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My name is Alicia McDonald. I'm the director of privacy here at the CIS, the Center for Internet and Society.

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We're a public interest group at the forefront of technology law and policy based in the Stanford Law School.

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Last month, former President Carter announced that he no longer sends email to other world leaders.

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He is concerned that the NSA is reading his email so instead he writes things out longhand himself and males them.

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Now, I don't know if the NSA is reading President Carter's email or not, but I do know that pulling back from things that are permissible,

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that voluntarily stopping yourself from doing something. We call that a chilling effect.

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And you may have felt that shalt too. A Harris poll at the beginning of this month found 47% of Americans have changed the activities they do online,

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now that they know that they're being surveilled.

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So we change what we do, we change who we connect with as a result.

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One of the other comments President Carter made got picked up in the German press, and it was this.

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America does not at the moment have a functioning democracy.

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Right? No functioning democracy. That's a really strong statement.

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Again, I don't know if that's right or wrong, but I do agree that those are the stakes.

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So these are really important issues, and I'm very glad that you're here with us tonight.

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As we've all been trying to figure out what does it mean that we have these documents from Snowden, what do we do about this?

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We've held a number of events Tuesday nights at Stanford.

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We have some that are up online already. You're able to go see about light beam from Mozilla, about tour, taught by Tom Lowenball.

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We have upcoming events as well on PGP email encryption, and also an evening with Peter Eckersley from the electronic frontier foundation.

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And then the first Tuesday next month in May, we will be hearing from Julia Angwin, who's a journalist with Washington Post.

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She has a new book out, Drag Net Nation that focuses more on the consumer side rather than the government side.

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So we have some great events. I hope you'll join us for those.

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And tonight is the highlight of events for the year for me, for Bruce. It's another Tuesday.

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So he has been described as a security guru. Bruce has been a meme before memes went viral.

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I learned today there's an action figure.

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I hadn't known that.

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And if you study crypto, you've read Bruce Nyer.

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And you're lucky that he's a terrific writer. He's written 12 books. He's at Harvard right now.

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He can teach math to the masses. He can speak geek to power.

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And we're all very fortunate since he's trusted by academics, government, and privacy advocates alike.

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He has an unusual ability to cross all sorts of boundaries.

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So thank you very much and join me in welcoming Bruce Nyer.

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So thank you. Thanks for coming.

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It's a little later for me than for you, but we'll get through this.

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There's a lot. I could talk about surveillance and privacy and the internet.

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There are a lot of directions we can go.

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On this talk, I want to focus on the NSA, but a lot of what I'm saying touches a lot of other areas.

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We're going to end up touching a lot of areas.

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But since Edward Snowden walked out of the NSA with like, seems like a copy of everything.

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And gave it to journalists in Hong Kong, we've gotten a steady stream of news articles about things the NSA is doing.

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And the first ones were very sensational. I remember them very clearly.

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And over the months, there I think there's been a tiring in the public, even in the news about each additional one.

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They're exciting to me as a long time NSA watcher. They're exciting to techies.

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But it seems really hard to continue to continue because for the average person, what's different.

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The narrative set, the NSA spies, and sort of now the question is whether you think you're doing a good job or a bad job.

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You know, any individual story doesn't seem to change that.

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Right, that might change, right? We know we get something on the order of the NSA spies on Martin Luther King Jr.

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And you might get a change.

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But I want to step back and sort of give you what I think the takeaways are.

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We start from all the stories.

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The first is that the NSA has turned the internet into a giant surveillance platform.

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This platform is very robust.

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It's robust politically. It's robust technically.

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And it's robust legally.

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I can name three different programs.

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The NSA has forgetting at Google and Yahoo user data.

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Those programs are based on three different technical accesses, right?

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Three different legal authorities and agreements with three different corporations.

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And that's just email user data.

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The same is probably true for cell phone, for internet data, for everything else.

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If you have a 10 billion budget, dumbed in a dollar budget, and you're given the choice of this way versus that way, the correct answer is both.

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The second important takeaway is that the NSA continues to lie about its capabilities.

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Again and again, their caught saying things that aren't true.

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It turns out it's actually very hard when you don't know what they've got on you to lie properly because you say something in the next document contradicts it.

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It's happened a couple times.

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But mostly it's hiding behind torture definitions of words.

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I collect incidentally targeted, directed.

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Now you can be sure whatever the NSA says, they don't do something under this program or under this a thought.

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Now it means they do it under some other program or some other authority.

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It's some of it is designed to obscure from the public.

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Some of this is I think designed to obscure it from Congress to obscure budget.

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And you will see the same thing under two different code names.

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And that seems more budgetary than anything else.

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The third important takeaway is that there's a lot of sharing going on between different government organizations.

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The NSA, the CIA, the FBI, the DEA.

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Now we see some shadows of this.

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We saw one document that talked about the NSA passing information to the DEA and instructing them about how to lie about where it came from.

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It's called parallel construction.

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We know that some of the techniques we're seeing that the NSA does are mirroring FBI techniques.

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Very closely, and it seems unlikely that they were independently developed.

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So it's data, it's techniques.

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So the NSA's mission fundamentally is to collect everything.

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And you can see it in the documents.

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Glenn Greenwell talked about this.

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Which slogans like collect it all, know it all, exploit it all.

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Repermiate the different documents.

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You can see it in kind of the weird NSA stories about collecting data from the remote corners of the internet.

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I'm going to story the hit in the fall about the NSA collecting data from virtual worlds, like ever quest in second life.

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I mean, it was kind of funny and we could laugh at them.

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But if actually you want to collect all communications, that's a place for communications.

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And you could imagine the bad guys going on the second life in communicating.

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It's same with the collection of data from airplane to ground in interconnections.

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We heard about that last year.

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They came out last week that Google Internet is going beyond what's required by law to give data to the FBI.

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So to me to understand this mentality, you need to understand the history of the NSA.

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And it's really important to look back at their history and see how it evolved.

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The NSA was born after World War II at the beginning of the Cold War when the Soviet Union was the enemy.

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Plus, we're excited to see it.

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And the NSA's mission was to spy on the Soviet Union.

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This is the Cold War.

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We had this voyeuristic need to know everything that they were doing.

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We clicked a lot of data.

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It's some useful, some of it not.

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I forget who someone talked about the difference between secrets and mysteries.

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It's not easy to find out secrets with surveillance and mysteries.

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It's not easier to know the speed of the new Soviet battle tank than it is to figure out who's going to become chairman when Stalin dies.

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Or right now, it's probably easier to know how many Russian troops are in the Ukraine than to know what Putin is thinking.

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We were better at secrets than mysteries.

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But that Soviet Union was a packed military-focused NSA.

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In a sense, collapse a little bit with the fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of the Cold War.

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The collapse of the Soviet Union.

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And their mission refocused.

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We saw a lot more security out of them.

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We saw a commercial solution center.

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We saw algorithms.

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We saw analysis.

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We saw a much more openness.

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They were doing a lot more to protect communications than they ever were.

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That changed, stopped abruptly with the terrorist attacks at 10.

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After those attacks, President Bush gave the NSA an impossible mission.

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And that is never again.

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It's a crazy mission to give someone.

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But if you are test with making sure something never happens, the only way you can possibly achieve that is to know everything that does happen.

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So that giant eye of the NSA was turned outward on the world and it would not ourselves.

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And then this changed fundamentally the nature of the NSA's collection.

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Because when you are defined enemy, can be anyone anywhere.

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You have to collect data from everyone everywhere.

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And the core NSA mission, which was espionage,

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government on government espionage as old as governments,

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became government on population surveillance.

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That was the change.

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Now this new mission came out of the terrorist attacks,

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but it was very much aided by the natural trends in information technology.

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What's going on on the internet during that decade?

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It fundamentally data is a byproduct of the information society.

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Everything we do on a computer produces a transaction record.

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Whether it's your laptop, whether it's your phone, whether it's an ATM machine, a toll booth using your credit card,

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anything with a computer creates a transaction record.

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Data is a byproduct of all of our information society's socialization.

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When I landed here in San Francisco this morning, I had a nice conversation with my wife on eye message.

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That conversation would have happened by voice before this.

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Although that conversation is recorded, it's on my phone, it's on her phone, it's an Apple's computer.

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Increasingly, companies, computers are mediating all of our social interactions.

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And all of this data is increasingly stored and increasingly searchable.

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This is fundamentally Moore's law.

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Data storage drops to free, data processing drops to free, it becomes easier to save everything and to figure out what to save.

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I remember this, but when I first got email, I used to sort my email in 30 or 45 different email boxes,

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throwing away stuff that was important and saving the important stuff, there's a lot of email filing.

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I stopped in 2006, in 2007, and I just put everything in one mailbox and saved it all.

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Right, because in 2006, 4 email for me, search became cheaper than sort.

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It was easier to save everything and figure out what to save.

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That line has been crossed for pretty much everything and where it hasn't it will be soon.

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The marginal cost of saving is so low that the marginal value you need to save is so low.

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So you might as well save it all, maybe valuable at some point.

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Right, the result here is a public private surveillance partnership.

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There's a fundamental alliance of government and corporate interests.

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The surveillance is the business model of the internet.

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We build systems that spy on people and exchange for services.

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That's what we do.

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Right, and the NSA surveillance largely piggybacks on all of these corporate services.

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Right, we see the NSA capturing location data that you're cell phone producers.

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We see them identifying people with cookies on the internet.

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We see them collecting data on conversations and building social graphs from phone calls.

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It's not that it's almost not that the NSA woke up on morning and said, let's spy on everybody.

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They woke up on morning and said, corporation just spying on everybody.

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Let's just get ourselves a copy.

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It fundamentally we're living in the golden ages surveillance.

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Now, one of the arguments you'll hear, and we heard this from the president back in the last June, is that it's only metadata.

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Right, the idea being that your conversation is not being recorded, so just don't worry about it.

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I don't worry it's only metadata.

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That's odd for a computer person, right?

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You know, one program is metadata is other programs data,

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but it actually doesn't make sense in terms of surveillance.

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Because metadata equals surveillance.

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I'll give you an easy thought experiment to understand this.

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Imagine you hired a private detective to ease your off on somebody.

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That's a detective who put a bug in their homes, their cars, their offices,

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and you get a report on the conversations you had.

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If you asked that same detective to put someone on their surveillance, you'd get a different sort of report.

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The report would include where he went, who he spoke to, what he purchased, what he looked at, what he read, that's all metadata.

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Mededata is fundamentally surveillance data, and it's actually much more important than conversational data.

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Mededata tracks relationships, associations, it shows what we're interested in, it shows what's important to us,

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and it basically fundamentally reveals who we are.

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And as an added bonus, it's easy to store, to search, and to analyze.

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This is why the NSA is focused on metadata over data.

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They can do a lot more of it.

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And they do a lot.

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The NSA has some very sophisticated analysis tools to go through all this surveillance information.

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And that's something that hasn't come out of lots in the public stories.

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The stories tend to focus on collection and not a lot on analysis.

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The one exception is a Washington Post story about the NSA's collection of cell phone location data.

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And it includes some really interesting analysis tools that the NSA has.

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There's something called co-traveler.

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Where the NSA will take all of the state.

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If you think what this data is, it's basically populations under surveillance.

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The location data of every cell phone user is their movement data.

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Everyone's movement data 247.

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Well, you can start analyzing this data.

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One of the things they will look for are people who travel together more than normal.

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And looking for associations just from movement data.

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So they have some of interest.

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They might find people who are associated with them, who never communicate with them electronically.

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They also use that.

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And the exact action is really clever.

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They have the phone numbers of US agents abroad.

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They look for tails.

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That's clever.

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The other thing they do is they look for pairs of phones moving towards each other.

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They turn themselves off.

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And then turn on again, and our later moving away from each other.

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Look for secret meetings.

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Third cool thing.

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Look for phones that are used get turned off permanently.

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Then another phone is turned on, like shortly thereafter.

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And then that gets turned off.

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They look for chains of burner phones.

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If you're watching a wire, you know how this works.

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Right?

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They look for those amongst the sea of data.

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Turns out you can find some of them.

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So when you think about the data collection,

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you have to think about data being used together.

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Right? So calling metadata plus contactless collection from plus financial data.

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Or drones plus face recognition software plus face books tagged photo database plus NSA location data.

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I mean, those are the things you have to think about.

225
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Because that's what's going on.

226
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And it's very important in this debate to understand that this is not only about the NSA or about the United States.

227
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The United States is a very plid-lood's positioned on the internet.

228
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Quite a lot of the worldwide traffic goes through our borders,

229
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and almost all of the big internet companies are headquartered in the United States.

230
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But the techniques are general.

231
00:20:05,000 --> 00:20:10,000
When we talk about the NSA because the stodon documents have given us this extraordinary window,

232
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and what the NSA is doing.

233
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Right? There was a Russian stodon.

234
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We're talking about Russia.

235
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Because these techniques are what any well funded nation state adversary will do.

236
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Right? We know that China uses some of the same techniques for packet injection.

237
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I mean, the NSA program is called quantum.

238
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We know that China is the exact same thing.

239
00:20:33,000 --> 00:20:38,000
We know that Russia's Syria, Iran use a lot of these same things.

240
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Right? And technology spreads.

241
00:20:41,000 --> 00:20:45,000
Why to a lot of the techniques we see are also used in the hacker community.

242
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They're not as slick, they're not as well funded, they're not as well documented.

