usability.

1042
01:06:54,280 --> 01:06:57,280
It's much easier to make it over the world by myself and walk in.

1043
01:06:57,280 --> 01:07:02,280
It's annoying to pull a key out of my pocket and make sure I forget it, but in the lock, it can get to work.

1044
01:07:02,280 --> 01:07:04,280
And maybe all that affects usability.

1045
01:07:04,280 --> 01:07:10,280
For a door locks, we've incorporated that in a night.

1046
01:07:10,280 --> 01:07:14,280
We know we have social methods, we know how we know how to do it.

1047
01:07:14,280 --> 01:07:18,280
In computer security, we're not that good yet. It changes pretty rapidly.

1048
01:07:18,280 --> 01:07:24,280
But I don't think that problem ever goes away because I mean, this is back to security being attacked on the honest.

1049
01:07:24,280 --> 01:07:32,280
It's not only attacks and money, it's attacking capabilities, it's attacking opinions, it's attacking all these different dimensions.

1050
01:07:32,280 --> 01:07:36,280
But it wasn't attacks that it wouldn't work.

1051
01:07:36,280 --> 01:07:40,280
Now, you can trade and walk on each other, you can trade off money for a community.

1052
01:07:40,280 --> 01:07:45,280
They have a more expensive experience, they're like, I get scared by computer, by hard and in-garde standard, rather than.

1053
01:07:45,280 --> 01:07:50,280
It'll be really easy to be a log in, but it gets really expensive.

1054
01:07:50,280 --> 01:07:55,280
So, I can make it what is magnitude cheaper, I make it slightly less convenient.

1055
01:07:55,280 --> 01:08:01,280
But you can pretty much always trade those different methods of payment to all find each other.

1056
01:08:01,280 --> 01:08:11,280
And then the trick is finding the correct one for the space and find your it.

1057
01:08:11,280 --> 01:08:13,280
All right, I think I'm getting off stage now.

1058
01:08:13,280 --> 01:08:15,280
There's a computer's right.