243
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But they're there.

244
00:20:53,000 --> 00:21:00,000
So when you think of the NSA techniques, think of it as a preview of what criminals are going to be doing in three to five years.

245
00:21:00,000 --> 00:21:06,000
Or for less lucky, you know, six months, 18 months.

246
00:21:06,000 --> 00:21:10,000
Because today's secret NSA programs are coming tomorrow's PhD thesis in the next state's hacker tools.

247
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This is the way technology works.

248
00:21:14,000 --> 00:21:20,000
So when you think about it in this global sense, it's much easier to understand what the harm is.

249
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That we've built an internet that is insecure for everyone.

250
00:21:25,000 --> 00:21:31,000
We've enabled global surveillance by anyone.

251
00:21:31,000 --> 00:21:38,000
The ramifications of what we're doing are much greater than US spies on the bad guys.

252
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They're everyone spies on anyone.

253
00:21:43,000 --> 00:21:49,000
But in the US, this NSA surveillance breaks pretty much all of our systems.

254
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Right? They break our political systems.

255
00:21:52,000 --> 00:21:54,000
Congress cannot provide oversight.

256
00:21:54,000 --> 00:21:57,000
There's so much obligation. There's so much hiding.

257
00:21:57,000 --> 00:21:59,000
Citizens are kept in the dark.

258
00:21:59,000 --> 00:22:02,000
So we can't provide any oversight.

259
00:22:02,000 --> 00:22:04,000
We break our legal systems.

260
00:22:04,000 --> 00:22:11,000
I can't believe I'm saying this, but we live in a country where secret courts make secret rulings on secret laws.

261
00:22:11,000 --> 00:22:15,000
It breaks our commercial systems.

262
00:22:15,000 --> 00:22:21,000
Lots of US companies are complaining that products and services are no longer trusted worldwide.

263
00:22:21,000 --> 00:22:30,000
Because they cannot guarantee that the NSA hasn't forced them to make their products insecure and then lie about it.

264
00:22:30,000 --> 00:22:32,000
And it breaks our technical systems.

265
00:22:32,000 --> 00:22:39,000
And it's the very protocols and standards we use the internet are no longer trusted.

266
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And last week, heart bleed, I hope people remember this.

267
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Right? We know it happens on Monday.

268
00:22:44,000 --> 00:22:48,000
By Thursday, the big debate is, did the NSA know about it?

269
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Right?

270
00:22:51,000 --> 00:22:54,000
Was this an accident or an amyaction?

271
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I will never know. It seems like it was an accident.

272
00:22:59,000 --> 00:23:03,000
Actually, the debate was kind of funny because, right?

273
00:23:03,000 --> 00:23:14,000
The debate was, if the NSA knew about it, they were being irresponsible by not telling the community, by not fixing it.

274
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On the other hand, the NSA didn't know about it, but they were paying them for it.

275
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This was easy one.

276
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So they kind of damn be the way.

277
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But that's the choice there.

278
00:23:28,000 --> 00:23:38,000
If the NSA finds a vulnerability, should they use it to exploit or should they fix it to defend?

279
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That's our choice.

280
00:23:40,000 --> 00:23:47,000
We can either have an internet that is vulnerable to all attackers or an internet that is secure for all users.

281
00:23:47,000 --> 00:23:49,000
And this is not just a choice for today.

282
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We're making architecture choices that will affect us 10, 20 years down the road.

283
00:23:55,000 --> 00:24:03,000
We're building infrastructure now that we're going to have to live with for a long time.

284
00:24:03,000 --> 00:24:06,000
Now, there's some good news, bad news here.

285
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In his first interview after, you know, appearing in Hong Kong with everything.

286
00:24:13,000 --> 00:24:17,000
It was known, was talking to Guardian reporters and it's published into view.

287
00:24:17,000 --> 00:24:20,000
He's talking about security.

288
00:24:20,000 --> 00:24:25,000
And Marid is, quote, he says, encryption works properly implemented strong crypto systems.

289
00:24:25,000 --> 00:24:28,000
One of the few things you could rely on.

290
00:24:28,000 --> 00:24:32,000
I believe his right is a lot of evidence of this is true.

291
00:24:32,000 --> 00:24:38,000
My evidence in the documents, evidence in various programs.

292
00:24:38,000 --> 00:24:41,000
But then he said a sentence right after that, which is the bad news.

293
00:24:41,000 --> 00:24:48,000
Unfortunately, endpoint security is so terrifically weak that the NSA can frequently find ways around it.

294
00:24:48,000 --> 00:24:53,000
Or as I'll say, the math works, but math has no agency.

295
00:24:53,000 --> 00:24:59,000
In order to get actual security, you have to take the math and embed it in software,

296
00:24:59,000 --> 00:25:04,000
in an operating system, in hardware, on a network with people.

297
00:25:04,000 --> 00:25:09,000
And all of those steps are highly vulnerable.

298
00:25:09,000 --> 00:25:14,000
Now, we know that the NSA has some advances in cryptography and where this is more math-the-oddance,

299
00:25:14,000 --> 00:25:16,000
so I'd go into it.

300
00:25:16,000 --> 00:25:23,000
But most of how the NSA breaks cryptography is by getting around it.

301
00:25:23,000 --> 00:25:33,000
By exploiting bad implementations, default or weak keys, programming errors like heart bleed, sabotaging standards,

302
00:25:33,000 --> 00:25:41,000
deliberately inserting back doors and products, or, I guess, demanding keys from companies.

303
00:25:41,000 --> 00:25:44,000
And the last one is exfiltrating keys.

304
00:25:44,000 --> 00:25:48,000
That's NSA talk for stealing.

305
00:25:48,000 --> 00:25:50,000
Right, they do a lot of that.

306
00:25:50,000 --> 00:25:54,000
But mostly they rely on encrypted streams of data.

307
00:25:54,000 --> 00:25:56,000
Right, mostly internet is not encrypted.

308
00:25:56,000 --> 00:25:58,000
Most cloud services are not encrypted.

309
00:25:58,000 --> 00:25:59,000
Most cell phone data.

310
00:25:59,000 --> 00:26:01,000
And metadata is not encrypted.

311
00:26:01,000 --> 00:26:02,000
We have a third party data.

312
00:26:02,000 --> 00:26:05,000
We hear a lot about third party data in NSA documents.

313
00:26:05,000 --> 00:26:08,000
Most of that's not encrypted.

314
00:26:08,000 --> 00:26:10,000
Right, so here's our problem.

315
00:26:10,000 --> 00:26:14,000
Right, we've made both collection too easy.

316
00:26:14,000 --> 00:26:18,000
It's too easy for the NSA to collect information everybody,

317
00:26:18,000 --> 00:26:25,000
then it is to collect information on just the bad guys.

318
00:26:25,000 --> 00:26:29,000
Which means we made it too easy for everybody, not just the NSA.

319
00:26:29,000 --> 00:26:33,000
So that's the first one.

320
00:26:33,000 --> 00:26:35,000
Now, now solutions are varied.

321
00:26:35,000 --> 00:26:36,000
Solutions are complicated.

322
00:26:36,000 --> 00:26:39,000
I think this is necessarily so.

323
00:26:39,000 --> 00:26:44,000
This is a complex problem.

324
00:26:44,000 --> 00:26:50,000
And it's going to include self-corrections in government, self-corrections in corporations,

325
00:26:50,000 --> 00:26:55,000
technical countermeasures, legal countermeasures, international cooperation,

326
00:26:56,000 --> 00:26:58,000
changes in social norms.

327
00:26:58,000 --> 00:27:03,000
And I don't go over all of those.

328
00:27:03,000 --> 00:27:07,000
The first one to talk about the self-corrections.

329
00:27:07,000 --> 00:27:11,000
I think there's a lot of stuff going on inside the NSA right now.

330
00:27:11,000 --> 00:27:13,000
And it's amazing as it seems.

331
00:27:13,000 --> 00:27:21,000
The NSA had absolutely no contingency plans for all of our secrets being stolen at once.

332
00:27:21,000 --> 00:27:23,000
Right, no more.

333
00:27:24,000 --> 00:27:27,000
They got that one now.

334
00:27:27,000 --> 00:27:31,000
I mean, it took them about two months to get a PR firm with the right clearances to help

335
00:27:31,000 --> 00:27:33,000
it with their messaging.

336
00:27:33,000 --> 00:27:36,000
Now, they got that one now too.

337
00:27:36,000 --> 00:27:40,000
But the basic cost benefit analysis has changed.

338
00:27:40,000 --> 00:27:44,000
Right, when the NSA was planning an operation,

339
00:27:44,000 --> 00:27:49,000
they would think about the risk as the risk of the victim finding out about it,

340
00:27:49,000 --> 00:27:53,000
not the risk of it appearing in the newspaper.

341
00:27:53,000 --> 00:27:58,000
Right, the political blowback from the NSA surveillance has been considerable.

342
00:27:58,000 --> 00:28:02,000
And knowing that that's going to happen, that's more likely to happen,

343
00:28:02,000 --> 00:28:06,000
it's going to limit what the NSA does.

344
00:28:06,000 --> 00:28:12,000
Because there actually is a changing nature of secrecy going on.

345
00:28:12,000 --> 00:28:17,000
And you think back to, I don't know, the 70s, the 80s,

346
00:28:17,000 --> 00:28:21,000
the Organs secret organizations, the NSA, the CIA,

347
00:28:21,000 --> 00:28:26,000
they would pick people out of college, right, Yale graduates,

348
00:28:26,000 --> 00:28:30,000
and they would take them into the fold and teach them the secrets.

349
00:28:30,000 --> 00:28:33,000
They become part of the community, the M. Jobs for life.

350
00:28:33,000 --> 00:28:37,000
They'd be one of the elites, they protect the secrets.

351
00:28:37,000 --> 00:28:39,000
And that's the way it used to work.

352
00:28:39,000 --> 00:28:41,000
Doesn't work like that anymore.

353
00:28:41,000 --> 00:28:44,000
Well, how do they get jobs with contractors?

354
00:28:44,000 --> 00:28:49,000
And the notion for, as if a job for life, anybody under 40 is a joke.

355
00:28:53,000 --> 00:28:56,000
Right, you know, Edward Snowden was 28,

356
00:28:56,000 --> 00:29:00,000
Chelsea Manning was 26, Edward Snowden was a contractor,

357
00:29:00,000 --> 00:29:02,000
looking at maybe the contracts going up,

358
00:29:02,000 --> 00:29:06,000
Manning was on a four year tour, these people didn't have jobs for life.

359
00:29:06,000 --> 00:29:09,000
They didn't have the same relationship with the organizations

360
00:29:09,000 --> 00:29:12,000
that the previous generation did.

361
00:29:14,000 --> 00:29:17,000
And that just makes secrecy harder.

362
00:29:17,000 --> 00:29:22,000
And the NSA is going to have to incorporate these new increased

363
00:29:22,000 --> 00:29:25,000
risk-resistance exposure in everything they do.

364
00:29:28,000 --> 00:29:31,000
Right, you have to assume that any program they instantiate

365
00:29:31,000 --> 00:29:33,000
becomes public in three to five years.

366
00:29:33,000 --> 00:29:36,000
And that changes things, because nobody would have cared

367
00:29:36,000 --> 00:29:39,000
to the Snowden documents that the NSA spied on,

368
00:29:39,000 --> 00:29:43,000
North Korea and the Taliban, right, said a spied on Belgium.

369
00:29:43,000 --> 00:29:46,000
Or even worse, that the UK spied on Belgium

370
00:29:46,000 --> 00:29:48,000
was a Connecticut spying on Nebraska.

371
00:29:51,000 --> 00:29:54,000
And the NSA is very risk-averse.

372
00:29:54,000 --> 00:29:57,000
So I think this changes things.

373
00:29:57,000 --> 00:30:00,000
I think there are other conversations happening

374
00:30:00,000 --> 00:30:02,000
in the government.

375
00:30:02,000 --> 00:30:06,000
The effectiveness of bulk collection has been taken for granted

376
00:30:06,000 --> 00:30:09,000
and it's being increasingly questioned.

377
00:30:10,000 --> 00:30:14,000
There isn't increasing belief that this is not effective.

378
00:30:14,000 --> 00:30:18,000
Too much noise obscures your signal.

379
00:30:18,000 --> 00:30:23,000
In the early years, the NSA would pass tips to the FBI.

380
00:30:23,000 --> 00:30:26,000
And I remember I figured, a couple years after,

381
00:30:26,000 --> 00:30:29,000
there was a big headline saying, you know,

382
00:30:29,000 --> 00:30:31,000
10,000 tips, no actual plots.

383
00:30:31,000 --> 00:30:34,000
So the best thing to do is stop sending us this stuff.

384
00:30:34,000 --> 00:30:35,000
You're annoying us.

385
00:30:36,000 --> 00:30:38,000
We have to follow up on all these dumb first,

386
00:30:38,000 --> 00:30:41,000
four slarms, and we can't get our actual work done.

387
00:30:41,000 --> 00:30:47,000
Any of these systems, four slarms overwhelm your signal.

388
00:30:47,000 --> 00:30:49,000
And there's a lot of other arguments

389
00:30:49,000 --> 00:30:52,000
rely on detection, hinders other solutions.

390
00:30:52,000 --> 00:30:56,000
There's a lot of reasons why this doesn't work.

391
00:30:56,000 --> 00:30:59,000
There are also limitations of intelligence.

392
00:30:59,000 --> 00:31:02,000
My data does not equal information.

393
00:31:02,000 --> 00:31:04,000
Information doesn't equal knowledge.

394
00:31:04,000 --> 00:31:06,000
I have you remember the story last year

395
00:31:06,000 --> 00:31:09,000
that the United States had a three day advanced warning

396
00:31:09,000 --> 00:31:12,000
that Syria was going to use in chemical weapons on our population.

397
00:31:12,000 --> 00:31:14,000
And the question I asked recently is,

398
00:31:14,000 --> 00:31:17,000
well if we knew that, why didn't we stop it?

399
00:31:17,000 --> 00:31:19,000
The answer is a lot of answers,

400
00:31:19,000 --> 00:31:21,000
and one of them is we couldn't.

401
00:31:21,000 --> 00:31:23,000
Nothing we could do.

402
00:31:23,000 --> 00:31:28,000
That all that data gave us is a little bit of knowledge.

403
00:31:28,000 --> 00:31:30,000
Nothing actionable.

404
00:31:31,000 --> 00:31:34,000
That's just really not clear with a lot of surveillance is worth it.

405
00:31:34,000 --> 00:31:37,000
And there's more now more arguments that it's not.

406
00:31:37,000 --> 00:31:39,000
That is mostly voyeurism.

407
00:31:41,000 --> 00:31:44,000
The third self-correction is inside corporations.

408
00:31:44,000 --> 00:31:48,000
My corporations have a new cost benefit analysis here.

409
00:31:48,000 --> 00:31:53,000
It is laid as 2002 when the NSA goes to AT&T and says,

410
00:31:53,000 --> 00:31:56,000
hey, we want to spy on all of your customers.

411
00:31:56,000 --> 00:31:59,000
AT&T says, sure, you know, put your stuff in that

412
00:31:59,000 --> 00:32:02,000
and you're not going to be able to do that.

413
00:32:02,000 --> 00:32:05,000
You're not going to be able to do that.

414
00:32:05,000 --> 00:32:07,000
You're not going to be able to do that.

415
00:32:07,000 --> 00:32:09,000
You're not going to be able to do that.

416
00:32:09,000 --> 00:32:11,000
You're not going to be able to do that.

417
00:32:11,000 --> 00:32:13,000
You're not going to do that.

418
00:32:13,000 --> 00:32:15,000
You're not going to do that.

419
00:32:15,000 --> 00:32:17,000
You're not going to do that.

420
00:32:17,000 --> 00:32:19,000
You're not going to do that.

421
00:32:19,000 --> 00:32:21,000
You're not going to do that.

422
00:32:21,000 --> 00:32:23,000
You're not going to do that.

423
00:32:23,000 --> 00:32:25,000
You're not going to do that.

424
00:32:25,000 --> 00:32:27,000
You're not going to do that.

425
00:32:27,000 --> 00:32:33,000
There's a little bit of game playing here doing things that look good instead of actually fighting,

426
00:32:33,000 --> 00:32:37,000
but there is more resistance.

427
00:32:37,000 --> 00:32:39,000
So these self-correction are happening.

428
00:32:39,000 --> 00:32:41,000
I think they're minor, I think they will.

429
00:32:41,000 --> 00:32:44,000
There are other things going on as well.

430
00:32:44,000 --> 00:32:50,000
There are technical changes going on on the internet.

431
00:32:50,000 --> 00:32:54,000
I'm often asked what is the most surprising thing of the NSA document so far.

432
00:32:54,000 --> 00:32:56,000
I'll tell you the most surprising thing.

433
00:32:56,000 --> 00:33:02,000
The NSA might have a bigger budget than every other intelligence agency in the world combined,

434
00:33:02,000 --> 00:33:06,000
but they are not made of magic.

435
00:33:06,000 --> 00:33:17,000
They are susceptible to the laws of economics, the laws of physics, the laws of mathematics,

436
00:33:17,000 --> 00:33:21,000
just like everybody else.

437
00:33:21,000 --> 00:33:30,000
The technical goal is to leverage those laws that if we can technically make bold collection

438
00:33:30,000 --> 00:33:33,000
more expensive, we will make ourselves safer.

439
00:33:33,000 --> 00:33:36,000
We're never going to get rid of targeted surveillance.

440
00:33:36,000 --> 00:33:40,000
I don't think that's possible anytime in our lifetimes.

441
00:33:40,000 --> 00:33:50,000
But we can make bold surveillance so expensive that it's limited and targeted surveillance is preferred.

442
00:33:50,000 --> 00:33:53,000
There are lots of different things to do here.

443
00:33:53,000 --> 00:33:58,000
Encryption tools and in many tools, other security tools.

444
00:33:58,000 --> 00:34:03,000
Open standard open source that's harder to subvert, partly notwithstanding.

445
00:34:03,000 --> 00:34:09,000
Target dispersal, I think we were way more secure when they were in 10,000 ISPs in the world.

446
00:34:09,000 --> 00:34:15,000
And my favorite and the hardest is information assurance.

447
00:34:15,000 --> 00:34:23,000
It's some way to demonstrate that a piece of software does what we expected to do and nothing else.

448
00:34:23,000 --> 00:34:30,000
It's difficult, maybe impossible, but real important.

449
00:34:30,000 --> 00:34:35,000
But largely this is a political problem and it's a difficult political problem.

450
00:34:35,000 --> 00:34:41,000
We're long past the point where singular legal interventions will do any good.

451
00:34:41,000 --> 00:34:48,000
And a lot of the public debate has centered around the telephone metadata program.

452
00:34:48,000 --> 00:34:53,000
Probably because that was the first Snowden story.

453
00:34:53,000 --> 00:34:56,000
That's the one that people most know about.

454
00:34:56,000 --> 00:34:58,000
That's the one that the president talks most about.

455
00:34:58,000 --> 00:35:03,000
And that's the one that the president is trying to reform in a variety way,

456
00:35:03,000 --> 00:35:06,000
some of which useful, some which meaningless.

457
00:35:07,000 --> 00:35:14,000
But that's just one particular collection program under one particular legal authority.

458
00:35:14,000 --> 00:35:21,000
It doesn't even begin to address the larger problem.

459
00:35:21,000 --> 00:35:24,000
And we know basically how to solve this.

460
00:35:24,000 --> 00:35:26,000
We know the framework of the solution.

461
00:35:26,000 --> 00:35:32,000
Basically, it's transparency, oversight, and accountability.

462
00:35:32,000 --> 00:35:42,000
But fundamentally, that's how we deal with the problem of giving power to authority and making sure they don't abuse it.

463
00:35:42,000 --> 00:35:50,000
Right? The devil's in the details, there's a lot of details, but that's basically the way it works.

464
00:35:50,000 --> 00:35:56,000
One of the problems we're seeing is that law lags technology.

465
00:35:56,000 --> 00:35:59,000
It's not just a quote by a general heightened.

466
00:35:59,000 --> 00:36:05,000
General heightened was the CIA, the NSA director before General Alexander who just retired.

467
00:36:05,000 --> 00:36:08,000
And this is this quote from after he retired.

468
00:36:08,000 --> 00:36:11,000
And he's on television talking about NSA surveillance.

469
00:36:11,000 --> 00:36:14,000
And I'm going to read it because it's really interesting.

470
00:36:14,000 --> 00:36:17,000
He says, give me the box you will allow me to operate in.

471
00:36:17,000 --> 00:36:22,000
I'm going to play to the very edges of that box.

472
00:36:22,000 --> 00:36:27,000
I mean, it's an interesting quote. What are you saying is, look, I'm not in charge of the laws.

473
00:36:27,000 --> 00:36:33,000
You Congress are in charge. Give me my box, pass the laws, tell me what I can and can't do.

474
00:36:33,000 --> 00:36:44,000
Right? I'm going to operate to the edges of that box, which is what you'd expect me to do, because I'm a good guy, and I'm going to do my job to the fullest.

475
00:36:44,000 --> 00:36:51,000
The problem with that idea is that technology changes the box.

476
00:36:51,000 --> 00:37:01,000
Right? You know, Congress passed the law. You have a box and someone invents, you know, I don't know, wireless networking or the iPhone or Facebook or something else.

477
00:37:01,000 --> 00:37:04,000
And suddenly the box gets bigger. Right?

478
00:37:04,000 --> 00:37:10,000
And then the NSA who's way quicker than Congress rushes to fill the new box, because that's what his box is.

479
00:37:10,000 --> 00:37:15,000
And now it's harder to reduce capabilities.

480
00:37:15,000 --> 00:37:18,000
And that seems to happen again and again.

481
00:37:22,000 --> 00:37:25,000
Right? There's...

482
00:37:26,000 --> 00:37:35,000
She's interesting article by Jack Galsmith. Jack Galsmith was actually he's my favorite ex Bush official.

483
00:37:35,000 --> 00:37:37,000
And he's now in Harvard Law School.

484
00:37:37,000 --> 00:37:45,000
And he was the one who forced that Ashcroft bedside meeting where the just smart almost resigned in mass, because of activity.

485
00:37:45,000 --> 00:37:57,000
So he said, look, this is illegal. You can't do this. Anyway, he wrote an essay early in the in the in the Snowden document release, which talking about oversight.

486
00:37:57,000 --> 00:38:00,000
Actually, I'm going to save that story.

487
00:38:00,000 --> 00:38:04,000
That never happened.

488
00:38:04,000 --> 00:38:08,000
Talk more about openness now.

489
00:38:08,000 --> 00:38:19,000
One of the things I've been thinking about as a way to deal with some of this is to how to deal with much less secrecy in this environment.

490
00:38:19,000 --> 00:38:28,000
Because the the the the the problem of the transparency oversight accountability sequence is you need transparency to start.

491
00:38:28,000 --> 00:38:34,000
And how do you get that in such inherently secret environment?

492
00:38:34,000 --> 00:38:39,000
So one of the things I'm thinking about is if can we separate espionage from surveillance?

493
00:38:39,000 --> 00:38:41,000
Because remember that I told the history of the NSA.

494
00:38:41,000 --> 00:38:49,000
There's that government on government espionage mission and that government on surveillance government on population surveillance mission.

495
00:38:49,000 --> 00:38:55,000
The government on government, you know, is going to happen that that's right. That's rightfully secret.

496
00:38:55,000 --> 00:38:59,000
The government on population can be much more open.

497
00:38:59,000 --> 00:39:03,000
There's a great article that appeared in the Atlantic website that a month ago.

498
00:39:03,000 --> 00:39:07,000
And a title was why isn't the fourth amendment classified?

499
00:39:07,000 --> 00:39:09,000
But the interesting question.

500
00:39:09,000 --> 00:39:22,000
One of the arguments you hear from the NSA all the time is, well, we'd love to tell you what we're doing, but if we tell you, the enemy is listening, we can't tell you and not tell them so we can't tell you.

501
00:39:22,000 --> 00:39:24,000
Right, plausible.

502
00:39:24,000 --> 00:39:34,000
But if you look at the fourth amendment and if you look at all the case loss surrounding the fourth amendment, that is a how too manual on how to evade police search.

503
00:39:34,000 --> 00:39:41,000
It tells you in exact terms how to get around the letter of the law.

504
00:39:41,000 --> 00:39:50,000
Why is that not classified? And given that it's not classified, how is society survive at all these centuries?

505
00:39:50,000 --> 00:39:55,000
I mean, it turns out that we can do with much less secrecy.

506
00:39:55,000 --> 00:39:58,000
In the police world, there's a lot less secrecy.

507
00:39:58,000 --> 00:40:04,000
Right, there exists no police budget in the country that is classified.

508
00:40:04,000 --> 00:40:08,000
There exists no surveillance budget in the country that is unclassified.

509
00:40:08,000 --> 00:40:10,000
What's going on here?

510
00:40:10,000 --> 00:40:17,000
Are we postulating that terrorists are much much clever than organized crime? Does it make sense?

511
00:40:21,000 --> 00:40:28,000
Right, so what's happened if you think about it, this surveillance operation, this government on population,

512
00:40:28,000 --> 00:40:35,000
could in theory fall within the police norm or the military norm?

513
00:40:35,000 --> 00:40:41,000
Because of history, because of where the agencies were, it fell under the military norm.

514
00:40:41,000 --> 00:40:44,000
It fell under the military norm of secrecy.

515
00:40:44,000 --> 00:40:49,000
I think moving it to the police norm of secrecy will have a norm of value.

516
00:40:49,000 --> 00:40:53,000
Right, it is not the end, it is just the beginning.

517
00:40:53,000 --> 00:40:58,000
But it is, I think it's an important beginning.

518
00:40:58,000 --> 00:41:01,000
So, I mean, lately, I've been advocating, breaking up the NSA.

519
00:41:01,000 --> 00:41:05,000
We already have the problem of this NSA dual mission.

520
00:41:05,000 --> 00:41:10,000
If they learn about heart bleed, should they exploit it or should they use it to protect people?

521
00:41:10,000 --> 00:41:14,000
Right, there are two different groups in the NSA, two halves.

522
00:41:14,000 --> 00:41:22,000
On each side of that equation, and the exploit is just winning.

523
00:41:22,000 --> 00:41:29,000
So, if you think about it, it looks something like the SB and Aage function moved it to the CIA, kind of where it belongs.

524
00:41:29,000 --> 00:41:38,000
Took all the counterterrorism stuff, all the surveillance stuff, moved to the FBI, kind of where that belongs under the FBI rules, which are way more open.

525
00:41:38,000 --> 00:41:43,000
Right, and our sort of less, they less end runs around laws.

526
00:41:44,000 --> 00:41:53,000
And what's left will be the protect component of the NSA, which we actually can, can sorely need, and use that for protection.

527
00:41:53,000 --> 00:41:57,000
Kind of similar to what the presence of you group on surveillance recommended.

528
00:41:57,000 --> 00:42:03,000
They recommended that these missions be broken up further, that having them too close is a problem.

529
00:42:03,000 --> 00:42:11,000
They also recommend that moving cyber command, the military attack, internet, group away from the NSA,

530
00:42:11,000 --> 00:42:16,000
and the war into the military, I think that makes sense too.

531
00:42:16,000 --> 00:42:22,000
So, thinking about these things, I think, is really interesting, and worth having these discussions.

532
00:42:22,000 --> 00:42:25,000
Now, how do we get out of this?

533
00:42:25,000 --> 00:42:33,000
But, of course, even if we succeed here in reigning an NSA surveillance, that only affects the United States.

534
00:42:33,000 --> 00:42:38,000
Right, it doesn't affect the actions of any other country.

535
00:42:38,000 --> 00:42:42,000
And regularly, you will hear an argument of this form.

536
00:42:42,000 --> 00:42:47,000
The NSA has to do what it's doing because China does too.

537
00:42:47,000 --> 00:42:51,000
Right, I mean, that's an arms race argument.

538
00:42:51,000 --> 00:42:56,000
Right, we're in a arms race with Russia, we're in a arms race with China.

539
00:42:56,000 --> 00:43:00,000
Right, there's a zero-sum game, it's us versus them.

540
00:43:00,000 --> 00:43:05,000
If one of us has to win, it can't be them, therefore it must be us.

541
00:43:05,000 --> 00:43:08,000
That's the basic argument.

542
00:43:08,000 --> 00:43:11,000
I think we have to get beyond it.

543
00:43:11,000 --> 00:43:17,000
Right, it's not us versus them, it's everyone versus nobody.

544
00:43:17,000 --> 00:43:26,000
And we have to get to the point where governments realize that a secure internet is an everyone's best interest.

545
00:43:26,000 --> 00:43:34,000
Right, that the NSA and the US should work to secure the internet even if China doesn't play a long.

546
00:43:35,000 --> 00:43:42,000
Then it's a question of, you know, are we going to build a national line just because they do, of course not, because it doesn't make sense.

547
00:43:42,000 --> 00:43:46,000
And that turns the zero-sum game into a positive sum game.

548
00:43:46,000 --> 00:43:49,000
Then you can have laws and treaties to support that.

549
00:43:49,000 --> 00:43:51,000
You can have technology to support the laws.

550
00:43:51,000 --> 00:43:56,000
You can have laws and technologies to deal with non-compliant actors, both state and non-state.

551
00:43:56,000 --> 00:44:00,000
And it doesn't solve the problem.

552
00:44:00,000 --> 00:44:06,000
But it makes it sort of into any of those other really, really hard international problems we have.

553
00:44:06,000 --> 00:44:12,000
Like money laundering or nuclear non-proliferation or human trafficking or small arms trafficking.

554
00:44:12,000 --> 00:44:21,000
I mean, those are still big problems and we're not solving them, but at least we're moving in the same direction.

555
00:44:21,000 --> 00:44:25,000
Right, with surveillance, we're not even moving in the same direction.

556
00:44:25,000 --> 00:44:30,000
There were still stuck in this us versus them mentality.

557
00:44:30,000 --> 00:44:36,000
So lastly, and I'm most importantly, this is a social problem.

558
00:44:36,000 --> 00:44:41,000
But as long as we're scared, we will allow everything.

559
00:44:41,000 --> 00:44:46,000
And this is where the goal of the story actually belongs.

560
00:44:46,000 --> 00:44:48,000
He wrote an essay on the law fair blog.

561
00:44:48,000 --> 00:44:54,000
Basically said, you know, you guys are saying you want more oversight, but actually you don't.

562
00:44:54,000 --> 00:44:59,000
Because right now, if you get more oversight, you'll get a much more permissive NSA.

563
00:44:59,000 --> 00:45:08,000
As long as lawmakers are scared, as long as the NSA can say, if you don't do this, you will have blood on your hands.

564
00:45:08,000 --> 00:45:13,000
Right, and people believe them when they say that.

565
00:45:14,000 --> 00:45:22,000
More oversight means more permissions, because no one wants to say no, and potentially get it wrong.

566
00:45:22,000 --> 00:45:29,000
As long as we prioritize control over liberty, we'll never get security.

567
00:45:29,000 --> 00:45:35,000
As long as the argument is on the other side, terrorists will kill your children.

568
00:45:35,000 --> 00:45:37,000
We're not going to get anywhere.

569
00:45:37,000 --> 00:45:41,000
We have to get to the point where this is a ridiculous argument.

570
00:45:41,000 --> 00:45:49,000
We can look back at the US and terminate the Japanese during World War II and say, what in the world are we thinking?

571
00:45:49,000 --> 00:45:54,000
Or look back at McCarthyism and say, are you kidding what we that crazy?

572
00:45:54,000 --> 00:46:00,000
I mean, we'll get to the point where we look back at the past decade and say, oh, don't be ridiculous.

573
00:46:00,000 --> 00:46:04,000
We didn't actually do that in airports. That's stupid.

574
00:46:05,000 --> 00:46:08,000
But it's going to take a while.

575
00:46:08,000 --> 00:46:14,000
And it could very well be that we have to get there first.

576
00:46:14,000 --> 00:46:19,000
Because right now, you have judges who are scared being different, children.

577
00:46:19,000 --> 00:46:22,000
You have Congress who is scared being different, children.

578
00:46:22,000 --> 00:46:25,000
You have a president who is scared being different, children.

579
00:46:25,000 --> 00:46:31,000
And you've got a lot of the people who are saying, look, just make sure terrorists don't kill much children.

580
00:46:34,000 --> 00:46:39,000
It's hard to have a rational debate when there is such a pervasive fear.

581
00:46:39,000 --> 00:46:42,000
Now, there's less fear now than there was 10 years ago.

582
00:46:42,000 --> 00:46:48,000
We're getting out of our collective post-traumatic stress syndrome.

583
00:46:48,000 --> 00:46:53,000
But it's slow.

584
00:46:53,000 --> 00:46:56,000
And the neat thing is once we get there, the NSA can help.

585
00:46:56,000 --> 00:46:58,000
But I've been mentioning a few times.

586
00:46:58,000 --> 00:47:00,000
The NSA has a dual mission.

587
00:47:01,000 --> 00:47:07,000
The dual mission was to ease drop on the enemy communications and protect domestic communications.

588
00:47:07,000 --> 00:47:11,000
And that dual mission made a lot of sense during the Cold War.

589
00:47:11,000 --> 00:47:17,000
Right? The NSA would spy on their stuff and protect our stuff because the stuff was different.

590
00:47:17,000 --> 00:47:20,000
The stuff's all the same now.

591
00:47:20,000 --> 00:47:31,000
Everyone uses email and TCP-IP and Microsoft Word and OpenSSL.

592
00:47:31,000 --> 00:47:37,000
Right? We all use the same stuff. There's no R stuff versus their stuff anymore.

593
00:47:37,000 --> 00:47:41,000
It's all everyone's stuff.

594
00:47:41,000 --> 00:47:48,000
Defending R infrastructure also defends their infrastructure.

595
00:47:48,000 --> 00:47:56,000
Right? We have to recognize that defending is more important than attacking.

596
00:47:56,000 --> 00:47:59,000
So I started up by saying that Internet surveillance is robust, right?

597
00:47:59,000 --> 00:48:03,000
Rebus legally, politically, and technically.

598
00:48:03,000 --> 00:48:06,000
It is. I mean, this is a real hard one.

599
00:48:06,000 --> 00:48:12,000
And we need to solve this, you know, not just for the NSA, but for everybody.

600
00:48:12,000 --> 00:48:18,000
We need to solve this in a way where what other governments do don't matter.

601
00:48:18,000 --> 00:48:21,000
What cyber criminals do doesn't matter.

602
00:48:21,000 --> 00:48:25,000
What rogue actors doesn't do doesn't matter.

603
00:48:25,000 --> 00:48:29,000
Right? We need to build resilience into our infrastructure.

604
00:48:29,000 --> 00:48:37,000
Security, privacy, all of those things that actually make us more secure.

605
00:48:37,000 --> 00:48:43,000
I mean, we're at the point where security is vital to society, all of society.

606
00:48:43,000 --> 00:48:46,000
And we need to move forward to get there.

607
00:48:46,000 --> 00:48:48,000
Thank you.

608
00:48:48,000 --> 00:48:53,000
So I'm happy to take questions.

609
00:48:53,000 --> 00:48:57,000
I see two microphones there. I assume they're on if they're not.

610
00:48:57,000 --> 00:49:00,000
Some of them will turn them on kind of magically.

611
00:49:00,000 --> 00:49:01,000
Please.

612
00:49:02,000 --> 00:49:10,000
So I studied CS here and I have a pretty good idea of like what, which of my day is being collected, what sort of day is this on the NSA servers.

613
00:49:10,000 --> 00:49:12,000
But my question is, why should I care?

614
00:49:12,000 --> 00:49:20,000
Like if the NSA has one gigabyte of my data and two petabytes of everyone else's, why should I care that my data is sitting there and that's.

615
00:49:20,000 --> 00:49:22,000
So you're a computer science person.

616
00:49:22,000 --> 00:49:26,000
I mean, so which one of the, I mean, I think this is a much more popular fallacy.

617
00:49:26,000 --> 00:49:40,000
And it's the you know, hiding in plain sight fallacy that because the NSA has lost it on everybody, they can't possibly do anything about me, but you know, you know, computers can are really really good at boring repetitive tasks.

618
00:49:40,000 --> 00:49:42,000
That's what they excel at.

619
00:49:42,000 --> 00:49:45,000
So sifting through everybody's data is easy.

620
00:49:45,000 --> 00:49:55,000
I mean, I didn't know this, but I learned this last week that to ping the entire internet and see who's vulnerable to heart bleed takes like 20 minutes.

621
00:49:55,000 --> 00:50:02,000
So where it's, it's not an impediment that they have petabytes.

622
00:50:02,000 --> 00:50:05,000
Petabytes are actually pretty easy now to deal with.

623
00:50:05,000 --> 00:50:09,000
So it's a question of of of of of of our data.

624
00:50:09,000 --> 00:50:10,000
And do we care?

625
00:50:10,000 --> 00:50:12,000
I mean, do we care that?

626
00:50:12,000 --> 00:50:16,000
And this is where, you know, corporate and government kind of blur.

627
00:50:16,000 --> 00:50:19,000
Right Google knows what kind of porn all of you like.

628
00:50:19,000 --> 00:50:21,000
Is this good as this bad?

629
00:50:21,000 --> 00:50:28,000
Right the government knows, I mean, our government and also the Chinese government, if they want to, what everybody is reading.

630
00:50:28,000 --> 00:50:34,000
It's fundamentally knowing people's preferences, knowing what's important to them.

631
00:50:34,000 --> 00:50:35,000
And how is this useful?

632
00:50:35,000 --> 00:50:40,000
Well, we made corporations use of a psychological manipulation for advertising.

633
00:50:40,000 --> 00:50:44,000
Governments use it for crime prevention, social control.

634
00:50:44,000 --> 00:50:48,000
It lots of countries this day is collected to arrest people.

635
00:50:48,000 --> 00:50:55,000
It happens in China, happens in the Ukraine, the past week, and happens in Syria.

636
00:50:55,000 --> 00:51:01,000
So by defending the internet, all of it, we defend against all of these attackers.

637
00:51:01,000 --> 00:51:04,000
I mean, it's less about the NSA and more about everybody.

638
00:51:04,000 --> 00:51:13,000
I'm actually less concerned about the NSA collecting my data than I am at the NSA deliberately subverting security standards and products and protocols to make my data vulnerable to all attacks.

639
00:51:13,000 --> 00:51:18,000
Now, the risks of data being lost.

640
00:51:18,000 --> 00:51:22,000
We see a bunch of examples of data being stolen.

641
00:51:22,000 --> 00:51:29,000
So those are the harms that some of them feel a bit extreme, some of them are very real.

642
00:51:29,000 --> 00:51:35,000
But we're moving to a world where there actually is no privacy.

643
00:51:35,000 --> 00:51:40,000
Now, what's interesting is, is my mention of that conversation I had on an eye message to my wife this morning.

644
00:51:40,000 --> 00:51:45,000
Now, it's on our phones, but our phones only store the last 50 messages.

645
00:51:45,000 --> 00:51:49,000
So in a couple of days, they're going to roll off our phones.

646
00:51:49,000 --> 00:51:53,000
Apple doesn't actually have that limitation of 50 message storage.

647
00:51:53,000 --> 00:52:01,000
So that conversation is now stored on Apple computers, potentially government computers, forever.

648
00:52:01,000 --> 00:52:05,000
And we're living in a world where we're increasingly judged by that data.

649
00:52:05,000 --> 00:52:09,000
I mean, some of the, some of it's, you know, on different scales.

650
00:52:09,000 --> 00:52:13,000
Right, Google uses that data to decide if I want to buy a car.

651
00:52:13,000 --> 00:52:15,000
And if they get it wrong, I see it for Chevy, don't want to buy it.

652
00:52:15,000 --> 00:52:16,000
So what?

653
00:52:16,000 --> 00:52:21,000
Right, in the middle, people use that data to determine a credit score and maybe they get a house loan or I don't.

654
00:52:21,000 --> 00:52:25,000
On the far end, NSA decides who to drop a drone strike on.

655
00:52:25,000 --> 00:52:28,000
But false loms really bad there.

656
00:52:28,000 --> 00:52:32,000
So, so, how am I doing?

657
00:52:33,000 --> 00:52:36,000
That's good, thanks.

658
00:52:36,000 --> 00:52:38,000
All right.

659
00:52:38,000 --> 00:52:46,000
Hi, I've heard suggestions that if we encouraged all data online or as much as possible to be encrypted, it would slow the NSA down.

660
00:52:46,000 --> 00:52:52,000
I know Google has been encouraging more stuff to be encrypted.

661
00:52:52,000 --> 00:52:57,000
Do you think it's likely to happen that most data online is encrypted and do you think it'll make any difference?

662
00:52:57,000 --> 00:52:59,000
So I don't think most will. I think more will be.

663
00:52:59,000 --> 00:53:01,000
I don't think more will be.

664
00:53:01,000 --> 00:53:03,000
I don't think more will be.

665
00:53:03,000 --> 00:53:05,000
I don't think more will be.

666
00:53:05,000 --> 00:53:07,000
I don't think more will be.

667
00:53:07,000 --> 00:53:09,000
I don't think more will be.

668
00:53:09,000 --> 00:53:11,000
I don't think more will be.

669
00:53:11,000 --> 00:53:13,000
I don't think more will be.

670
00:53:13,000 --> 00:53:15,000
I don't think more will be.

671
00:53:15,000 --> 00:53:17,000
I don't think more will be.

672
00:53:17,000 --> 00:53:19,000
I don't think more will be.

673
00:53:19,000 --> 00:53:21,000
I don't think more will be.

674
00:53:21,000 --> 00:53:23,000
I don't think more will be.

675
00:53:23,000 --> 00:53:25,000
I don't think more will be.

676
00:53:25,000 --> 00:53:27,000
I don't think more will be.

677
00:53:27,000 --> 00:53:29,000
I don't think more will be.

678
00:53:29,000 --> 00:53:31,000
I don't think more will be.

679
00:53:31,000 --> 00:53:33,000
I don't think more will be.

680
00:53:33,000 --> 00:53:35,000
I don't think more will be.

681
00:53:35,000 --> 00:53:37,000
I don't think more will be.

682
00:53:37,000 --> 00:53:39,000
I don't think more will be.

683
00:53:39,000 --> 00:53:41,000
I don't think more will be.

684
00:53:41,000 --> 00:53:43,000
I don't think more will be.

685
00:53:43,000 --> 00:53:45,000
I don't think more will be.

686
00:53:45,000 --> 00:53:47,000
I don't think more will be.

687
00:53:47,000 --> 00:53:49,000
I don't think more will be.

688
00:53:49,000 --> 00:53:51,000
I don't think more will be.

689
00:53:51,000 --> 00:53:53,000
I don't think more will be.

690
00:53:53,000 --> 00:53:55,000
I don't think more will be.

691
00:53:55,000 --> 00:53:57,000
I don't think more will be.

692
00:53:57,000 --> 00:53:59,000
I don't think more will be.

693
00:53:59,000 --> 00:54:01,000
I don't think more will be.

694
00:54:01,000 --> 00:54:03,000
I don't think more will be.

695
00:54:03,000 --> 00:54:05,000
I don't think more will be.

696
00:54:05,000 --> 00:54:07,000
I don't think more will be.

697
00:54:07,000 --> 00:54:09,000
I don't think more will be.

698
00:54:09,000 --> 00:54:11,000
I don't think more will be.

699
00:54:11,000 --> 00:54:13,000
I don't think more will be.

700
00:54:13,000 --> 00:54:15,000
I don't think more will be.

701
00:54:15,000 --> 00:54:17,000
I don't think more will be.

702
00:54:17,000 --> 00:54:19,000
I don't think more will be.

703
00:54:19,000 --> 00:54:21,000
I don't think more will be.

704
00:54:21,000 --> 00:54:23,000
I don't think more will be.

705
00:54:23,000 --> 00:54:25,000
I don't think more will be.

706
00:54:25,000 --> 00:54:27,000
I don't think more will be.

707
00:54:27,000 --> 00:54:29,000
I don't think more will be.

708
00:54:29,000 --> 00:54:31,000
I don't think more will be.

709
00:54:31,000 --> 00:54:33,000
I don't think more will be.

710
00:54:33,000 --> 00:54:35,000
I don't think more will be.

711
00:54:35,000 --> 00:54:37,000
I don't think more will be.

712
00:54:37,000 --> 00:54:39,000
I don't think more will be.

713
00:54:39,000 --> 00:54:41,000
I don't think more will be.

714
00:54:41,000 --> 00:54:43,000
I don't think more will be.

715
00:54:43,000 --> 00:54:45,000
I don't think more will be.

716
00:54:45,000 --> 00:54:47,000
I don't think more will be.

717
00:54:47,000 --> 00:54:49,000
I don't think more will be.

718
00:54:49,000 --> 00:54:51,000
I don't think more will be.

719
00:54:51,000 --> 00:54:53,000
Actually, the NSA does the exploitation.

720
00:54:53,000 --> 00:54:55,000
Cyber command does the attack.

721
00:54:55,000 --> 00:54:57,000
And this is why cyber command was put.

722
00:54:57,000 --> 00:54:59,000
So in the same building as the NSA,

723
00:54:59,000 --> 00:55:00,000
at least next door, I forget who's.

724
00:55:00,000 --> 00:55:01,000
I don't actually know who's where.

725
00:55:01,000 --> 00:55:03,000
The same generals and charge of both.

726
00:55:03,000 --> 00:55:07,000
Because the techniques are exactly the same.

727
00:55:07,000 --> 00:55:13,000
The only difference is what you do after you break into the computer.

728
00:55:13,000 --> 00:55:15,000
The astel data or do you know,

729
00:55:15,000 --> 00:55:17,000
leave a logic bomb.

730
00:55:17,000 --> 00:55:19,000
And you watch the rhetoric.

731
00:55:19,000 --> 00:55:22,000
It's really interesting that we use.

732
00:55:22,000 --> 00:55:25,000
When the Chinese attack Google,

733
00:55:25,000 --> 00:55:28,000
the headlines are all about China starting the cyber war.

734
00:55:28,000 --> 00:55:31,000
They're breaking into US computers.

735
00:55:31,000 --> 00:55:34,000
When it came out that the US attacks China,

736
00:55:34,000 --> 00:55:36,000
the headlines are all, oh, it's espionage.

737
00:55:36,000 --> 00:55:37,000
Happens all the time.

738
00:55:37,000 --> 00:55:38,000
Don't worry about it.

739
00:55:38,000 --> 00:55:40,000
Are the exact same stuff.

740
00:55:40,000 --> 00:55:43,000
And the problem is, when you're the victim,

741
00:55:43,000 --> 00:55:45,000
you can't tell the difference.

742
00:55:46,000 --> 00:55:49,000
CNN, it looks exactly like CNN.

743
00:55:51,000 --> 00:55:53,000
Except for the effect.

744
00:55:53,000 --> 00:55:55,000
And I think this makes it very difficult.

745
00:55:55,000 --> 00:55:59,000
When I talk about moving the NSA's espionage mission

746
00:55:59,000 --> 00:56:02,000
into the CIA or into the military,

747
00:56:02,000 --> 00:56:05,000
I want it to be where it belongs.

748
00:56:05,000 --> 00:56:08,000
You're actually attacking someone else's computer,

749
00:56:08,000 --> 00:56:09,000
breaking into it.

750
00:56:09,000 --> 00:56:11,000
You're only sealed stuff,

751
00:56:11,000 --> 00:56:14,000
but you're still doing the same offensive operation.

752
00:56:14,000 --> 00:56:16,000
So making a military thing,

753
00:56:16,000 --> 00:56:20,000
make some military hierarchy sign off on it.

754
00:56:20,000 --> 00:56:22,000
But you're right.

755
00:56:22,000 --> 00:56:24,000
You can't tell the difference.

756
00:56:24,000 --> 00:56:28,000
So why wouldn't a foreign power consider

757
00:56:28,000 --> 00:56:31,000
exfiltration or exploitation that doesn't have

758
00:56:31,000 --> 00:56:34,000
an attack payload not an active war?

759
00:56:34,000 --> 00:56:35,000
They bite.

760
00:56:35,000 --> 00:56:38,000
Active war is as much political as it is technical.

761
00:56:38,000 --> 00:56:41,000
Lots of things are an act of war that you decide

762
00:56:41,000 --> 00:56:44,000
aren't because you don't want to go to war.

763
00:56:44,000 --> 00:56:45,000
Stucks net.

764
00:56:45,000 --> 00:56:50,000
When the US and Israel attack the Iranian nuclear power facility

765
00:56:50,000 --> 00:56:52,000
and destroy equipment,

766
00:56:52,000 --> 00:56:55,000
by any textbook definition that's an active war.

767
00:56:55,000 --> 00:56:57,000
But Iran says, I don't know, I'm going to war with the US.

768
00:56:57,000 --> 00:56:59,000
That's not going to be no fun.

769
00:56:59,000 --> 00:57:03,000
So yes, I think it could be an active war.

770
00:57:03,000 --> 00:57:07,000
And actually worry about the US and China

771
00:57:07,000 --> 00:57:09,000
doing this to each other.

772
00:57:09,000 --> 00:57:12,000
So we can get out of hand pretty fast.

773
00:57:12,000 --> 00:57:15,000
So this kind of escalation could happen.

774
00:57:15,000 --> 00:57:19,000
I think it's very destabilizing that we are doing it.

775
00:57:19,000 --> 00:57:22,000
And it's interesting, we unilaterally went to China

776
00:57:22,000 --> 00:57:26,000
a couple of weeks ago and said, okay, look, here are rules.

777
00:57:26,000 --> 00:57:27,000
Right?

778
00:57:27,000 --> 00:57:29,000
This is what we're doing.

779
00:57:29,000 --> 00:57:31,000
And you're not doing anything else.

780
00:57:31,000 --> 00:57:33,000
Who knows if we were lying or not?

781
00:57:33,000 --> 00:57:36,000
But I think that was an attempt to dampen down

782
00:57:36,000 --> 00:57:38,000
some of this rhetoric that was just getting a little bit

783
00:57:38,000 --> 00:57:41,000
scary for everybody involved.

784
00:57:41,000 --> 00:57:43,000
And they could get there again.

785
00:57:43,000 --> 00:57:47,000
I worry about the destabilization here.

786
00:57:47,000 --> 00:57:50,000
Please.

787
00:57:50,000 --> 00:57:52,000
Why do you want to tell the people?

788
00:57:52,000 --> 00:57:55,000
Sixth, frankly, what would you say to the fact

789
00:57:55,000 --> 00:57:59,000
that the goal surveillance after September 11th basically

790
00:57:59,000 --> 00:58:00,000
has worked?

791
00:58:00,000 --> 00:58:04,000
I agree with all the technical reasons and such things

792
00:58:04,000 --> 00:58:07,000
as what you said, like, why can't it budget be public

793
00:58:07,000 --> 00:58:10,000
or the NSA or why can't they just do targeted attacks?

794
00:58:10,000 --> 00:58:14,000
But I feel like there's a intuitive thing that I don't have

795
00:58:14,000 --> 00:58:16,000
trouble arguing against about the fact that it has worked.

796
00:58:16,000 --> 00:58:18,000
And we don't know what would happen if we try to restrict them

797
00:58:18,000 --> 00:58:19,000
in certain ways.

798
00:58:19,000 --> 00:58:20,000
Well, it seems like it hasn't.

799
00:58:20,000 --> 00:58:24,000
I mean, the analysis we've seen is that it's not very effective.

800
00:58:24,000 --> 00:58:28,000
You know, Hayden said I could have stopped 53 terrorist attacks

801
00:58:28,000 --> 00:58:30,000
after September 11th.

802
00:58:30,000 --> 00:58:32,000
And that number got wittled down eventually

803
00:58:32,000 --> 00:58:34,000
until we got one San Francisco cab driver

804
00:58:34,000 --> 00:58:36,000
sitting money back to Yemen.

805
00:58:36,000 --> 00:58:38,000
I mean, I'll stuff happen to broad.

806
00:58:38,000 --> 00:58:40,000
It means a whole lot of reasons.

807
00:58:40,000 --> 00:58:42,000
But I mean, that really does seem

808
00:58:42,000 --> 00:58:43,000
farceical.

809
00:58:43,000 --> 00:58:45,000
The NSA said they could have stopped 9-11.

810
00:58:45,000 --> 00:58:47,000
They couldn't stop the Boston bombing.

811
00:58:47,000 --> 00:58:49,000
And that was one guy in the terrorist watch list.

812
00:58:49,000 --> 00:58:51,000
The other guy with a stoppy Facebook trail.

813
00:58:51,000 --> 00:58:54,000
And that kind of should have been give me.

814
00:58:54,000 --> 00:58:59,000
So it seems that the successes we have

815
00:58:59,000 --> 00:59:01,000
come from following leads.

816
00:59:01,000 --> 00:59:05,000
And you have to remember, in the early as of September 11th,

817
00:59:05,000 --> 00:59:08,000
the government was trotting out any two-bit terrorist

818
00:59:08,000 --> 00:59:10,000
wannabe as a success.

819
00:59:10,000 --> 00:59:13,000
Anything that could remotely be a success

820
00:59:13,000 --> 00:59:14,000
they would trump it.

821
00:59:14,000 --> 00:59:16,000
If these programs produce successes,

822
00:59:16,000 --> 00:59:18,000
they would have told us.

823
00:59:18,000 --> 00:59:20,000
Because it was enormous PR value

824
00:59:20,000 --> 00:59:22,000
in having these successes.

825
00:59:22,000 --> 00:59:26,000
And it's so the following leads seem to work.

826
00:59:26,000 --> 00:59:28,000
So you think about the liquid bombers.

827
00:59:28,000 --> 00:59:30,000
The guys in London, they were arrested

828
00:59:30,000 --> 00:59:32,000
and they're London apartments.

829
00:59:32,000 --> 00:59:34,000
Before they got to the airport, they picked a plot

830
00:59:34,000 --> 00:59:36,000
designed to get around airport security.

831
00:59:36,000 --> 00:59:38,000
They were caught not through this bulk surveillance,

832
00:59:38,000 --> 00:59:40,000
but through following leads.

833
00:59:40,000 --> 00:59:43,000
Following leads is what works.

834
00:59:43,000 --> 00:59:49,000
The bulk surveillance seems to be far too expensive for its value.

835
00:59:49,000 --> 00:59:52,000
The Utah Data Center is $10 billion.

836
00:59:52,000 --> 00:59:55,000
Plus a hundred million a year.

837
00:59:55,000 --> 00:59:59,000
We just go get nearly that value from that.

838
00:59:59,000 --> 01:00:00:01,000
How many FBI agents are going to hire

839
01:00:01,000 --> 01:00:02,000
a $10 billion dollar?

840
01:00:02,000 --> 01:00:05,000
Well, they cost fully burdened a couple of thousand dollars a year.

841
01:00:05,000 --> 01:00:08,000
I mean, this is crazy.

842
01:00:08,000 --> 01:00:11,000
Please.

843
01:00:11,000 --> 01:00:13,000
So you've talked about bulk surveillance

844
01:00:13,000 --> 01:00:16,000
and targeted exploits.

845
01:00:16,000 --> 01:00:19,000
I'm wondering what happens if we have bulk exploits.

846
01:00:19,000 --> 01:00:22,000
You've said how, you know, if we can build encryption into things

847
01:00:22,000 --> 01:00:25,000
it becomes much harder for the NSA to spy on everyone and everything.

848
01:00:25,000 --> 01:00:28,000
But they have these persistent payloads that have come out

849
01:00:28,000 --> 01:00:32,000
and they've got these documents where your network switch might be exploited

850
01:00:32,000 --> 01:00:34,000
in such a way that it stays owned by the NSA.

851
01:00:34,000 --> 01:00:37,000
Your laptop chip and they've already hacked Huawei

852
01:00:37,000 --> 01:00:42,000
was to say that every single Apple computer in this room isn't being exploited

853
01:00:42,000 --> 01:00:43,000
or won't be exploited.

854
01:00:43,000 --> 01:00:44,000
So nothing is to say that.

855
01:00:44,000 --> 01:00:47,000
And actually I've never heard the book or bulk exploit by a like it.

856
01:00:47,000 --> 01:00:49,000
It's my, as a good way to describe it.

857
01:00:49,000 --> 01:00:55,000
Because the thing that I've checked to most is this subversion of products,

858
01:00:55,000 --> 01:00:57,000
protocols, and saniters, right?

859
01:00:57,000 --> 01:01:00,000
Every Apple computer being subverted.

860
01:01:00,000 --> 01:01:04,000
So, and that is in a sense of bulk exploit.

861
01:01:04,000 --> 01:01:07,000
But we saw that Tiao catalog, it's really cool if you hadn't seen it.

862
01:01:07,000 --> 01:01:12,000
Well, these great, you know, grain of rice size computers, they slip in in places

863
01:01:12,000 --> 01:01:16,000
and ways they have grabbing data and that stuff's super phenomenal.

864
01:01:16,000 --> 01:01:17,000
That's very targeted.

865
01:01:17,000 --> 01:01:20,000
I mean, it's the list of good stuff the NSA does.

866
01:01:20,000 --> 01:01:23,000
But I want you to go hack the computers in North Korea.

867
01:01:23,000 --> 01:01:24,000
Do them.

868
01:01:24,000 --> 01:01:25,000
That's fantastic.

869
01:01:25,000 --> 01:01:27,000
But don't hack everybody's.

870
01:01:27,000 --> 01:01:33,000
So, yeah, I think that notion of bulk exploit is a good way of framing that.

871
01:01:33,000 --> 01:01:37,000
And you will see it in a future article of mine very soon.

872
01:01:37,000 --> 01:01:47,000
I'd write it down, and I'll have a pen.

873
01:01:47,000 --> 01:01:52,000
Oh, and that's the Wi-Fi password.

874
01:01:52,000 --> 01:01:56,000
Okay, so that's the Wi-Fi password in case I'm boring.

875
01:01:56,000 --> 01:02:04,000
So, I think it's with bitter irony that we are talking about preserving our freedoms by essentially giving them up.

876
01:02:04,000 --> 01:02:11,000
But I wanted to comment on your statement that you thought it might be a good idea for maybe portions of the NSA

877
01:02:11,000 --> 01:02:15,000
to maybe be moved under an organization, perhaps like the CIA.

878
01:02:15,000 --> 01:02:25,000
And I wanted to ask, do you really feel comfortable that having the CIA run these same types of programs would provide more oversight, more trust,

879
01:02:25,000 --> 01:02:32,000
and a better kind of outcome because I struggle to see what you just changing the labor.

880
01:02:32,000 --> 01:02:36,000
So, I just meant the focus government on government stuff.

881
01:02:36,000 --> 01:02:39,000
I mean, and that's the thing I think we'll never get oversight on.

882
01:02:39,000 --> 01:02:41,000
I think that's okay.

883
01:02:41,000 --> 01:02:45,000
Government's spying on governments is a secret military operation.

884
01:02:45,000 --> 01:02:47,000
I'm willing to seed all of that.

885
01:02:47,000 --> 01:02:52,000
I don't need to know U.S. operations against the Chinese government.

886
01:02:52,000 --> 01:02:55,000
But terrorism is not a government function.

887
01:02:55,000 --> 01:02:56,000
Right.

888
01:02:56,000 --> 01:02:57,000
Is terrorism preserved?

889
01:02:57,000 --> 01:02:58,000
How do you as corpus?

890
01:02:58,000 --> 01:03:00,000
How do you preserve constitutional law?

891
01:03:00,000 --> 01:03:03,000
How do you preserve the Fourth Amendment?

892
01:03:03,000 --> 01:03:04,000
All those types of things.

893
01:03:04,000 --> 01:03:05,000
So, that's the stuff to see.

894
01:03:05,000 --> 01:03:09,000
And that's the stuff that I want to move into something more FBI-like.

895
01:03:09,000 --> 01:03:17,000
That kind of stuff that requires surveillance of populations feels a lot more like conventional, has a lot of CIA breach that.

896
01:03:17,000 --> 01:03:19,000
What is Guantanamo about it?

897
01:03:19,000 --> 01:03:20,000
Understood.

898
01:03:20,000 --> 01:03:21,000
Yes.

899
01:03:21,000 --> 01:03:22,000
I feel very uncomfortable about it.

900
01:03:22,000 --> 01:03:25,000
If you were to take this and move it from the state of society.

901
01:03:25,000 --> 01:03:26,000
It's a different thing.

902
01:03:26,000 --> 01:03:27,000
It's a different thing.

903
01:03:27,000 --> 01:03:28,000
It's a different thing.

904
01:03:28,000 --> 01:03:29,000
It's a different thing.

905
01:03:29,000 --> 01:03:30,000
It's a different thing.

906
01:03:30,000 --> 01:03:31,000
It's a different thing.

907
01:03:31,000 --> 01:03:32,000
It's a different thing.

908
01:03:32,000 --> 01:03:33,000
It's a different thing.

909
01:03:33,000 --> 01:03:34,000
It's a different thing.

910
01:03:34,000 --> 01:03:35,000
It's a different thing.

911
01:03:35,000 --> 01:03:36,000
It's a different thing.

912
01:03:36,000 --> 01:03:37,000
It's a different thing.

913
01:03:37,000 --> 01:03:38,000
It's a different thing.

914
01:03:38,000 --> 01:03:39,000
It's a different thing.

915
01:03:39,000 --> 01:03:40,000
It's a different thing.

916
01:03:40,000 --> 01:03:41,000
It's a different thing.

917
01:03:41,000 --> 01:03:42,000
It's a different thing.

918
01:03:42,000 --> 01:03:43,000
It's a different thing.

919
01:03:43,000 --> 01:03:44,000
It's a different thing.

920
01:03:44,000 --> 01:03:45,000
It's a different thing.

921
01:03:45,000 --> 01:03:46,000
It's a different thing.

922
01:03:46,000 --> 01:03:47,000
It's a different thing.

923
01:03:47,000 --> 01:03:48,000
It's a different thing.

924
01:03:48,000 --> 01:03:49,000
It's a different thing.

925
01:03:49,000 --> 01:03:50,000
It's a different thing.

926
01:03:50,000 --> 01:03:51,000
It's a different thing.

927
01:03:51,000 --> 01:03:52,000
It's a different thing.

928
01:03:52,000 --> 01:03:53,000
It's a different thing.

929
01:03:53,000 --> 01:03:54,000
It's a different thing.

930
01:03:54,000 --> 01:03:55,000
It's a different thing.

931
01:03:55,000 --> 01:03:56,000
It's a different thing.

932
01:03:56,000 --> 01:03:57,000
It's a different thing.

933
01:03:57,000 --> 01:03:58,000
It's a different thing.

934
01:03:58,000 --> 01:03:59,000
It's a different thing.

935
01:03:59,000 --> 01:04:00,000
It's a different thing.

936
01:04:00,000 --> 01:04:01,000
It's a different thing.

937
01:04:01,000 --> 01:04:02,000
It's a different thing.

938
01:04:02,000 --> 01:04:03,000
It's a different thing.

939
01:04:03,000 --> 01:04:04,000
It's a different thing.

940
01:04:04,000 --> 01:04:05,000
It's a different thing.

941
01:04:05,000 --> 01:04:06,000
It's a different thing.

942
01:04:06,000 --> 01:04:07,000
It's a different thing.

943
01:04:07,000 --> 01:04:08,000
It's a different thing.

944
01:04:08,000 --> 01:04:09,000
It's a different thing.

945
01:04:09,000 --> 01:04:10,000
It's a different thing.

946
01:04:10,000 --> 01:04:11,000
It's a different thing.

947
01:04:11,000 --> 01:04:12,000
It's a different thing.

948
01:04:12,000 --> 01:04:13,000
It's a different thing.

949
01:04:13,000 --> 01:04:14,000
It's a different thing.

950
01:04:14,000 --> 01:04:15,000
It's a different thing.

951
01:04:15,000 --> 01:04:16,000
It's a different thing.

952
01:04:16,000 --> 01:04:17,000
It's a different thing.

953
01:04:17,000 --> 01:04:18,000
It's a different thing.

954
01:04:18,000 --> 01:04:19,000
It's a different thing.

955
01:04:19,000 --> 01:04:20,000
It's a different thing.

956
01:04:20,000 --> 01:04:21,000
It's a different thing.

957
01:04:21,000 --> 01:04:22,000
It's a different thing.

958
01:04:22,000 --> 01:04:23,000
It's a different thing.

959
01:04:23,000 --> 01:04:24,000
It's a different thing.

960
01:04:24,000 --> 01:04:25,000
It's a different thing.

961
01:04:25,000 --> 01:04:26,000
It's a different thing.

962
01:04:26,000 --> 01:04:27,000
It's a different thing.

963
01:04:27,000 --> 01:04:28,000
It's a different thing.

964
01:04:28,000 --> 01:04:29,000
It's a different thing.

965
01:04:29,000 --> 01:04:30,000
It's a different thing.

966
01:04:30,000 --> 01:04:31,000
It's a different thing.

967
01:04:31,000 --> 01:04:32,000
It's a different thing.

968
01:04:32,000 --> 01:04:33,000
It's a different thing.

969
01:04:33,000 --> 01:04:34,000
It's a different thing.

970
01:04:34,000 --> 01:04:35,000
It's a different thing.

971
01:04:35,000 --> 01:04:36,000
It's a different thing.

972
01:04:36,000 --> 01:04:37,000
It's a different thing.

973
01:04:37,000 --> 01:04:38,000
It's a different thing.

974
01:04:38,000 --> 01:04:39,000
It's a different thing.

975
01:04:39,000 --> 01:04:40,000
It's a different thing.

976
01:04:40,000 --> 01:04:41,000
It's a different thing.

977
01:04:41,000 --> 01:04:42,000
It's a different thing.

978
01:04:42,000 --> 01:04:43,000
It's a different thing.

979
01:04:43,000 --> 01:04:44,000
It's a different thing.

980
01:04:44,000 --> 01:04:45,000
It's a different thing.

981
01:04:45,000 --> 01:04:46,000
It's a different thing.

982
01:04:46,000 --> 01:04:47,000
It's a different thing.

983
01:04:47,000 --> 01:04:48,000
It's a different thing.

984
01:04:48,000 --> 01:04:49,000
It's a different thing.

985
01:04:49,000 --> 01:04:50,000
It's a different thing.

986
01:04:50,000 --> 01:04:51,000
It's a different thing.

987
01:04:51,000 --> 01:04:52,000
It's a different thing.

988
01:04:52,000 --> 01:04:53,000
It's a different thing.

989
01:04:53,000 --> 01:04:54,000
It's a different thing.

990
01:04:54,000 --> 01:04:55,000
It's a different thing.

991
01:04:56,000 --> 01:04:56,000

992
01:04:56,000 --> 01:04:57,000
It's a different thing.

993
01:04:57,000 --> 01:04:58,000
It's a different thing.

994
01:04:58,000 --> 01:04:59,000
It's a different thing.

995
01:04:59,000 --> 01:05:00,000
It's a different thing.

996
01:05:00,000 --> 01:05:01,000
It's a different thing.

997
01:05:01,000 --> 01:05:02,000
It's a different thing.

998
01:05:02,000 --> 01:05:03,000
It's a different thing.

999
01:05:03,000 --> 01:05:04,000
It's a different thing.

1000
01:05:04,000 --> 01:05:05,000
It's a different thing.

1001
01:05:05,000 --> 01:05:06,000
It's a different thing.

1002
01:05:06,000 --> 01:05:07,000
It's a different thing.

1003
01:05:07,000 --> 01:05:08,000
It's a different thing.

1004
01:05:08,000 --> 01:05:09,000
It's a different thing.

1005
01:05:09,000 --> 01:05:10,000
It's a different thing.

1006
01:05:10,000 --> 01:05:11,000
It's a different thing.

1007
01:05:11,000 --> 01:05:12,000
It's a different thing.

1008
01:05:12,000 --> 01:05:13,000
It's a different thing.

1009
01:05:13,000 --> 01:05:14,000
It's a different thing.

1010
01:05:14,000 --> 01:05:15,000
It's a different thing.

1011
01:05:15,000 --> 01:05:16,000
It's a different thing.

1012
01:05:16,000 --> 01:05:17,000
It's a different thing.

1013
01:05:17,000 --> 01:05:18,000
It's a different thing.

1014
01:05:18,000 --> 01:05:19,000
It's a different thing.

1015
01:05:19,000 --> 01:05:20,000
It's a different thing.

1016
01:05:20,000 --> 01:05:21,000
It's a different thing.

1017
01:05:21,000 --> 01:05:22,000
It's a different thing.

1018
01:05:22,000 --> 01:05:23,000
It's a different thing.

1019
01:05:23,000 --> 01:05:24,000
It's a different thing.

1020
01:05:24,000 --> 01:05:25,000
It's a different thing.

1021
01:05:25,000 --> 01:05:26,000
It's a different thing.

1022
01:05:26,000 --> 01:05:27,000
It's a different thing.

1023
01:05:27,000 --> 01:05:28,000
It's a different thing.

1024
01:05:28,000 --> 01:05:29,000
It's a different thing.

1025
01:05:29,000 --> 01:05:30,000
It's a different thing.

1026
01:05:30,000 --> 01:05:31,000
It's a different thing.

1027
01:05:31,000 --> 01:05:32,000
It's a different thing.

1028
01:05:32,000 --> 01:05:33,000
It's a different thing.

1029
01:05:33,000 --> 01:05:34,000
It's a different thing.

1030
01:05:34,000 --> 01:05:35,000
It's a different thing.

1031
01:05:35,000 --> 01:05:36,000
It's a different thing.

1032
01:05:36,000 --> 01:05:37,000
It's a different thing.

1033
01:05:37,000 --> 01:05:38,000
It's a different thing.

1034
01:05:38,000 --> 01:05:39,000
It's a different thing.

1035
01:05:39,000 --> 01:05:40,000
It's a different thing.

1036
01:05:40,000 --> 01:05:41,000
It's a different thing.

1037
01:05:41,000 --> 01:05:42,000
It's a different thing.

1038
01:05:42,000 --> 01:05:43,000
It's a different thing.

1039
01:05:43,000 --> 01:05:44,000
It's a different thing.

1040
01:05:44,000 --> 01:05:45,000
It's a different thing.

1041
01:05:45,000 --> 01:05:46,000
It's a different thing.

1042
01:05:46,000 --> 01:05:47,000
It's a different thing.

1043
01:05:47,000 --> 01:05:48,000
It's a different thing.

1044
01:05:48,000 --> 01:05:49,000
It's a different thing.

1045
01:05:49,000 --> 01:05:50,000
It's a different thing.

1046
01:05:50,000 --> 01:05:51,000
It's a different thing.

1047
01:05:51,000 --> 01:05:52,000
It's a different thing.

1048
01:05:52,000 --> 01:05:53,000
It's a different thing.

1049
01:05:53,000 --> 01:05:54,000
It's a different thing.

1050
01:05:54,000 --> 01:05:55,000
It's a different thing.

1051
01:05:55,000 --> 01:05:56,000
It's a different thing.

1052
01:05:56,000 --> 01:05:57,000
It's a different thing.

1053
01:05:57,000 --> 01:05:58,000
It's a different thing.

1054
01:05:58,000 --> 01:05:59,000
It's a different thing.

1055
01:05:59,000 --> 01:06:00,000
It's a different thing.

1056
01:06:00,000 --> 01:06:01,000
It's a different thing.

1057
01:06:01,000 --> 01:06:02,000
It's a different thing.

1058
01:06:02,000 --> 01:06:03,000
It's a different thing.

1059
01:06:03,000 --> 01:06:04,000
It's a different thing.

1060
01:06:04,000 --> 01:06:05,000
It's a different thing.

1061
01:06:05,000 --> 01:06:06,000
It's a different thing.

1062
01:06:06,000 --> 01:06:07,000
It's a different thing.

1063
01:06:07,000 --> 01:06:08,000
It's a different thing.

1064
01:06:08,000 --> 01:06:09,000
It's a different thing.

1065
01:06:09,000 --> 01:06:10,000
It's a different thing.

1066
01:06:10,000 --> 01:06:11,000
It's a different thing.

1067
01:06:11,000 --> 01:06:12,000
It's a different thing.

1068
01:06:12,000 --> 01:06:13,000
It's a different thing.

1069
01:06:13,000 --> 01:06:14,000
It's a different thing.

1070
01:06:14,000 --> 01:06:15,000
It's a different thing.

1071
01:06:15,000 --> 01:06:16,000
It's a different thing.

1072
01:06:16,000 --> 01:06:17,000
It's a different thing.

1073
01:06:17,000 --> 01:06:18,000
It's a different thing.

1074
01:06:18,000 --> 01:06:19,000
It's a different thing.

1075
01:06:19,000 --> 01:06:20,000
It's a different thing.

1076
01:06:20,000 --> 01:06:21,000
It's a different thing.

1077
01:06:21,000 --> 01:06:22,000
It's a different thing.

1078
01:06:22,000 --> 01:06:23,000
It's a different thing.

1079
01:06:23,000 --> 01:06:24,000
It's a different thing.

1080
01:06:24,000 --> 01:06:25,000
It's a different thing.

1081
01:06:25,000 --> 01:06:26,000
It's a different thing.

1082
01:06:26,000 --> 01:06:27,000
It's a different thing.

1083
01:06:27,000 --> 01:06:28,000
It's a different thing.

1084
01:06:28,000 --> 01:06:29,000
It's a different thing.

1085
01:06:29,000 --> 01:06:30,000
It's a different thing.

1086
01:06:30,000 --> 01:06:31,000
It's a different thing.

1087
01:06:31,000 --> 01:06:32,000
It's a different thing.

1088
01:06:32,000 --> 01:06:33,000
It's a different thing.

1089
01:06:33,000 --> 01:06:34,000
It's a different thing.

1090
01:06:34,000 --> 01:06:35,000
It's a different thing.

1091
01:06:35,000 --> 01:06:36,000
It's a different thing.

1092
01:06:36,000 --> 01:06:37,000
It's a different thing.

1093
01:06:37,000 --> 01:06:38,000
It's a different thing.

1094
01:06:38,000 --> 01:06:39,000
It's a different thing.

1095
01:06:39,000 --> 01:06:40,000
It's a different thing.

1096
01:06:40,000 --> 01:06:41,000
It's a different thing.

1097
01:06:41,000 --> 01:06:42,000
It's a different thing.

1098
01:06:42,000 --> 01:06:43,000
It's a different thing.

1099
01:06:43,000 --> 01:06:44,000
It's a different thing.

1100
01:06:44,000 --> 01:06:45,000
It's a different thing.

1101
01:06:45,000 --> 01:06:46,000
It's a different thing.

1102
01:06:46,000 --> 01:06:47,000
It's a different thing.

1103
01:06:47,000 --> 01:06:48,000
It's a different thing.

1104
01:06:48,000 --> 01:06:49,000
It's a different thing.

1105
01:06:49,000 --> 01:06:50,000
It's a different thing.

1106
01:06:50,000 --> 01:06:51,000
It's a different thing.

1107
01:06:51,000 --> 01:06:52,000
It's a different thing.

1108
01:06:52,000 --> 01:06:53,000
It's a different thing.

1109
01:06:53,000 --> 01:06:54,000
It's a different thing.

1110
01:06:54,000 --> 01:06:55,000
It's a different thing.

1111
01:06:55,000 --> 01:06:56,000
It's a different thing.

1112
01:06:56,000 --> 01:06:57,000
It's a different thing.

1113
01:06:57,000 --> 01:06:58,000
It's a different thing.

1114
01:06:58,000 --> 01:06:59,000
It's a different thing.

1115
01:06:59,000 --> 01:07:00,000
It's a different thing.

1116
01:07:00,000 --> 01:07:01,000
It's a different thing.

1117
01:07:01,000 --> 01:07:02,000
It's a different thing.

1118
01:07:02,000 --> 01:07:03,000
It's a different thing.

1119
01:07:03,000 --> 01:07:04,000
It's a different thing.

1120
01:07:04,000 --> 01:07:05,000
It's a different thing.

1121
01:07:05,000 --> 01:07:06,000
It's a different thing.

1122
01:07:06,000 --> 01:07:07,000
It's a different thing.

1123
01:07:07,000 --> 01:07:08,000
It's a different thing.

1124
01:07:08,000 --> 01:07:09,000
It's a different thing.

1125
01:07:09,000 --> 01:07:10,000
It's a different thing.

1126
01:07:10,000 --> 01:07:11,000
It's a different thing.

1127
01:07:11,000 --> 01:07:12,000
It's a different thing.

1128
01:07:12,000 --> 01:07:13,000
It's a different thing.

1129
01:07:13,000 --> 01:07:14,000
It's a different thing.

1130
01:07:14,000 --> 01:07:15,000
It's a different thing.

1131
01:07:15,000 --> 01:07:16,000
It's a different thing.

1132
01:07:16,000 --> 01:07:17,000
It's a different thing.

1133
01:07:17,000 --> 01:07:18,000
It's a different thing.

1134
01:07:18,000 --> 01:07:19,000
It's a different thing.

1135
01:07:19,000 --> 01:07:20,000
It's a different thing.

1136
01:07:20,000 --> 01:07:21,000
It's a different thing.

1137
01:07:21,000 --> 01:07:22,000
It's a different thing.

1138
01:07:22,000 --> 01:07:23,000
It's a different thing.

1139
01:07:23,000 --> 01:07:24,000
It's a different thing.

1140
01:07:24,000 --> 01:07:25,000
It's a different thing.

1141
01:07:25,000 --> 01:07:26,000
It's a different thing.

1142
01:07:26,000 --> 01:07:27,000
It's a different thing.

1143
01:07:27,000 --> 01:07:28,000
It's a different thing.

1144
01:07:28,000 --> 01:07:29,000
It's a different thing.

1145
01:07:29,000 --> 01:07:30,000
It's a different thing.

1146
01:07:30,000 --> 01:07:31,000
It's a different thing.

1147
01:07:31,000 --> 01:07:31,000

1148
01:07:31,000 --> 01:07:32,000
It's a different thing.

1149
01:07:32,000 --> 01:07:33,000
It's a different thing.

1150
01:07:33,000 --> 01:07:34,000
It's a different thing.

1151
01:07:34,000 --> 01:07:35,000
It's a different thing.

1152
01:07:35,000 --> 01:07:36,000
It's a different thing.

1153
01:07:36,000 --> 01:07:37,000
It's a different thing.

1154
01:07:37,000 --> 01:07:38,000
It's a different thing.

1155
01:07:38,000 --> 01:07:39,000
It's a different thing.

1156
01:07:39,000 --> 01:07:40,000
It's a different thing.

1157
01:07:40,000 --> 01:07:41,000
It's a different thing.

1158
01:07:41,000 --> 01:07:42,000
It's a different thing.

1159
01:07:42,000 --> 01:07:43,000
It's a different thing.

1160
01:07:43,000 --> 01:07:44,000
It's a different thing.

1161
01:07:44,000 --> 01:07:45,000
It's a different thing.

1162
01:07:45,000 --> 01:07:46,000
It's a different thing.

1163
01:07:46,000 --> 01:07:47,000
It's a different thing.

1164
01:07:47,000 --> 01:07:48,000
It's a different thing.

1165
01:07:48,000 --> 01:07:49,000
It's a different thing.

1166
01:07:49,000 --> 01:07:50,000
It's a different thing.

1167
01:07:50,000 --> 01:07:51,000
It's a different thing.

1168
01:07:51,000 --> 01:07:52,000
It's a different thing.

1169
01:07:52,000 --> 01:07:53,000
It's a different thing.

1170
01:07:53,000 --> 01:07:54,000
It's a different thing.

1171
01:07:54,000 --> 01:07:55,000
It's a different thing.

1172
01:07:55,000 --> 01:07:56,000
It's a different thing.

1173
01:07:56,000 --> 01:07:57,000
It's a different thing.

1174
01:07:57,000 --> 01:07:58,000
It's a different thing.

1175
01:07:58,000 --> 01:07:59,000
It's a different thing.

1176
01:07:59,000 --> 01:08:00,000
It's a different thing.

1177
01:08:00,000 --> 01:08:01,000
It's a different thing.

1178
01:08:01,000 --> 01:08:02,000
It's a different thing.

1179
01:08:02,000 --> 01:08:03,000
It's a different thing.

1180
01:08:03,000 --> 01:08:04,000
It's a different thing.

1181
01:08:04,000 --> 01:08:05,000
It's a different thing.

1182
01:08:05,000 --> 01:08:06,000
It's a different thing.

1183
01:08:06,000 --> 01:08:07,000
It's a different thing.

1184
01:08:07,000 --> 01:08:08,000
It's a different thing.

1185
01:08:08,000 --> 01:08:09,000
It's a different thing.

1186
01:08:09,000 --> 01:08:10,000
It's a different thing.

1187
01:08:10,000 --> 01:08:11,000
It's a different thing.

1188
01:08:11,000 --> 01:08:12,000
It's a different thing.

1189
01:08:12,000 --> 01:08:13,000
It's a different thing.

1190
01:08:13,000 --> 01:08:14,000
It's a different thing.

1191
01:08:14,000 --> 01:08:15,000
It's a different thing.

1192
01:08:15,000 --> 01:08:16,000
It's a different thing.

1193
01:08:16,000 --> 01:08:17,000
It's a different thing.

1194
01:08:17,000 --> 01:08:18,000
It's a different thing.

1195
01:08:18,000 --> 01:08:19,000
It's a different thing.

1196
01:08:19,000 --> 01:08:20,000
It's a different thing.

1197
01:08:20,000 --> 01:08:21,000
It's a different thing.

1198
01:08:21,000 --> 01:08:22,000
It's a different thing.

1199
01:08:22,000 --> 01:08:23,000
It's a different thing.

1200
01:08:23,000 --> 01:08:24,000
It's a different thing.

1201
01:08:24,000 --> 01:08:25,000
It's a different thing.

1202
01:08:25,000 --> 01:08:26,000
It's a different thing.

1203
01:08:26,000 --> 01:08:27,000
It's a different thing.

1204
01:08:27,000 --> 01:08:28,000
It's a different thing.

1205
01:08:28,000 --> 01:08:29,000
It's a different thing.

1206
01:08:29,000 --> 01:08:30,000
It's a different thing.

1207
01:08:30,000 --> 01:08:31,000
It's a different thing.

1208
01:08:31,000 --> 01:08:32,000
It's a different thing.

1209
01:08:32,000 --> 01:08:33,000
It's a different thing.

1210
01:08:33,000 --> 01:08:34,000
It's a different thing.

1211
01:08:34,000 --> 01:08:35,000
It's a different thing.

1212
01:08:35,000 --> 01:08:36,000
It's a different thing.

1213
01:08:36,000 --> 01:08:37,000
It's a different thing.

1214
01:08:37,000 --> 01:08:38,000
It's a different thing.

1215
01:08:38,000 --> 01:08:39,000
It's a different thing.

1216
01:08:39,000 --> 01:08:40,000
It's a different thing.

1217
01:08:40,000 --> 01:08:41,000
It's a different thing.

1218
01:08:41,000 --> 01:08:42,000
It's a different thing.

1219
01:08:42,000 --> 01:08:43,000
It's a different thing.

1220
01:08:43,000 --> 01:08:44,000
It's a different thing.

1221
01:08:44,000 --> 01:08:45,000
It's a different thing.

1222
01:08:45,000 --> 01:08:46,000
It's a different thing.

1223
01:08:46,000 --> 01:08:47,000
It's a different thing.

1224
01:08:47,000 --> 01:08:48,000
It's a different thing.

1225
01:08:48,000 --> 01:08:49,000
It's a different thing.

1226
01:08:49,000 --> 01:08:50,000
It's a different thing.

1227
01:08:50,000 --> 01:08:51,000
It's a different thing.

1228
01:08:51,000 --> 01:08:52,000
It's a different thing.

1229
01:08:52,000 --> 01:08:53,000
It's a different thing.

1230
01:08:53,000 --> 01:08:54,000
It's a different thing.

1231
01:08:54,000 --> 01:08:55,000
It's a different thing.

1232
01:08:55,000 --> 01:08:56,000
It's a different thing.

1233
01:08:56,000 --> 01:08:57,000
It's a different thing.

1234
01:08:57,000 --> 01:08:58,000
It's a different thing.

1235
01:08:58,000 --> 01:08:59,000
It's a different thing.

1236
01:08:59,000 --> 01:09:00,000
It's a different thing.

1237
01:09:00,000 --> 01:09:01,000
It's a different thing.

1238
01:09:01,000 --> 01:09:02,000
It's a different thing.

1239
01:09:02,000 --> 01:09:03,000
It's a different thing.

1240
01:09:03,000 --> 01:09:04,000
It's a different thing.

1241
01:09:04,000 --> 01:09:05,000
It's a different thing.

1242
01:09:05,000 --> 01:09:06,000
It's a different thing.

1243
01:09:06,000 --> 01:09:07,000
It's a different thing.

1244
01:09:07,000 --> 01:09:08,000
It's a different thing.

1245
01:09:08,000 --> 01:09:09,000
It's a different thing.

1246
01:09:09,000 --> 01:09:10,000
It's a different thing.

1247
01:09:10,000 --> 01:09:11,000
It's a different thing.

1248
01:09:11,000 --> 01:09:12,000
It's a different thing.

1249
01:09:12,000 --> 01:09:13,000
It's a different thing.

1250
01:09:13,000 --> 01:09:14,000
It's a different thing.

1251
01:09:14,000 --> 01:09:15,000
It's a different thing.

1252
01:09:15,000 --> 01:09:16,000
It's a different thing.

1253
01:09:16,000 --> 01:09:17,000
It's a different thing.

1254
01:09:17,000 --> 01:09:18,000
It's a different thing.

1255
01:09:18,000 --> 01:09:19,000
It's a different thing.

1256
01:09:19,000 --> 01:09:20,000
It's a different thing.

1257
01:09:20,000 --> 01:09:21,000
It's a different thing.

1258
01:09:21,000 --> 01:09:22,000
It's a different thing.

1259
01:09:22,000 --> 01:09:23,000
It's a different thing.

1260
01:09:23,000 --> 01:09:24,000
It's a different thing.

1261
01:09:24,000 --> 01:09:25,000
It's a different thing.

1262
01:09:25,000 --> 01:09:26,000
It's a different thing.

1263
01:09:26,000 --> 01:09:27,000
It's a different thing.

1264
01:09:27,000 --> 01:09:28,000
It's a different thing.

1265
01:09:28,000 --> 01:09:29,000
It's a different thing.

1266
01:09:29,000 --> 01:09:30,000
It's a different thing.

1267
01:09:30,000 --> 01:09:31,000
It's a different thing.

1268
01:09:31,000 --> 01:09:32,000
It's a different thing.

1269
01:09:32,000 --> 01:09:33,000
It's a different thing.

1270
01:09:33,000 --> 01:09:34,000
It's a different thing.

1271
01:09:34,000 --> 01:09:35,000
It's a different thing.

1272
01:09:35,000 --> 01:09:36,000
It's a different thing.

1273
01:09:36,000 --> 01:09:37,000
It's a different thing.

1274
01:09:37,000 --> 01:09:38,000
It's a different thing.

1275
01:09:38,000 --> 01:09:39,000
It's a different thing.

1276
01:09:39,000 --> 01:09:40,000
It's a different thing.

1277
01:09:40,000 --> 01:09:41,000
It's a different thing.

1278
01:09:41,000 --> 01:09:42,000
It's a different thing.

1279
01:09:42,000 --> 01:09:43,000
It's a different thing.

1280
01:09:43,000 --> 01:09:44,000
It's a different thing.

1281
01:09:44,000 --> 01:09:45,000
It's a different thing.

1282
01:09:45,000 --> 01:09:46,000
It's a different thing.

1283
01:09:46,000 --> 01:09:47,000
It's a different thing.

1284
01:09:47,000 --> 01:09:48,000
It's a different thing.

1285
01:09:48,000 --> 01:09:49,000
It's a different thing.

1286
01:09:49,000 --> 01:09:50,000
It's a different thing.

1287
01:09:50,000 --> 01:09:51,000
It's a different thing.

1288
01:09:51,000 --> 01:09:52,000
It's a different thing.

1289
01:09:52,000 --> 01:09:53,000
It's a different thing.

1290
01:09:53,000 --> 01:09:54,000
It's a different thing.

1291
01:09:54,000 --> 01:09:55,000
It's a different thing.

1292
01:09:55,000 --> 01:09:56,000
It's a different thing.

1293
01:09:56,000 --> 01:09:57,000
It's a different thing.

1294
01:09:57,000 --> 01:09:58,000
It's a different thing.

1295
01:09:58,000 --> 01:09:59,000
It's a different thing.

1296
01:09:59,000 --> 01:10:00,000
It's a different thing.

1297
01:10:00,000 --> 01:10:01,000
It's a different thing.

1298
01:10:01,000 --> 01:10:02,000
It's a different thing.

1299
01:10:02,000 --> 01:10:03,000
It's a different thing.

1300
01:10:03,000 --> 01:10:04,000
It's a different thing.

1301
01:10:04,000 --> 01:10:05,000
It's a different thing.

1302
01:10:05,000 --> 01:10:06,000
It's a different thing.

1303
01:10:06,000 --> 01:10:07,000
It's a different thing.

1304
01:10:07,000 --> 01:10:08,000
It's a different thing.

1305
01:10:08,000 --> 01:10:09,000
It's a different thing.

1306
01:10:09,000 --> 01:10:10,000
It's a different thing.

1307
01:10:10,000 --> 01:10:11,000
It's a different thing.

1308
01:10:11,000 --> 01:10:12,000
It's a different thing.

1309
01:10:12,000 --> 01:10:13,000
It's a different thing.

1310
01:10:13,000 --> 01:10:14,000
It's a different thing.

1311
01:10:14,000 --> 01:10:15,000
It's a different thing.

1312
01:10:15,000 --> 01:10:16,000
It's a different thing.

1313
01:10:16,000 --> 01:10:17,000
It's a different thing.

1314
01:10:17,000 --> 01:10:18,000
It's a different thing.

1315
01:10:18,000 --> 01:10:19,000
It's a different thing.

1316
01:10:19,000 --> 01:10:20,000
It's a different thing.

1317
01:10:20,000 --> 01:10:21,000
It's a different thing.

1318
01:10:21,000 --> 01:10:22,000
It's a different thing.

1319
01:10:22,000 --> 01:10:24,000
It's a different thing.

1320
01:10:24,000 --> 01:10:25,000
It's a different thing.

1321
01:10:25,000 --> 01:10:26,000
It's a different thing.

1322
01:10:26,000 --> 01:10:27,000
It's a different thing.

1323
01:10:27,000 --> 01:10:28,000
It's a different thing.

1324
01:10:28,000 --> 01:10:29,000
It's a different thing.

1325
01:10:29,000 --> 01:10:30,000
It's a different thing.

1326
01:10:30,000 --> 01:10:31,000
It's a different thing.

1327
01:10:31,000 --> 01:10:32,000
It's a different thing.

1328
01:10:32,000 --> 01:10:33,000
It's a different thing.

1329
01:10:33,000 --> 01:10:34,000
It's a different thing.

1330
01:10:34,000 --> 01:10:35,000
It's a different thing.

1331
01:10:35,000 --> 01:10:36,000
It's a different thing.

1332
01:10:36,000 --> 01:10:37,000
It's a different thing.

1333
01:10:37,000 --> 01:10:38,000
It's a different thing.

1334
01:10:38,000 --> 01:10:39,000
It's a different thing.

1335
01:10:39,000 --> 01:10:40,000
It's a different thing.

1336
01:10:40,000 --> 01:10:41,000
It's a different thing.

1337
01:10:41,000 --> 01:10:42,000
It's a different thing.

1338
01:10:42,000 --> 01:10:43,000
It's a different thing.

1339
01:10:43,000 --> 01:10:44,000
It's a different thing.

1340
01:10:44,000 --> 01:10:45,000
It's a different thing.

1341
01:10:45,000 --> 01:10:46,000
It's a different thing.